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ABSTRACT
The Regionalization of Emergency Medical Services: A Strategy for Planning
and Intervention
Shelley F. Bernstein
E. Michael Paul Thomas
Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning on May 23, 1975,
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degreesof Bachelor of
Science in the Department of Urban Studies and Planning and Master of City
Planning.
In response to increasing interest and concern about the quality of
emergency medical services (EMS) among members of the medical community
and the public at large, the Emergency Medical Services Systems Act of 1973
was passed overwhelmingly in Congress and enacted into law. The Act seeks
to establish "EMS systems" on the substate regional level throughout the
country. Although a body of literature exists that examines the regionali-
zation of governmental functions from a normative perspective, little is
known about the regional provision of such private sector functions as hos-
pital emergency services. Moreover, the dynamic processes of implementing
the regionalization of locally provided services has received only perfunc-
tory attention, despite the likelihood of political and institutional reluc-
tance to cooperate on a regional level. Finally, the creation of EMS sys-
tems requires the incorporation of service components from public sector,
private sector, health and municipal institutions into an integrated regional
service system. This study constitutes an exploratory effort at assessing
the appropriateness of regional provision of EMS, identifying the critical
aspects of implementing the regional scale of service, and understanding
the process of creating a service system with components based in established
institutional settings.
In the context of the largely uncharted policy of the EMSS Act, this
study examines the translation of the concept of regional systems into an
attempt to actualize this form of EMS provision in an eight town area on
the North Shore of Massachusetts. In the course of performing this case
study, information was gathered from the files of the regional health plan-
ning agency on the North Shore, from an extensive set of interviews with
involved parties in all aspects of EMS planning, provision, and decision-
making, and from involvement in a critical series of meetings at which the
institutional concerns of EMS providers were revealed in confrontation with
the prospect of implementing a regional ambulance system. Throughout the
research, the effects of present EMS provision within broader based insti-
tutions were encountered and analyzed. Particular emphasis was placed on
investigation of the cost structure of service provision, the role which
EMS played in furthering the goals of the institutions in which it was
provided, and the values and incentive structures inherent to the diverse
components of service. In these investigations, the critical issue at
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stake was the response of the institution to policy changes motivated by
the quality and efficiency concerns of the EMSS Act initiatives.
In the particular events of the case study, the potential of regional
EMS systems to effect improvements in the quality and efficiency of service
was demonstrated by the outcomes of the planning process. The implementa-
tion of a hospital-centered system, integrated with a regional ambulance
service by means of a sophisticated radio communications network, presented
the opportunity to reduce the cost of emergency service while enhancing
the appropriateness of the medical treatment afforded to critically ill
and injured patients.
The case study also pinpoints the institutional characteristics that
mitigated against and prevailed over the aspects of the regional system
that threatened their concerns. The capability of individual institutions
to totally thwart the implementation of the EMS regional plan leads to the
conclusion that creation of regional service systems through a process
which relies on consensus among its participants is in fundamental conflict
with the institutional nature of EMS.
Finally, individual institutional decisionmaking was observed to
result in a distribution of resources substantially at odds with the norma-
tive goals of quality and efficiency in service provision. This suggested
the establishment of a regional policy-setting mechanism for EMS and, by
implication, for the entire health care system. The appropriate means of
investing authority in this regional mechanism is left as an open question
whose answer rests in the examination of the role of the federal government
in regulating and legislating for health care provision.
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CHAPTER ONE
THE EVOLUTION OF FEDERAL EMS POLICY
The field of emergency medical services has experienced a sharp up-
surge in interest and involvement in the past ten years. Medical pro-
fessional associations, national feature magazines, the news media, fed-
eral agencies, Congress and two Presidents have joined in efforts to upgard
emergency care, which has been called one of the most neglected areas in
health delivery. Since 1972, these efforts intensified at the federal
level along with the announcement of a major Presidential Initiative and
Congressional consideration of comprehensive legislation in the field.
These activities culminated in the enactment of the Emergency Medical Ser-
vices Systems Act of 1973, a landmark bill that currently serves as the
driving force in efforts to improve emergency health care in the United
States. The Act, and the extensive activities that it has generated in
the field of emergency medical services, is designed to implement sophis-
ticated service systems at the substate regional level throughout the coun-
try. This federal direction, and the concept of comprehensive regional
systems which it seeks to implement, represents a significant milestone in
efforts to upgrade emergency medical services. In the chapter that follows,
we examine the historical origins of this concept and its implications for
policy implementation on the state and local levels.
Emergency Medical Services in the United States
The provision of emergency medical services (EMS) is an important and
growing component of the overall health care delivery system in this country.
As demonstrated by the statistics that follow (compiled by the National
Academy of Sciences-National Research Council), EMS can provide life-saving
services to a substantial proportion of the population.
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Accidental injury and acute illness generate a staggering
demand on ambulance and rescue services, allied health
personnel, physicians, and hospitals for the delivery of
emergency medical services. Accidental injury is the
leading cause.of death among all persons aged 1 to 38.
Each year more than 52 million U.S. citizens are injured,
of whom more than 110,000 die, 11 million require bed care
for a day or more, and 400,000 suffer lasting disability
at a cost of nearly $3 billion in medical fees and hospital
expenses and over $7 billion in lost wages. Those re-
quiring hospitalization occupy an average of 65,000 beds
for 22 million bed-days under the care of 88,000 hospital
personnel. This hospital load is equivalent to 130 500-
bed hospitals. Of the more than 700,000 deaths from
heart disease each year, the majority are due to acute
myocardial infarction and more than half of these deaths
occur before reaching a hospital. Approximately 40
million persons seek care each year in hospital emergency
departments as a result of accidents, heart disease,
stroke, poisoning, diabetic coma, convulsive disorders,
and many other illnesses. 1
Since the 1950's, many important techniques have been developed that have
vastly increased the life-saving potential of emergency care, both on the
scene of a life-threatening emergency and in the hospital provision of
definitive care. However, the discrepancy between medical life-saving
capabilities in EMS and their application in an emergency situation is vast.
It has been estimated that more than 25 percent of the 800,000 deaths
annually from heart attacks, accidental injuries and other emergency con-
ditions could have been averted had the proper emergency care been pro-
vided to the victims. 2
In the same report, the Academy pointed out that emergency services
are among the most neglected aspects of health care. Prior to 1966, there
had been no federal activity and only one nation-wide health organization
that had made concerted effort in the EMS field. In 1966, the first federal
EMS activity was initiated with the passage of the National Highway Safety
Act. By 1973, EMS activities were included in more than one hundred federal
programs, including the EMSS Act of 1973. The Act began a massive funding
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initiative designed to establish a unified EMS policy to coordinate federal
efforts in the creation of EMS systems throughout the country.
The EMSS Act represents both a dramatic change in the role of the
federal government in EMS and an emphatic recognition of the emergence of a
new normative conception of the structure of EMS provision. The Act,
which is the largest federal effort in the history of EMS programs, pro-
vided $185 million for the implementation of these new directions. It
is intended to remedy the deficiencies in EMS that were either ignored or
fostered by the preceding federal initiatives -- by establishing new EMS
service systems on a substate regional level, with greatly upgraded tech-
nology and resources. The programs of the Act reflect a response to three.
observations about the state of EMS delivery in the United States -- an
unacceptably low level of EMS resources in contrast with a well-developed
technological capability, a consistent failure of previous federal efforts
to deal with EMS problems appropriately, and the desirability of a new
"systems approach" to EMS provision that emerged out of widely expanded
medical and planning interests in the field. These perceptions provide the
justification for the programs that the Act initiated. But in order to
evaluate its policies properly, it is necessary to understand the origins
of its rationale in the evolution of concern for EMS.
The Origins of Concern for EMS
In 1966, the first widespread worry about the provision of EMS was
raised when the NAS-NRC published a report entitled "Accidental Death and
Disability: The Neglected Disease of Modern Society".3 This report re-
ceived a vast amount of public exposure, and has been credited as a primary
motivation for federal activities in EMS in the nine years since its publica-
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tion.4 The report asserted that, although accidental death. was a major
health care problem, only one nationally organized effort existed for EMS
activities, no federal program had attempted to upgrade emergency depart-
ments or ambulance services, and vast numbers of people were dying or
suffering permanent disability as a result of this lack of attention.
The activities motivated by this report in 1966 set the tone for all
efforts to improve EMS over the six years that followed its publication and
were considered in the formulation of the EMSS Act. The document, the maga-
zine articles, and programs that followed treated EMS as though it had
two separable components -- the transportation services and the emergency
departments of hospitals -- each with its own set of deficiencies. Follow-
ing the report, federal efforts tended to focus solely on transportation,
while efforts within the medical field tended to be based on the emergency
department. This separation was further reflected in the development of
the EMSS Act when Congress looked to the past federal efforts as sources
of the EMS problems and consulted the medical professions for solutions to
these problems. The programmatic separation between the transportation and
hospital components of EMS continued almost until the passage of the EMSS
Act. In the period in which this separation predominated, many of the
problems that the 93rd Congress identified in federal EMS efforts were
allowed to develop.
Federal Efforts in EMS: The Programs and Their Problems
Of the two primary components, emergency transportation activities
were most visible to the public and generated the bulk of public concern
for EMS. 5 In response to this public concern, most of the federal efforts
prior to 1972 focused on the development of improved emergency ambulance
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capabilities. The most significant federal program in this field, and one
that typifies the approaches and problems of federal EMS efforts, was
operated by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration in the
Department of Transportation. The Highway Safety Act of 1966 directed this
Administration to undertake an extensive program in highway and traffic
safety that included the provision of emergency transportation to accident
victims. The passage of the Highway Safety Act was the first Congressional
activity in EMS, and the DOT program established by the Act was the largest
federal EMS program until the EMSS Act.
The DOT program combined grants-in-aid, design standards, and technolo-
gical transfer in its efforts to develop the transportation component of
EMS. Over the six years of the program, $50 million was granted to states
and localities for the purchase of ambulances and communications equipment.
To supplement its direct support program, the Act mandated extensive stan-
dards for vehicle design, minimum equipment requirements, attendant train-
ing recommendations, and training program curricula for personnel in the
emergency transportation field. Finally, through its grants for ambulances
and other emergency vehicles, the DOT program oversaw the incorporation of
technological advances, such as the life-saving techniques developed for
battlefield EMS in Vietnam, into the local provision of emergency trans-
6
portation services. This investnent increased the technological potential
for vehicles at the local level and, with the DOT standards, fostered an
awareness of the personnel and equipment required for the provision of so-
phisticated emergency medical care to highway accident victims.
The DOT efforts in emergency transportation were typical in three ways
of the other federal programs that followed. First, DOT saw the role of
ambulances on the most immediate level as a part of the highway safety system,
and more generally as a part of the total transportation system in its
purview. Its efforts attempted to involve the ambulance program more closely
with its other initiatives in the area of highway safety. An indirect re-
sult was that local highway safety agencies (e.g. the police) were en-
couraged to involve themselves in ambulance service as part of the local
efforts to develop total highway safety systems.
The second typical characteristic of the DOT program was its failure to
enforce standards in funding local emergency transportation services. The
DOT program was authorized to withold ten percent of authorized federal
highway funds from those states which did not meet the extensive standards of
the Highway Safety Act program, including specifications for emergency am-
bulance services. This prerogative, however, had not been exercised prior
to 1972. Moreover, in 1972, Congressional hearings on EMS disclosed that
the program had failed, in some instances, to elicit the required matching
funds from a number of the states who still continued to receive full com-
plements of Highway Safety and federal highway funds.7
Finally, the DOT Highway Safety Program was characteristic of other
federal efforts where states received and disbursed emergency transportation
funds without a substantive plan for their use. One of the provisions of
the ambulance standards required the drafting and approval of a state-wide
plan for the development of an emergency ambulance system.8 However, by
1972 only eight states possessed an "approved plan", and only fourteen
9
state plans had been drafted. This lack of planning at the state level
denied the DOT program much of its potential to accomplish concerted improve-
ments in the transportation component of EMS. The resulting shortcomings
in state ambulance services constituted one of the problems identified by
EMSS Act advocates as a characteristic deficiency of past federal efforts
in EMS.
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An Assessment of Federal EMS Activities: The Problems Ignored and Created
The DOT program, the largest of the many federal funding efforts in
EMS that preceded the EMSS Act, created problems which had the most substan-
tial impact on the structure of EMS transportation systems and on Congress's
assessment of federal EMS efforts. One characteristic common to most of
the federal programs was that they failed to stimulate state-level leader-
ship for local EMS activities. The DOT program recommended the establish-
ment of a coordinating agency within the state health departments, but with
few exceptions these agencies were mainly responsible for collecting and
disseminating information concerning the availability of funds from federal
sources and exercised little policy-making preroqativE or influence over
the structure of local services. 10
The lack of leadership at both the federal and state levels coupled
with the piecemeal availability of funds, fostered the development of a
fragmented and highly parochial local EMS system. Despite the seven years of
federal initiatives in EMS, Congressional hearings or the Act expressed con-
cerns that serious gaps and disparities existed in the local provision of
services and, moreover, that the quality of EMS was severely eroded by the
structure of local service provision.
Congress believed the roots of these deficiencies were reinforced by
the federal programs which had supported them. First, the funding criteria
for federal assistance had promoted the identification of the ambulance
function as an element of many systems other than EMS, working against the
formation of unified EMS systems on the local level. While the DOT program
saw ambulances as part of the transportation system, three other sources for
ambulance funds identified by DHEW in 1969 similarly tied funding of ambu-
lances to other system-related criteria. In particular, in order to receive
-13-
Hill-Burton Public Health Service funds, the ambulance and equipment had to
be considered "necessary items of equipment for a hospital-based and operated
ambulance service". The Civil Defense service provided funds "where ambu-
lance and rescue services are a part of the local Civil Defense system", and
the Small Business Administration offered loans to ambulance services oper-
ated on a "profit-making basis". 12
This variety of funding mechanisms also contributed to the second struc-
tural fault identified by Congress -- a tendency towards parochialism in
the provision of services that received federal assistance. Because of the
piecemeal funding operations that depended on local initiatives for action,
gaps in service existed where the initiative (and state leadership) was
lacking. Furthermore the localities tended to view the services that did
exist as restricted territorially by municipal boundaries. This produced
incidents that resembled border disputes over patient transport, some of
which were recounted in the EMSS Act hearings.13
The Need for Change in the Federal Role in EMS
The Congressional assessment of federal EMS activities, represented by
the passage of the EMSS Act, acknowledged the failure of these past efforts
to upgrade local EMS provision to an acceptable degree. In the legislative
hearings for the Act, the numerous federal programs were criticized for the
peripheral role that was afforded EMS, both in the lack of a federal EMS
policy and in the low levels of resources that were devoted to EMS by pro-
l'agrams with other primary concerns. There was no identifiable funding pro-
gram whose sole responsibility was EMS, so that no unified federal policy
existed. The Act was developed to rectify these two deficiencies. It
sought to alter the nature of federal EMS activities from the present pro-
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file of many conflicting and confusing independent activities to one in
which a unified and concentrated federal effort was presented.
In its adoption of a unified federal program, the Act had taken a
significant step in altering the federal EMS role. It went one step further,
however, in specifying that the new federal program would fund the creation
of regional EMS systems throughout the country. This step marked the first
federal attempt to implement a particular normative conceptualization of the
organization of EMS at the local level. Furthermore, the Act's normative
model of EMS differed significantly from past federal initiatives in that
it was centered around the organization of hospital emergency care capabili-
ties and the parallel incorporation of prehospital EMS components into
regional systems. With this approach, the Act had shifted the focus of
federal efforts from the supplementation of the transportation component to
the development of EMS systems with health facilities as their foundation.
This shift has its roots in several important developments within the health
profession. In order to assess the appropriateness of the Act's program and
the new normative approach it seeks to implement, the development of the EMS
systems concept must be traced from its institutional origins within the
health care system.
Origins of the EMS Systems Concept
The EMS systems model of the EMSS Act emerged as the product of re-
sponses to changes in the patterns of hospital emergency care provision.
These changes -- a drastic increase in the use of emergency facilities and
accompanying increase in their public relations role -- gave rise to serious
institutional pressures within the hospital component of EMS which contributed
to the development of a professional consciousness among providers of emer-
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gency medicine. The attention and efforts that were generated by this con-
sciousness eventually resulted in the formulation of the concepts that the
EMSS Act incorporated. The factors that contributed to the concept then, are
the changing patterns of emergency department usage, the rise of emergency
medicine as a specialization in the health field, and the exercise of the
increased EMS professional consciousness in the development of policy for
the hospital component of EMS.
Changing Patterns of Emergency Department Utilization
The first, and most pervasive, source of stress on the hospital com-
ponent of EMS was the result of changing patterns in the use of hospital
emergency facilities. By 1966, the emergency departments in all hospitals
were becoming one of the main sources of primary health care for the commu-
nity, in addition to their original responsibilities as providers of defi-
15
nitive emergency care. This was the result of a tremendous increase in
16
patient visits to the emergency rooms, 312 percent since 1954, and caused
a serious overutilization of hospital facilities that was growing at an esti-
mated annual rate of ten percent.17  In the emergency department a substan-
tial proportion of the increase was due to a huge influx of patients whose
18
conditions were not classifiable as emergent, but were using the hospital
as a source of their routine health care needs.
The second source of stress on the hospitals was produced by the in-
creased effect of the emergency department on the hospitals' patient load,
which strongly shaped the hospitals' relationship to the communities they
served. The care provided in the emergency departments had become a large
factor in the patients' view of the hospital, a trend that hospitals were
quick to notice. This prominence of the emergency department added to the
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prestige and resource levels that emergency care could command within the
hospitals and, as a growing specialization, in the medical profession at
large.
The Rise of the Emergency Medical Specialization
One of the most important outcomes of these two pressures was that
emergency care became one of the fastest growing specializations during the
early 1970's. The publicity that arose from "Accidental Death and Disability"
also contributed to the growth of the emergency specialization by adding
considerable prestige and public esteem to the hospital component of EMS. 20
This trend was manifested in the formation of numerous emergency medical
professional organizations since 1966, among them the University Association
for Emergency Medical Services, The American Trauma Society, the Emergency
Department Nurses Association, the Society of Critical Care Medicine and the
American College of Emergency Physicians. These groups quickly became power-
ful influences in shaping policy for emergency care provision, largely be-
cause of the lack of established leadership in the EMS area.
Policy for the Hospital Component of EMS
The primary policy problem faced. by the emergency medicine advocates
was the difficulty of maintaining an appropriate match between the emergency
department capabilities and the changing patient demands placed upon the
facilities. It was necessary to determine the extent to which resources
were to be allocated to meet the demand for non-emergent service, and to what
extent resources were to be diverted from the emergency functions of the de-
partment. It became increasingly clear that the facilities were caught be-
tween the need to maintain both non-emergent and emergent care capabilities
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at publicly acceptable levels and the limited resources available to do so.
The concept that emerged as the theoretical response to this conflict21
was the categorization of hospital facilities based on their capability to
provide service to the emergency patient in their emergency departments.
It arose from the efforts of the emergency medical groups to maintain high
standards of emergency care in the face of competition for resources from
non-emergent patient loads. Under this concept, definitive emergency care
was viewed as a function not strictly limited to the institutional confines
of an individual hospital which might no longer be capable of affording ser-
vices for all of its emergency patients. With this development, emergency
care took on the potential sophistication of specialized facilities for
different types of patient diagnoses. To operationalize this breakthrough,
the various professional groups issued a host of standards and recommenda-
tions specifying criteria and requirements for different categorization
schemes, motivating a movement to implement the categorization concept.22
The Incorporation of Prehospital Service into the EMS System Model
The next component of the EMSS Act's normative model -- interfacing
prehospital intake procedures with rationalized emergency departments --
was also motivated by these professional groups as an extension of categori-
zation. The potential specialization of hospital capabilities required an
accompanying increase in the sophistication of prehospital EMS so the hospi-
tal capabilities could be used appropriately. Thus, it became a concern of
the emergency professionals to seek an upgraded prehospital component, both
to alleviate prehospital mistreatment (of which there had been ample evidence)23
and to extend the system of EMS from the hospital emergency departments to
the scene of an emergency incident.
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By 1972, this approach to EMS systems, sketched out by several plan-
ning and professional efforts, 24 enabled a more rational assessment of the
deficiencies of present emergency medical services. The consensus that
was reached about the solutions to the deficiencies in EMS included three
main concepts. First, prehospital care was inadequate and needed to be
identified with the EMS system as a unified segment. Second, the hospital
care capabilities must be organized and extended into the prehospital as-
pects of EMS. Finally, due to the various federal programs and research
efforts, the technology existed to support this new concept of unification
of prehospital and hospital components of EMS.
Translation of the Systems Concept into Federal Policy
The process of translating the concept of EMS systems into federal
policy began in 1972, when federal EMS activity intnsified in parallel with
the announcement of an EMS Initiative at the Executive level of government.
That year, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare funded five major
EMS demonstration projects and sixty-five state and local EMS planning
efforts as part of the Initiative. The final component of the Initiative was
the establishment of a new Division of Emergency Health Care within HEW to
coordinate and serve as a clearinghouse for federal activities in EMS. The
HEW demonstration projects, the first federal attempt to combine all the
components of EMS represented federal acceptance of the EMS idealization that
had developed since the "Accidental Death and Disability" publication.
There was an element of political machination in this initiative, however, in
that the administration was attempting to curtail further categorical grants
in health programs, so this initiative was proposed as an alternative to
several pieces of legislation pending in Congress to establish categorical
-19-
programs for EMS grants to localities.
In 1972, the beginning step of Congressional acceptance of the systems
concept was manifested in the first Congressional EMS activity since the
passage of the Highway Safety Act. That year, both Houses considered and
passed versions of legislation to fund the establishment of EMS systems
throughout the nation. This legislative effort was rewarded a year later
when the EMS Systems Act of 1973 was passed, representing the culmination
of seven years of concern that began with the publication of Accidental
Death in 1966. The EMSS Act of 1973 adopted and extended the conceptualiza-
tion represented in the demonstration projects of the previous year thus
placing in legislated form the idealization of EMS systems that had emerged
among the emergency specialists.
The EMSS Act of 1973: A Unified Federal Program to Create EMS Systems
The EMSS Act, in response to the influences and problems of past federal
programs and to conceptual developments in the medical profession, under-
took two major tasks -- the coordination of all federal EMS efforts into a
newly unified and effective mechanism for policy execution, and the exploita-
tion of these federal efforts in the establishment of EMS systems throughout
the country. The Act includes $185 million over three years to assist local
services in the creation of EMS systems. It recognizes the diversity of
existing services in allowing for planning, implementation and expansion
grants to potential or existing systems, dependent on their current stage of
development.
The language of the Act, however, indicates a very precise notion of
the nature of the EMS systems that will be funded. The Act parallels the
conceptual development of EMS systems in identifying the hospital emergency
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facilitjes as the system's foundation and organizing prehospital components
as essential elements of the system. This concept was articulated in great
detail by the Act's definition of fifteen components that collectively com-
prise an EMS system. In the language of the Act,
An emergency medical services system shall - (i)
include an adequate number of health professions,
allied health professions, and other health per-
sonnel with appropriate training and experience;
(ii) provide for its personnel appropriate training
(including clinical training) and continuing educa-
tion programs which (I) are coordinated with other
programs in the system's service area which provide
similar training and education, and (II) emphasize
recruitment and necessary training of veterans of
the Armed Forces with military training and experience
in health care fields and of appropriate public
safety personnel in such area;
(iii) join the personnel, facilities, and equipment
of the system by a central communications system so
that requests for emergency health care services will
be handled by a comunications facility which (I)
utilizes emergency medical telephonic screening,(II) utilizes or, within such period as the Secretary
prescribes will utilize, the universal emergency tele-
phone number 911, and (III) will have direct communica-
tion connections and interconnections with the person-
nel, facilities, and equipment of the system and with
other appropriate emergency medical services systems;
(iv) include an adeuate number of necessary ground,
air, and water vehicles and other transportation
facilities to meet the individual characteristics of
the system's service area -
(I) which vehicles and facilities meet appropriate
standards relating to location, design, performance,
and equipment, and
(II) the operators and other personnel for which
vehicles and facilities meet appropriate training and
experience requirements;
(v) include an adequate number of easily accessible
emergency medical services facilities which are
collectively capable of providing services on a
continuous basis, which have appropriate nonduplica-
tive and categorized capabilities, which meet appro-
priate standards relating to capacity, location, per-
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sonnel, and equipment, and which are coordinated with
other health care facilities of the system;
(vi) provide access (including appropriate transporta-
tion) to specialized critical medical care units in the
system's service area, or, if there are no such units
or an inadequate number of them in such area, provide
access to such units in neighboring areas if access to
such units is feasible in terms of time and distance;
(vii) provide for the effective utilization of the
appropriate personnel, facilities, and equipment of
each public safety agency providing emergency services
in the system's service area;
(viii) be organized in a manner that provides persons
who reside in the system's service area and who have
no professional training or financial interest in the
provision of health care with an adequate opportunity
to participate in the making of policy for the system;
(ix) provide, without prior inquiry as to ability to pay,
necessary emergency medical services to all patients
requiring such services;
(x) provide for transfer of patients to facilities and
programs which offer such followup care and rehabilita-
tion as is necessary to effect the meximum recovery of
the patient;
(.xi) provide for a standardized patient recordkeeping
system meeting appropriate standards established by the
Secretary, which records shall cover the treatment of
the patient from initial entry into the system through
his discharge from it, and shall be consistent with en-
suing patient records used in followup care and re-
habilitation of the patient;
(xii) provide programs of public education and infor-
mation in the system's service area (taking into
account the needs of visitors to, as well as residents
of that area to know or be able to learn immediately
the means of obtaining emergency medical services)
which programs stress the general dissemination of in-
formation regarding appropriate methods of medical self-
help and first-aid and regarding the availability of
first-aid training programs in the area;
(xiii) provide for (I) periodic, comprehensive, and in-
dependent review and evaluation of the extent and qua-
lity of the emergency health care services provided in
the system's service area, and (II) submission to the
Secretary of the reports of each such review and evalu-
ation;
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(xiv) have a plan to assure that the system will be capable
of providing emergency medical services in the system's
service area during mass casualties, natural disasters,
or national emergencies; and
(xv) provide for the establishment of appropriate arrange-
ments with emergency medical services systems or similar
entities serving neighboring areas for the provision of
emergency medical services on a reciprocal basis where
access to such services would be more appropriate and
effective in terms of the services available, time, and
distance. 25
The EMS systems defined by these fifteen mandatory components, in-
dividually and collectively, differ from the present provision of EMS in
several important ways. First, this definition of an EMS system includes
many components which already exist and are customarily thought of as parts
of other systems (e.g. 911 telephone access to the system and patient re-
cord-keeping within the hospitals). In this type of component, the Act
is making EMS requirements that may substantially affect non-EMS systems.
Second, the Act seeks to insure that each component functions as a respon-
sive unit to the performance demands of EMS. The hospital facilities com-
ponent, for instance, must be collectively comprehensive and non-duplicative.
Finally, the components must be connected by a set of protocols that insures
appropriate treatment to patients from initial entry into the system through
the provision of followup care and rehabilitation. Moreover, each EMS
system must be successfully interfaced with other EMS and emergency service
systems in disasters and other unique situations.
The Act, thus, embodies two expansions of the present arrangement of
EMS. The Act seeks, first, to expand the hospital component to include all
facilities necessary to insure comprehensive care, thus defining the size of
the service area of the system in terms of the emergency care capabilities
it possesses. Within the service area of this expanded hospital component,
the fifteen components then expand the definition to include all aspects of
-23-
service (from the onset of symptoms in the patient to the provision of defin-
itive care in the appropriate facility) as being part of the system. In
adopting this definition of an EMS system, the Act accepted the burden of
bringing to fruition on a national scale, the concept of EMS provision
that previously existed only as a normative idealization, and what we have
seen of the history of EMS suggests that a vast number of problems will be
encountered.
Sources of Problems in the Creation of EMS Systems
In identifying potential problems faced by the EMSS Act programs, it
is only necessary to look at those problems the Act intended to address --
a lack of EMS resources, past failures of federal EMS programs and the ab-
sence of a systems approach in the provision of EMS. The Act hopes to
counter these problems by funding the establishment of EMS systems on a
regional level, through a unified federal approach. If the Act succeeds in
establishing these EMS systems, it will meet its objectives by creating foci
at the federal and local levels for the attainment and maintenance of the
full life-saving potentials of EMS.
Two major conceptual. elements of the EMS system idealization appear to
face major roadblocks in their implementation. The system idealization is
based on the concepts of categorization of hospital emergency capabilities
and linking prehospital components with this categorized system of facilities.
The Act seeks to have these linkages -- among hospitals, and between the
hospital and prehospital components -- established voluntarily as the pro-
duct of a planning process. As such it envisions a process of system self-
definition, where the components of the system congeal and identify themselves
as a system and then proceed to operationalize this identity as an EMS system.
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We have seen that previous voluntary federal EMS efforts, without strict
enforcement of standards or legislative guidance on the state and local
levels have resulted in fragmentation rather than coordination. The iden-
tity that emerged was a parochial one absorbed into systems other than EMS.
This observation reveals a precedent of failure in the self-definition pro-
cess of the EMSS Act program.
There are, however, three major differences between the EMSS Act program
and the federal EMS efforts that preceded it. First, because it is an EMS
program, the local efforts that it generated would identify with the EMS
system, as compared with previous federal efforts that fostered identifica-
tion with the transportation or other systems that sponsored EMS activities.
Second, the EMSS Act program integrates a planning process with the implemen-
tation process -- a combination that has yet to be attempted in federal EMS
efforts and may contribute to its success. And, finally, it is designed to
establish regional EMS systems, with the corresponding regional self-defini-
tional and planning processes. In order to evaluate the EMSS program, it is
necessary to weigh these three differences, unprecedented in previous
federal EMS efforts, against the failings of these previous programs.
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CHAPTER TWO
REGIONALIZATION
In response to the EMSS Act of 1973, federal EMS policymakers are
actively advocating regionalization as a means to rationalize emergency
medical services. The federal commitment to promote regional EMS systems
is reflected in the funding regulations of the Act. The regulations
require large geographical areas, defined around hospital care capabilities,
to address the fifteen mandatory components of a comprehensive EMS system.
As constituted in the mandatory components of the EMSS Act, regional
EMS systems require an expansion of the types of services included in an
EMS system, as well as the expansion of geographical boundaries of the
system. An EMS "region" should, in this perspective, be able to unite
the EMS components within the medical-geographical limits of the system.
Program guidelines for the EMSS Act list 4 critical factors for use in
defining the extent of EMS regions:
"(1) It must be contiguous with other EMS regions.
(2) It must be medically competent.
(3) It can be described by established geo-political lines.
(4) It must have sufficient population, resources, and
financial support to sustain an EMS system."
These factors combine to define the geographical size of EMS regions in
terms of the medical and organizational resources within its boundaries.
The federal commitment to both larger geographical units and broader
inclusion of services reflects the federal attitude that EMS regionaliza-
tion could effect two key changes in the provision of emergency care.
First, in a larger jurisdiction, a major upgrading of the individual EMS
components might occur due to the increased resources available for
purchasing equipment, sponsoring training programs, etc. Second, the
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coordination of these emergency medical services into a "regional
system" could transpire if all the components of the system were addressed
by the one larger jurisdiction responsible for the EMSS Act grant. As
a result, the concurrent upgrading and coordination efforts could alleviate
many of the problems perceived in EMS, such as poor quality vehicles,
untrained ambulance attendants, duplicative and ineffective hospital
care, and a general lack of communications among the components. These
problems, individually recognized and addressed in federal programs, have
molded the application of the regional concept to EMS.
The Evolution of Regionalization in Federal EMS Initiatives
The present concept of regionalized EMS systems developed from the
failures of previous federal efforts to motivate substantial changes in
emergency medical services. The shift in federal policy from upgrading
single EMS components to upgrading the whole "system" in a region is
reflected in the present federal description of an EMS system as an
"arrangement of personnel, facilities ahd equipment for the effective
and coordinated delivery of health care services in an appropriate
geographical area under emergency conditions."2 The significance of
this definition lies in the way it affects the operation and organization
of EMS, especially since the EMSS Act supports and encourages the develop-
ment of EMS systems that conform to the federal definition.
The notion of a coordinated arrangement of EMS is a recent concept,
emerging as a fully-articulated program element only in the EMSS Act.
In the past, EMS components operated in isolation from each other, and
federal legislation and programs accepted this operating structure in
supporting local services. For example, the first federal attempt to
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generate widespread interest in EMS, the DOT Highway Safety Program,.
which focused only on highway and traffic related EMS, motivated inter-
est in subsidies for new vehicles but did little to coordinate their
operation at the local level. The next major federal EMS Initiative, in
1972, arose in the Executive Branch. Although its intent may have been
highly political (to head off the pending Congressional action on cate-
gorical grants for EMS), the Initiative recognized the lack of substantial
changes in the way EMS was provided, and instituteda more aggressive policy
toward encouraging systematic change in EMS organizational structure and
technology.
The programs offered in the 1972 "EMS Initiative," sponsored by the
DHEW, represented a shift in federal sentiment that favored an EMS policy
which concentrated on more than one aspect of EMS. The new federal policy
explicitly recognized EMS as a part of the health care system, and pro-
vided strong motivation for more coordination in and among the EMS system
components.. The Initiative provided funds for developing demonstration
projects of "advanced EMS systems" and planning projects for regional and
subregional "comprehensive EMS systems."3 In this program, the government
assumed that larger, regional systems of EMS agencies could more effectively
accomplish improvement in EMS than would piecemeal efforts of many disso-
ciated local agencies.
This initiative modified the image of an EMS system in two ways, which
created the base for the EMSS Act policy. First, the geographical area to
be considered as a coherent EMS system was expanded and defined in regional
terms for the first time. Second, the boundary which circumscribed the
services to be included in an EMS system was expanded to encompass those
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services necessary for prehospital care, transportation, communications
and coordination. This major shift in federal policy is reflected in
the recipients of the grants who were primarily state, multi-county
areas, and Regional Medical Programs. The fact that Regional Medical
Programs, which encompass areas which range from several counties to
several states, were the recipients of the planning project grants indi-
cated that federal policy makers had taken the approach that larger areas
were the appropriate size for regional EMS systems.
In federal circles the DHEW demonstration programs were proclaimed
successful in establishing regional EMS systems, thus reinforcing the
federal commitment to regionalization as an effective way to organize EMS.
The statistics that were cited in support of these programs made reference
to the numbers of lives saved and reduced deaths per injury, which served
as appealing indications that future programs should duplicate their demon-
stration "models" in other places. Unfortunately, the RMP program was dis-
continued at the same time that regional EMS was being pushed, preventing
widespread dissemination of information about their EMS programs. As a
result, the strategies and the problems that they encountered were never
made part of the public knowledge of EMS programs. This is critical in
evaluating the EMSS Act, which adopted many of the same approaches in its
efforts to establish and upgrade EMS systems.
All that had been learned from previous federal initiatives was
brought together in the EMSS Act of 1973. The legislation was designed to
have a strong influence on the provision of EMS services through a combina-
tion of a discretionary grant management policy with a strongly articulated
regional philosophy. It was made clear that only proposals which reflected
a firm move toward regionalization would be considered in the funding process,
and that only those regions which were of "appropriate size" and addressed
all the 15 mandatory components would be funded.5 States and multi-county
areas, moreover, were favored in the proposal review process, which
indicated that the expansion of the region size was also necessary to
ensure that the entity responsible for the EMS system had sufficient author-
ity and resources available to maintain a large complex system.
The rationale for making regionalization the focus of the Act's pro-
gram stemmed from the desire to organize EMS around the capabilities of
hospital emergency facilities. Implicit in the notion of comprehensive
regional EMS systems was the realization that boundaries of hospital ser-
vice areas did not coincide with the boundaries of counties, municipalities,
communications systems or ambulance services. Moreover, the hospital
component in most regions would require the specialized capabilities of
several facilities in order to include the comprehensive range of treat-
ment required to be "medically competent." These requirements result in
hospital services that are comprehensive at the regional level, which,
because the systems were centered on the hospitals, also indirectly neces-
sitated the expansion of the prehospital component.
The expansion of prehospital services required by the Act paralleled
the hospital expansion in two ways. First, by their inclusion in the
hospital-centered EMS systems, prehospital components were to be coordinated.
and, by inference provided for a regional service area. Also, because of
the new specialized profile of the hospital component, the prehospital
services had to develop more sophisticated coordination and treatment
capabilities, in order to link effectively with the specialized hospital
facilities. This second expansion is reflected in many of the Act's
mandatory attributes for prehospital care that are not currently in
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existence in most EMS systems.6
In the pursuit of this expanded definition of EMS, the Act is seek-
ing to accomplish simultaneously two distinct objectives--the regional-
ization of EMS through the provision of hospital and prehospital functions
at a regional level, and the integration of these two functions into a
service system. Moreover, the Act asserts that these two objectives
are inseparable with the contention that a comprehensive regional hospital
network is fundamental to EMS systems. The provision of the hospital and
prehospital functions at a regional level assumes the successful comple-
tion of an extremely complex and difficult step in the implementation of
regional EMS systems--the removal of responsibility for these functions
from their present local jurisdictions and the allocation of this
responsibility, instead, to a newly defined regional service system. From
this viewpoint, regionalization can also be perceived as a strategy to
allocate EMS services to different institutions or government agencies in
a systematic manner. The issues involved in reallocating service functions
to different jurisdictions and scales of operation have previously been
encountered in a wide range of services, and the literature that these
encounters have generated serves to outline the issues that we can expect
in reallocating( the hospital and prehospital functions of EMS to the
regional level.
Regionalization and Functional Allocation of Services
There has been much literature written on the allocation of municipal
services to government levels. In particular, the Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR), a government agency that studies the
problems impending the effectiveness of the federal system, had produced
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numerous volumes on regionalism and the assignment of public service
responsibilities to state, local and areawide units. The thrust of ACIR
research has been to attempt the development of normative criteria for
judging the efficacy of particular allocations, based on characteristics
of the service in question and the institutional context of its provision.
An examination of the ACIR criteria can provide us with a broader perspec-
tive of the potential benefits and problems involved in the reallocation
of EMS services to the regional level. This section presents a summary of
the results of the ACIR research and other pertinent literature and its
applicability to the regionalization efforts of the EMSS Act.
The literature on regionalization and functional allocations reflects
the increased importance of these strategies in the formulation of federal,
state and local policies for the provision of governmental services.
Increasing numbers of programs are utilizing these strategies to centralize
or decentralize services in attempts to increase the efficiency and effect-
iveness of expenditures for their provision. These strategies cause constant
shifts and alterations in the relationships between the different levels of
government and generate constant pressures for change in the provision of
services. The ACIR attempted, through its research, to develop means for
assessing the effectiveness of changes in functional allocation, and cri-
teria for analyzing the effects on intergovernmental relationships that
arise. They hoped to develop a typology of situations in which functional
reallocation would be beneficial in terms of improved service, or detri-
mental in terms of severe disruption of intergovernmental relations. In
this way, the ACIR seeks to avoid the undesirable effects of unsystematic
allocations of functions to the different levels of government.
The ACIR has identified a number of adverse results that can occur from
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allocating functions to inappropriate jurisdictions, and the potential
for alleviating these conditions often plays a substantial role in the
debate over functional reallocation. Their research contends that mis-
allocations can result in services with unnecessarily high costs of pro-
vision, low levels of quality, and restricted scope of operation. Further-
more, the ACIR points to severe problems of gaps and faulty distribution
of services that occur from a lack of coordination in service delivery.7
Finally, an improper allocation of service responsibility can create a
substantial mismatch between the recipients of benefits and the bearers
of costs of service provision. The ACIR has defined the governing
variable in determining the presence or absence of these conditions to
be the geographic and jursidictional scale of service provision. In
particular, they have focused research on the economic, political and
administrative implications of different scales of service provision.
To delineate the characteristics and capabilities of different jurisdic-
tions and scales of service, the ACIR explored issues of economic
efficiency, fiscal equity, administrative effectiveness and political
8accountability. In examining these issues, the ACIR uncovered many of
the conceptual bases of the public debate over altering the governmental
scale of service provision, some of which are critically important in
consideration of regional EMS.
These four criteria are designed to serve as guidelines in determining
the level and type of government to which a function is to be allocated.
In their treatment of economic efficiency, the ACIR seeks to identify
parameters which will insure that government functions are allocated to
jurisdictional levels that can minimize the unit cost of service provision.
The three parameters of economic efficiency identified by the ACIR--
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economies of scale, service competition, and public pricing 9--are designed
to insure that the jurisdiction is large enough to incorporate technology
and specialized personnel in a higher quality service with lower unit
costs than smaller jurisdictions without these capabilities, small enough
that service provision does not become monopolistic, and sufficiently
competent that costs remain relatively stable. The criterion of fiscal
equity specifies that the jurisdiction should be tailored to the function
in such a way that the boundaries of service also delimit the extent of
costs and benefits. 10 Also, the jurisdiction should be sufficiently broad
to insure that disparities in cost and service levels are eliminated
internally and interjurisdictionally. Political accountability tends to
require smaller jurisdictions with services more amenable to citizen
access and control.11
The final criterion, administrative effectiveness, addresses the char-
acteristics of jurisdictions in five parameters--general-purpose character,
geographic adequacy, management capability, intergovernmental flexibility
and legal adequacy.12 From the ACIR perspective, a jurisdiction, in
addition to being large enough to adequately provide and administer parti-
cular services, should administer a variety of functions to allow the
development of comparative priorities, and require appropriate evaluation
and performance standards. The jurisdiction should be willing to venture
into innovative intergovernmental policies and have adequate legal author-
ity to insure the execution of its functional responsibilities. 13
Problems with Functional Allocation Criteria
The ACIR allocation criteria are intended to serve as a normative
guide and first step in the functional assignment process, which continues
-38-
with the selection of institutions to provide the functions, and the
choice of functions to be distributed to these institutions.14 This
process, as envisioned by ACIR, is thus a highly idealized and static
representation of the extremely complex process of shifting allocations
among jurisdictions. The Commission has placed a major emphasis on the
investigation and documentation of numerous regional service mechanisms
(such as special purpose districts, regional councils, metropolitan
governments, etc.) as applications of their criteria. However, although
the criteria are intended to provide a systematic formula for allocation,
the dynamic process of achieving the normative functional assignment has
been largely ignored.
The ACIR has made several statements about the dynamics of functional
allocation in support of their recommendations for federal standards in
the area. 15 These statements have served to indicate some of the problems
that might be encountered at the local level in performing reassignments,
but they have been restricted to the context of local responses to particu-
lar proposed regional mechanisms--e.g. the problems to be faced in institut-
ing metropolitan government. Thus, the usefulness of the ACIR literature
in our study is limited in one respect to the assessment of the appropriate-
ness of the EMSS Act's assignment of EMS to the regional level, and offers
little guidance in evaluating the process of achieving that allocation.
The Commission has performed such an assessment on certain other aspects
of health and medical services and an examination of their assessment
reveals several other limitations on the usefulness of their research for
our purposes.
The ACIR has applied their allocation process to the public health
function and the governmental hospital function, with the result that
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two principle differences emerge from their general approach that are
important in our consideration of EMS regionalization. In the public
health allocation, they proposed the delineation and individual alloca-
tion of sub-functions of public health, suggesting that such sub-functions
as immunization and records-keeping might properly be performed on differ-
ent jurisdictional levels.18 Their treatment of governmental hospital,
while it relates more directly to the EMS system, reveals a fundamental
difficulty in applying the ACIR research to the EMSS Act's functional
reassignments. In this treatment, they explicitly recognize the limita-
tions of public sector attempts to reallocate private sector functions
in their conclusion that "governmental hospitals should be planned in
relation to non-governmental hospital services."19 In adopting this
approach, the Commission defined the public sector role in areawide hospi-
tal services to be the correction of any gaps and deficiencies that private
sector services might have developed. This is in marked difference to the
Commission's treatment of public sector functions, because it further
decreases the dynamic aspects of functional allocation criteria with its
assumption that the scale of existing private sector services defines the
jurisdictional scale of the hospital service function.
The implications of these considerations--multiple functions within
public health services and the mixture of public and private sectors in
hospital services--are indirectly treated in other literature on the
scale of health provision.20  A major focus of this literature is the
problem of fragmentation arising from "local home rule" provision of
health care and the gaps and disparities in service that result. These
treatments, and Duhl in particular, advocate the creation of "linkings"
among health care sources for particular sub-functions of health care. But
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they, too, deal inadequately with the dynamic process of creating the
links. Duhl points to the particular problem of this process by noting
the lack of a jurisdictional hierarchy in local health care provision,
which, he says, necessitates the voluntary development of "multi-level
21
authorities" to solve areawide problems. But this constitutes one of
the few models for developing regional systems of health care delivery,
and both Duhl and Dinerman shy away from the "political factors integrally
22
related to any proposed functional reorganization." The literature
of regionalization is thus, rather limited in its application to the
particular problems involved in the establishment of regional EMS systems
envisioned by the EMSS Act, because, in fact, it ignores the problems of
implementation.
The Regionalization of EMS
In our discussion of regionalization literature, we have identified
three distinct problematic areas fundamental to the outcome of the EMSS
Act--the allocation of service functions to jurisdictional levels, the
process of achieving the desired allocation, and the institutional relation-
ships required to establish and maintain a particular allocation. The ACIR
has dealt extensively with public sector functional allocation.
In applying their research to the question of EMS regionalization,
we encounter severe deficiencies because of the accompanying shift to pri-
vate sector service provision of critical components. (hospitals) of the
proposed EMS system. The criteria of economic efficiency and administrative
effectiveness tend to support the regional approach to EMS provision, with
its requirements of highly specialized facilities and sophisticated manage-
ment capabilities. However, these considerations address only the character-
istics of service provision and ignore the demand characteristics of the
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service. In the public sector, the criteria that support enlarged service
areas, such as economic efficiency and administrative effectiveness, are
balanced by public equity and political accountability considerations
which, in some cases, can dictate smaller region sizes. But the private
sector provision of EMS components, particularly the hospital services,
raises a different set of client-oriented considerations which are not
addressed by existing regionalization literature. Hence, the assumption
that EMS should be allocated to a regional level is highly problematical
in the normative context of this literature, since only service supply
issues have been addressed in ways appropriate to EMS.
We have seen that the process of achieving a regional-level allocation
has been inadequately addressed by the literature. The EMSS Act adopts
23
an implementation model similar to the one described by Duhl, in which
the different providers are brought together voluntarily to bring about
regional service provision. However, this consensual model has not been
thoroughly articulated, and many of the fundamental and institutional prob-
lems involved in such a process are virtually uncharted.
Finally, the EMS regionalization proposed by the Act raises unique
problems in the institutional relationships it seeks to establish at the
regional level. The Act is designed to develop a regional service from
components currently provided in both the public and the private sectors,
and which involve institutions with widely diverse concerns and priorities.
The Act seeks to extend this consensual implementation model to bring
these services into conformity with the goals of regional EMS systems,
and then to develop this consensus into a management and administrative
capability at the regional level, for services whose jurisdictions had been
almost exclusively at the local level. This approach to the integration of
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multi-disciplinary services is highly problematic, and largely untouched
in the literature.
Our thesis, then, seeks to explore the regionalization of EMS, in
an attempt to expand the analysis of these problematic areas and to under-
stand their implications for the effectiveness of the federal EMS policy
embodied in the EMSS Act.
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CHAPTER THREE
METHODOLOGY
Questions for Research
The primary goal of our thesis is to develop an understanding of
the federal assumptions aboutithe*institutional structure and nature 6f
EMS provision and determine the impact of federal EMS regionalization
policy on this structure. The EMSS Act in particular, provides criteria
for defining the appropriate size of an EMS region centered around
hospital care capabilities, provides a normative set of mandatory compon-
ents, describes the planning process needed for developing EMS systems,
and proposes the interinstitutional relationships necessary to create
a regional hospital-centered EMS system. It is these characteristics of
the Act that appeared to be the essence of the federal EMS policy. How-
ever, it was also these characteristics that we sensed as the most
problematic and ambiguous aspects of the EMSS Act. In order to assess
these assumptions, we conducted an empirical investigation in a North
Shore region of Greater Boston that attempted to implement the federal
regionalization policy. We designed three major questions, based on
the problematic characteristics noted above, to guide our research:
(1) Did the federal definition of an EMS region translate
to the local level?
(2) What was the nature of the planning process used to
develop the regional EMS system in the area we studied?
(3) Did the federal definition of the essential institutional
relationships in a regional EMS system translate to the
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local level: in the outcome of the planning process?
in the outcome of the implementation process?
Is the Federal Regional Definition Applicable?
In order to determine if the area we studied was a valid EMS
region, we applied the federal EMSS Act guidelines to the Area's char-
acteristics. Since we were addressing an area that had been defined by
local EMS planners as an EMS region, our first question was: What
criteria had these planners used to define the region? Then, given
these geographical boundaries, we applied the federal EMSS Act criteria:
"Is the region contiguous with other EMS regions? Is it medically compe-
tent? Can it be described by established geo-political boundaries? Does
it have sufficient population, resources, and financial support to sustain
an EMS system?" We believed that if we established the area as a valid
federally defined EMS region, we could then apply the rest of the Act's
regionalization criteria to our region.
We also wanted to sense the reasonableness of allocating EMS to
the regional level in much the same way as the ACIR (see Chapter 2)
viewed the allocation of other service functions. This assessment was
performed by using indicators that had been suggested by the ACIR
analysis. Once we had determined whether our region was valid according
to the EMSS Act's standards we wanted to know what benefits or costs
resulted from the geographical expansion of the EMS systems' boundaries,
beside meeting EMSS Act regulations. Also, one of the critical assump-
tions in the funding requirements of the Act was that larger areas were
more appropriate for the organization of EMS systems, an assumption that
we wanted to test against the increased managerial, administrative, and
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planning capabilities. Our last question, then, asked: As a result
of meeting, at least minimally, the EMSS Act's regional definition, does
the region so defined have the regional institutional base, planning
expertise, management capability, or the ability :to create 'incentives,
necessary to develop a regional EMS system?
Nature of the EMS Planning Process?
We also saw the nature of the planning process proposed by the EMSS
Act as potentially problematic because it relied on a rather broad model
which did not appear to reflect the complexity of creating regional EMS
systems. In addition, we believed that the planning process would be a
rather critical operation in creating EMS systems, and as a result, we
wanted to discover the variables. which described the nature of the pro-
cess. We sensed there might be a linkage between the way the system was
planned and the ,potential for implementation, so that an- understanding
of the planning process would also assist in understanding the implementa-
tion process. Since the EMSS Act made special mention of the requirement
that EMS providers and consumers be represented in the planning process,
we thought an examination of the process would reveal some interesting
patterns describing the interrelationships between the various actors,
their institutions, and their interests in a regional EMS system.
The set of questions we developed to investigate the nature of the
planning process were: What critical values guided the planning process?
Who were the participants? What interests did they represent? What roles
did they play? How did the participants interact in the planning process?
What mechanism was created or existed for this interaction? What insti-
tutions did the mechanism presume would implement their plans?
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Essential Regional Institutional Relationships?
In our last question we attempted to address the outcomes of the
planning and implementation processes. In the planning process we were
interested in viewing the plans that resulted in terms of the necessary
regional interinstitutional relationships specified in the EMSS Act. In
particular, we wanted to know if the structure proposed by the planning
process to run the regional EMS system, had the necessary relationships
with the institutions currently providing EMS to insure that EMS would
be coordinated and provided at the regional level.
An important assertion of the EMSS Act was that the components of an
EMS system had to be integrated through an appropriate regional agency,
so that the EMS resources in the area could be utilized effectively to
meet the needs of the area. These components fell into two major groups,
the prehospital and hospitals systems. Therefore, we wanted to know if
the planning process had generated plans that addressed the necessary
relationships; between the prehospital components, the hospital components,
and the necessary linkages between these two groups of systems. These
questions served essentially as a reality check between the outcome of
the planning process and the idealized regional system embodied in the
EMSS Act. We wanted to further validate our region in light of the EMSS
Act requirements and pursue the link between the results in our region
and the expected outcome of the EMSS Act.
The second and most critical area of concern was the result of the
implementation efforts. Our previous questions had determined whether
we could consider our region a legitimate one according to federal stand-
ards, and now we wanted to see if the expected outcome of the regional
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systems defined by the Act were in fact the same outcomes we witnessed
in our region. But first, we needed to ask: Did the structure proposed
by the planning process require major changes in the institutional
structures that currently provided EMS? If major changes were required,
it might indicate that the implementation process needed to take extra
account of the magnitude and character of the changes.
We also wanted to document the degree to which the necessary changes
had been implemented. After this documentation was complete, the follow-
ing questions were asked: What issues determined the implementation of
the changes? Did the planning mechanism address these issues? What
incentives did they use? Did the implemented structure have the
necessary regional institutional relationships (according to the Act)?
This last set of questions would answer the overall question: Can the
EMSS Act achieve its goal of creating hospital-centered regional EMS
systems?
Our questions, then, look at the federal EMS policy, in terms of
the EMSS Act, examine the problematic aspects of the concept, the target
of the concept (that is, the institutional structure of EMS provision),
and finally, the outcome of applying the concept to the EMS institutional
structure. By assessing the policy and its outcome at the local level
we can begin to understand the critical elements of the regional EMS
concept that promote or inhibit its implementation and the implications
of these outcomes for designing future interventions in the EMS system.
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Development of the Case Study
Despite the recent increase in funding programs for regional EMS
systems development (EMSS Act, Robert Wood Johnson Foundation), little
empirical research has been conducted on the organizational and insti-
tutional aspects of the regional EMS systems concept that has evolved
from past federal initiatives. This organizational structure, based on
hospital emergency capabilities, is essentially untested from an insti-
tutional analysis perspective. Moreover, the information that exists
about the operation of EMS systems has not been used to generate
theories about how regionalization of EMS works. The latest federal
initiative, the EMSS Act, which required the development of regional
hospital-based EMS systems, seems to have been based on medical perceptions
of the problems confronting EMS and Congressional desire for a well-funded
federal role in EMS. This theory of EMS systems organization focuses on
hospital resources as the critical variable for defining the EMS system,
and overlooks the political and institutional variables within an EMS
system that determine the implementability of the hospital-based systems
concept.
EMS is not the only service system which has used regionalization
theories to determine an appropriate organizational structure for the
provision of services. 2 A considerable amount of literature on the
regionalization of municipal services has been generated by the Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations in an attempt to systematize a
set of criteria for the allocation of functional provision of municipal
services. 3 Translated into the EMS system context, this allocation
procedure would determine the best governmental level (local, county,
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metropolitan, state) for the provision of ambulance services, hospital
emergency care, communications, and all the other components of an EMS
system.
There are two major problems with this translation. First, hospital-
based regional EMS systems orients the system around the supply of special-
ized hospital care in EMS provision. This emphasizes the economies of
scale criteria of the ACIR regionalism theory because the focus argues
it is economical to have specialized emergency departments which are
organized to collectively provide all the emergency health care that
is needed. The predominance of the economies of scale variable in the
definition of regional EMS systems makes the remainder of the ACIR
regionalism theory inapplicable. Second, the hospital basis of regional
EMS systems places the focus of service provision in the private sector
which nullifies the political analysis performed by ACIR. In addition,
the ACIR literature addresses the municipal service sector, so a private
sector emphasis makes it impossible to readily adapt the ACIR research
to EMS systems based in the private sector because of the fundamental
differences between the economic structures of the two sectors. As a
result of these fundamental differences between hospital-based EMS
regionalization and the existing literature on regionalism, it is evident
that we cannot "borrow" the theoretical models of municipal service
regionalism organization to investigate regional hospital-based EMS
systems.
In order to develop our own theoretical model of EMS regional
organization, we conducted an exploratory investigation using a holistic
approach.4 This approach is used to study complex situations in assessing
the "nature of a total system, rather than of a particular process within
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the situation."5 EMS systems appear to be complex situations containing
an underlying structure of interrelated elements.6 The holistic approach,
then, is used in our study to determine the general characteristics of
hospital-based regional EMS systems and the critical variables that
define and operate within these systems, rather than test any preconceived
hypotheses.
We chose the Greater Lynn area as the object of our investigation
because of its proximity and because it appeared to include most of
the 15 mandatory system components of the EMSS Act. In addition, Greater
Lynn is part of the jurisdiction of the North Shore Health Planning
Council, a regional agency that is presently executing the Massachusetts
program supported by EMSS Act funds. Therefore, we believed we would
be able to observe the planning and implementation of many of the assump-
tions behind the EMSS Act. Finally, we were aware of an attempt to
regionalize ambulance services in the Greater Lynn area, which would
permit us to investigate the potential of the federal EMS strategy to
effectuate change in the provision of EMS. The organization of our research
design to carry out this study is described in the next section.
Organization of the Research
The research design for the case study involved four major tasks:
(1) compiling all the written material which described the state, regional,
and Greater Lynn EMS-related activities; (2) interviews with the program
participants at the local, state, and federal levels, (3) participant-
observation of parts of the EMS activities; and (4) analysis of the
combined data described above.
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These tasks were not performed in the order cited because we entered
the situation at a period when a proposal to regionalize the transporta-
tion services in the Greater Lynn Area was being reconsidered, allowing
us to witness first-hand some of the activities and meetings-that trans-
pired during these renewed efforts. Therefore it was necessary to acquire
a background knowledge of the circumstances of the regional ambulance
service attempt, attend the numerous meetings, and develop contacts with
the EMS program participants in the Area at the same time. In addition,
our desire to investigate all the possible interrelationships that existed
in the region required that we continuously request referrals and follow
these leads.
We had to be careful in our approach to local interests because the
regional transportation system was still an ongoing and delicate process
in Greater Lynn. In fact we were instructed to be cautious in who we
approached and in the questions we asked. We were concerned that the
sensitivity of the situation would make it difficult to obtain informa-
tion, especially the hidden issues in the regional transportation efforts.
We found, however, that people were willing to freely discuss their opin-
ions and interests and in addition, permitted us to attend several
strategic planning meetings which were both private and highly political.
Our immediate involvement in the ambulance planning activities facilitated
our acceptance by the EMS providers in Greater Lynn. Once we were recog-
nized as part of the network of people interested in EMS, our presence
at meetings was never questioned and our questions were answered with
extreme cooperation.
Although oor initial introduction to the region was through the North
Shore Health Planning Council, we made extensive use of the local
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newspapers for articles that had appeared on EMS in Greater Lynn. This
gave us an introduction to the events and activities that had transpired
in the past several years and a list of people who had been involved in
EMS efforts. Our first concern was how we were to present ourselves to
EMS providers and decisionmakers in the Area. We decided to initiate
our own contacts and avoid affiliations with any of the EMS interest
groups in the Area. As a result, we were able to solicit data about the
hospitals, ambulance services, and interest groups in the towns from
many different perspectives.
A major part of our research plan was to conduct extensive interviews
with all people who had any association with EMS activities in Greater
Lynn, in order to collect as much data as possible to assist our identi-
fication of the underlying patterns of interrelationships. We did not want
to rely solely on newspaper articles, EMS planners' opinions, or second-
hand accounts. Our set of interviews for each town relevant to the case
study typically included:
-- representatives from the ambulance service (municipal or
private)
-- representatives from the hospitals (administrators and
doctors)
-- elected town officials who had decisionmaking power over
ambulance provision (city councilors, selectmen)
-- other people of interest including EMS citizen advocates and
reporters from local newspapers.
Taken together these people represented all those who were interested in
or responsible for EMS services. We continually relied on the regional
health planning agency EMS Project for their perspective on local
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activities as well as the regional perspective on the state activities.
These interviews were interactive sessions where we both exchanged
information about our experiences with the local providers.
Moreover, our interest in federal and state activities necessitated
interviews with the regional DHEW representative, staff at the Massachu-
setts Office of Emergency Medical Services (OEMS), and a former staff
member from the Tri-State Regional Medical Program EMS Project. These
interviews resulted in a density of data which was used to verify the
events of past and present activities. We conducted our investigation in
an exploratory manner, continually probing to discover new issues, rela-
tionships, and variables that might be of interest. We ended our inter-
views only when we began to hear the same information repeated.
The interviews furnished critical insights as to the relationships
between interest groups, institutions, and the issues surrounding region-
alization. We realized, however, the subjective nature of these inter-
views, with particular respect to the timing of our investigation (while
the regional transportation scheme was under reconsideration). As a
result, we also used local newspaper stories and the North Shore Health
Planning Council files (with the extensive cooperation of Martin Levitan
and Director Polly Mansfield of the EMS Project). These files contained
memorandums, agendas from meetings with local EMS interests, correspond-
ence, grant applications, final reports, and numerous other material,
providing an extensive documentation of the changing relationships between
the regional agency and the state, local, and Regional Medical Program
agencies.
Since the nature of our approach required synthesizing holistic
assessment from the data we had collected, we used what Glaser and
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Strauss call the "constant comparative" method of analysis to systematically
generate and develop our theory.7 This method involves numerous readings
of the case study information, always identifying critical relationships
and variables which would lead to hypotheses about the nature of these
relationships. These hypotheses were modified with each new insight
from the data. In addition, we were both well-acquainted with the
issues and events, consequently, we were able to generate colloquaies
which contributed considerably to the analysis of the case study and the
development of the hypotheses. As a result, we evolved an understanding
of the nature of hospital-centered regional EMS systems and the critical
variables therein.
Setting of the Study
The state and regional environment of the case study of EMS activities
in the Greater Lynn area is essential for a full understanding of the
events and their "causes". We collected information about EMS activities
as they developed at the state and regional levelse in response to federal
initiatives. From this information we tried to determine the critical
programmatic switches, the changes in power and authority, the impact of
federal grants, and trace the development of the state program to its
present form as a recipient of an EMSS Act grant. We found the historical
and programmatic development of the state and regional EMS systems as
critical commentary that needed to be included as part of the case study.
As such, the case study examines the state, regional, and local EMS
programs as a unit with an emphasis on the significant relationships among
the programs. Therefore, it is unnecessary to detail this context in this
section.
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Methodological Issues
One of the major problems with the holistic single case study
approach we chose, is generalization, especially with "an N of One."8
There are, however, two arguments for generalizing from a case study
based on the density of the information collected. The first approach
to the problem supports the notion that given a set of conditions of the
essential elements of a system, then a particular organization or system
as a whole must result. Therefore, "the particular cases serve partly
as an argument for the theory and partly as an illustration of its appli-
cation'.'9 Secondly, it is asserted that "whenever the system is repeated
. . . the same interrelationships must exist and phenomena which are
essentially the same . . . will be observed."10
In the case study method, the validity of the holistic assessment
and the degree to which systems substantially similar to the studied
system are present elsewhere, determine the precisions and contributions
of the generalizations. The task of substantiating the holistic assess-
ment is not an easy one, often resulting in generalizations which, accord-
ing to Robert Merton, are "post factum sociological interpretations,"
generated after the data was collected and not tested on prior hypo-
theses.11  Herbert Gans, to explain the difficulty in validating his
sociological research, concluded his work with the following paragraph:
"This, then,,is not a scientific study, for it does not
provide what Merton has called compelling evidence for a
series of hypotheses. It is, rather, an attempt by a
trained social scientist to describe and explain the
behavior of a large number of people, using his methodolo-
logical and theoretical training to sift the observations,
and to report only those generalizations which are justi-
fied by the data. The validity of my findings thus rests
ultimately on my judgements about the data, and of course
on my theoretical and personal biases in deciding what
to study, what o see, what to ignore and how to analyze
the products." 1
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One of the benefits for the holistic approach is the amount and!
scope of the data available for the development and testing of theories
of organization for the case variables. In some cases, the theories will
exceed the data and postulate interrelationships between the data variables
that are not explicitly evident. Also, it is extremely difficult to
remove all bias from our account of the situation. We tried to build
our model on the data that we observed, read, and collected from inter-
views, being careful not to exclude relevant information that might have
suggested conflicting models. However, we were unable to use all the
information we collected, using instead that data which we felt best
supported our theory.
Furthermore, the case study presents a set of events and proposed
"causes" of those events. The holistic assessment relies upon the
researchers' interpretation of these events in a plausible framework, to
highlight the significant variables and relationships which describe the
nature of the system. We tried to recall the EMS activities and events
as accurately as possible, given our interpretive framework. Conse-
quently, most of the small detailed events have been united into descrip-
tive analogues that relate to the whole situation more coherently than
the individual details. Hopefully, the reader will recognize the difference
between these events and the researchers' interpretations of these events
and respond with the appropriate discretion.
Even if our holistic assessment of the Greater Lynn EMS experience
is accurate, the transferability of our findings to other EMS experiences
is extremely limited unless EMS systems highly similar to Greater Lynn's
exist elsewhere. The major issue, then, is whether Greater Lynn's EMS
system characteristics such as: resources, transfer patterns, mutual
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aid pacts, governmental decision processes, socio-economic character,
planning process, and EMS program, are at all representative character-
istics of other existing systems. Clearly, the governmental structure
of local town government with city councils, town selectpeople, and town
managers, is peculiar to New England style government. But the EMS
resource levels and character of ambulance services is quite similar
to most suburban areas. Therefore, the police and private ambulance
provider models can be applied most anywhere. The homogeneity of the
hospital system is not completely unlike most suburban areas which have
adequate resources and in fact, suburban areas also typically have
nearby urban centers to rely on for the most sophisticated emergency care.
The socio-economic variables will change from area to area, but the nature
of the region, with a small decaying urban core surrounded by more
affluent suburbs, is also not unlike many of the smaller metropolitan
areas in the country.
Finally, the argument that Massachusetts, and hence Greater Lynn, are
part of an EMSS Act grant program indicates that some similarites must
exist in other state coordinated programs under the EMSS Act program.
Although we are analyzing only one case in the Act's program, we assume
that the requirements and guidelines of the Act have generated comparable
efforts elsewhere. The major difference is probably in the State's use of
the Comprehensive Health Planning "B" agencies as the regional agency to
plan and guide the implementation of the state program. It became clear
in our interviews that the strategy to use "B" agencies under tight con-
tract with the state was an uncommon one. At the very minimum, however, we
generated hypotheses about hospital-centered regional EMS systems which
will be useful in further investigations.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE CASE STUDY
The federal policy in EMS, as embodied in the EMSS Act, can be
examined in the context of the case study which follows. The Massachu-
setts Department of Public Health, the recipient of a large federal
grant has already begun a process of pursuing these federal policy di-
rections in the development of regional EMS systems throughout the state.
The case traces the state's process of translating federal policy into
EMS activity at two key levels -- regional and local. At the regional
level we trace the efforts of one Massachusetts region to initiate and
conduct a planning process and to attempt, through that process to es-
tablish the regional EMS Networks envisioned by the EMSS Act. At the
local level, we examine the reactions to these policy directions of the
existing institutional structure by which emergency medical services
are provided.
Reflecting these centers of activity in EMS, the case study is
organized in three sections analyzing in turn, the state, regional, and
local activities in EMS. The first two sections describe the historical
roles of the Massachusetts Office of Emergency Medical Services and the
regional health planning agencies in influencing the local activities and
infrastructures. The final section, the local perspective of the plan-
ning and development of three EMS components, investigates the institu-
tional characteristics that promoted and inhibited attempts to regionalize
EMS. This arrangement of the case assembles the issues at the various
programmatic levels, and so indicates the potential impacts of regionali-
zation on EM-S organization and provision.
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The State Context: The Genesis of EMS Activity
The present state program in Massachusetts evolved from a fragmented
set of activities which merged together over time in reaction to the con-
ceptions of "EMS Systems" outlined in federal programs. These notions of
how EMS systems should be defined and operated were combined in the state
program and translated through regional agencies to local activities.
But the federal programs often had inconsistent and unrealistic expectations
which only confused the local development of EMS systems by the construction
of local infrastructures that later had to be eliminated for the implementa-
tion of future plans. In this context, efforts in Massachusetts have been
undertaken to utilize the ideologies promulgated at the federal level,
identify the parts of an EMS system, plan for their cooperation, and at the
same time use the existing natural relationships to define the boundaries
of "regional" EMS systems. Thus the evolutionary process has used local,
state and federal resources to form its EMS activities into a network of re-
gional systems.
The Roots of Massachusetts EMS
Until the early 1970's, few emergency medical services activities
existed in Massachusetts. Prior to that time, EMS-related activities were
in operation in many of the components of EMS such as training, facilities,
public education, etc. Red Cross was developing numerous training courses
that were available to the public. Civil Defense was designing responses
to various disasters and testing them with simulated situations. Both
were interested in public education programs to inform citizens of proper
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emergency procedures. Hospitals were expanding emergency and outpatient
facilities in response to community need for readily available health care.
However, these efforts were fragmented and operated in isolation from each
other. In addition, there was no money specifically allocated for EMS
resources and no standards for equipment, personnel training, or emergency
facilities. The common goal of saving lives in emergency situations
failed to bridge the existing communications gap betweeen the agencies
engaged in these activities. As a result, a unified conception of EMS was
slow to develop.
There were two early attempts to coordinate existing services to
build an EMS system. First, the department of Public Health hired a
tentured civil service person who was associated with the civil defense
efforts of the department, but who appeared to be assigned to EMS to keep
busy. Clearly she could not handle the EMS system for the entire state,
so she was dispatched to an area of the state and given the freedom to do
as she pleased. Her experiences with civil defense led her to run
numerous disaster drills until the people involved got tired of her antics.
She was replaced several years later, in 1971, by Karen Holmes, whose
efforts to coordinate EMS efforts at the state level were doomed to be
ineffectual without a staff or budget. Consequently, she spent most of
her time just trying to get money to begin activities at the state level
to upgrade emergency medical services.
A second early and equally incremental effort to improve one aspect
of the EMS "system" in Massachusetts was the purchase of ambulances -- a
critical factor in the development of local interests around EMS.
Paralleling the Highway Safety Act of 1966, money was poured into the pur-
chase of ambulances through the Governor's Highway Safety Bureau. The
representative in the Highway Safety Bureau, Francis Colleton, fought
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with Karen Holmes in her attempts to get additional DOT highway funds
through the Bureau to establish a state office for coordinating EMS.
The process of allocating ambulances has remained obscure to this
day, but these early efforts helped place almost 200 ambulances in many
of the small rural and suburban communities through matching funds, and
in some cases replaced the station wagons used by police for transporta-
tion. What is important about these allocations is that these vehicles,
purchased between 1970 and 1972 (now outdated in design and in disrepair),
stimulated a strong home rule attitude on the part of the towns with respect
to the ambulances and resulted in strong assumptions that an ambulance
would be located in their community. The program also implanted these
ambulances in many police and fire departments which have come to see
emergency services as an important part of their role.
While local interest in decentralized EMS was strong, several factors
collaborated to force the creation of an EMS system on a larger scale.
First, a climate of concern about EMS was generated by a National Academy
of Sciences - National Research Council study entitled, "Accidental
Death and Disability: The Neglected Disease of Modern Society". This
study focused nationwide attention on the magnitude of the problem by
citing statistics, but did not present any specific policy recommendations.
Second, conflict between operating procedures of DOT and standards
developed by the Highway Safety Act emerged during the 1972 Congressional
hearings concerning new EMS legislation. - DOT had, for example, distributed
ambulances regardless of whether the state had an approved plan according
to Standard 11 of the Highway Safety Act. The DOT money, moreover, had
also provided for the establishment of a state division of emergency ser-
vices to create a state plan over a three year period. The funds to create
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a state Office for Emergency Medical Services ensued from Karen Holmes'
success in convincing the Governor's Highway Safety Bureau that such an
office was critical to EMS activities in the state. The grant permitted
the hiring of a project director, research assistant, and secretary to
accomplish the following tasks: coordinate efforts in EMS at all levels
of government and provide leadership in the field, establish an advisory
committee in EMS, assess present legislation, rules and regulation, and
propose new laws, establish an EMS data collection system, survey and
evaluate EMS system, and to develop and implement a state plan for EMS.
The money was released in January 1973, at which time a director and
research assistant, Robert Murray and Linda Leddy, were hired. But the
bare essentials such as office equipment were not furnished to the Office
for Emergency Services, so this initial core of 2 people were still severely
hindered in attempts to mobilize the activities of the state into a co-
ordinated EMS program. For these reasons, the transformation of OEMS from
this-modest office into a powerful centralized agency was slow. It be-
came clear that if the above tasks were to be accomplished, more people
and resources were needed to shorten the startup time for the state to be-
gin its activities.
The Tri-State Regional Medical Program
EMS efforts appeared to gain more promise when DHEW announced, in
early 1972, a new federal initiative in EMS under two funding mechanisms.
One was for earmarked funds for completing "advanced EMS systems" to be
allocated to five demonstration projects, the other was $8 million of
supplemental funds that were available for Regional Medical Programs,
formed through the Heart Disease, Cancer and Stroke Amendents of 1965.
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The RMPs were to provide a framework for the dissemination of medical
knowledge about heart disease, cancer, and stroke, so it seemed a likely
extension of their interests in heart disease, to permit them to apply
for the supplemental grants.
This federal initiative was an important shift in thinking about and
funding EMS activities. Unlike the earlier DOT emphasis on highway safety,
the new program moved from highway safety to a health care basis for plan-
ning and developing EMS programs. The purpose of the supplemental grant
program was to "develop and/or implement regional and/or subregional
effective comprehensive EMS SYSTEMS." (capitals in original). Technology
and methodology for delivering uality services existed, in HEW's eyes,
and the problem was "the lack of an informed cooperative linkage of the
elements to provide effective care." The philosophy of the program was
that "effective change will result from careful planning and implementa-
tion on a time-phase basis" and in a "receptive environment". Essentially
the emphasis was to utilize existing resources to produce the change,
"rather than superimposing sweeping changes in conflict with the existing
system." This required the formal expression of cooperation from the pro-
viders and community at large.
DHEW made some costly assumptions in their decision to place the
grant program with RMPs. First was the assumption that RMPs would con-
tinue in their current strength for at least the period of the grant. This
proved false and created some major problems in Massachusetts. Second,
HEW operated under the theory that RMPs, which could cover anywhere from
several counties to several states, were the appropriate size around which
to plan a regional EMS system. Third, they had not realized the impact
of the DOT Highway Safety Act program and thought so little EMS activity
existed in the field that they were not superimposing sweeping changes
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on a system. Finally, the proposal writing and program initiation
assumed that some professional expertise and informed knowledge about
how an EMS system should operate existed, despite the fact that this was
the first comprehensive federal program.
The impacts of these assumptions became clear as soon as the New
England regions and subregions began to vie for the new funds. The abili-
ty to generate a professional proposal became the dominating influence. The
Tri-State RMP, for example, which covers the states of Massachusetts,
Rhode Island, and New Hampshire, decided to apply for the money and in
the course of three weeks was able to produce a first draft. At the same
time, Tri-State tried to motivate interest in an application to get a
demonstration project grant, only because the money was available. Be-
cause of the considerable time constraint, Tri-State decided to have each
state submit its own proposal for the development of statewida EMS Systems.
Within each statewide proposal, provision was made for sub-contracting
the planning and development of EMS systems at the regional level.
The requirement of a professional state plan and existing expertise
presented some problems for the Massachusetts program. The program could
not be coordinated at the state level because OEMS was not yet (Iarch
1972) in existence and as a result no focal point existed at the state
level for the Massachusetts program. As a result, Tri-State had to
write the state portion of the Massachusetts program in anticipation of
the development of OEMS.
Even more problematic was the fact that the Mass. component had to be
a dual effort with a division of responsibility between the state Depart-
ment of Public Health and the Comprehensive Health Planning "B" Agencies.
Clearly, Tri-State would have wanted a state run program, but there was
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no leadership at the state level. (DPH) and only the CHP "B" agencies
had been in existence since their creation through the Comprehensive Health
Planning and Service Act of 1966, which stipulated a program of federal,
state and local planning for comprehensive health services through region-
al agencies serving as the focus for local coordination of health insti-
tutions and personnel. The emphasis of their activities was to develop
regional health plans with community participation.
Because of this kind of fragmentation in Massachusetts, for example,
it was clear that the more powerful force in the DHEW program was not the
individual states but the relatively better organized Tri-State RMP. It
was the overall coordinator for the 3 states and also was responsible for
the evaluation and physician training tasks and assuring that the EMS
systems were consistent in- the states. The relative weakness of the Mass.
arrangement and what Tri-State saw as this arrangement's potential for
internal conflict were demonstrated in the way the tasks in the proposal
were divided between the state and the "B" agencies. The MASS. DPH-OEMS
was to use the TRMP funds to supplement and enlarge its existing EMS
program funded by DOT, and expand its scope beyond that of highway acci-
dent victims. New activities that it proposed to undertake were modest
and primarily focused on "support" functions: (1) to conduct an Emer-
gency Transportation Study to survey all vehicles in MASS. being used
for emergency transportation, (2) to administer and coordinate a number
of EMT-A courses to train 1200 persons, and (3) to institute an active
public information program and serve as a central information center for
EMS information.
Critically, the CHP "B" agencies, on the other hand, were to be the
action arm of the MASS. Program, and promote community involvement in
keeping with the tradition of the "B" agency planning strategy within the
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plans and regulations established by tie DPH. Their tasks involved: (1)
establishment of an EMS office within their respective agencies to carry
out EMS planning on an areawide basis, (2) develop community advisory
boards to guide policy and program development, (3) to engage in program
of community education through region wide conferences, and (4) to establish
communications links between vehicles, personnel, and facilities.
Rather than providing a strong centralized system, then, Tri-State
initially created a climate favorable to the development of sub-state regions.
This program depended on the "B" agencies to pull together the parts of the
system at the regional level. Delegating responsibilities to the "B" agencies
as regional EMS offices, such as organizing community advisory boards, edu-
cation of the community, and establishment of communication links among
the components, suggested there was a more unified conception to developing
EMS systems. It would be the job of the "B" agencies to identify and link
these parts so that plans could be developed for their unified operation.
The general lack of professional expertise in EMS planning (which
had been merely assumed in the DHEW concept) became evident as soon as
TRMP received $1.5 million of the total $8 million under the supplemental
grant program, and starting July 1, 1972, Tri-State regional medical program
and Massachusetts became committed to improving the EMS system. The
money was clearly far more than Tri-State had expected and more than they
effectively ,knew how to spend. Although the original proposal was written
according to a 3 year implementation plan and the final grant was a 2 year
funding, Tri-State operated under the assumption that there was an implied
commitment on the part of the federal government to continue funds for
implementation of the plans after the two year period.
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One of the first problems of the Tri-State program was that, because
no prior planning system for EMS had existed, the "B" agencies as well as
Tri-State knew little about planning or implementing "EMS SYSTEMS". Staffs
had to be recruited for the "B" agencies to form EMS projects, and after a
hectic summer of organization and contract writing, the CHP agencies set
up their EMS projects with a staff of only 2 people per project. The
last activities of 1972 were the initial organization of regional EMS
Advisory Boards, which were to be the backbone of the community participation
in the EMS planning process.
Probably because of its fragmented organization, the state was having
even greater startup problems and by the time the "B" agencies had initiated
their activities, the state had barely hired their director and research
assistant. Since the "B" agencies were subcontracting directly with Tri-
State, they forged ahead mostly under its direction. But the direction
was not well defined aside from a few tasks specified in the proposal,
such as establishing an EMS staff and community advisory boards, engaging
in community education, in some cases through regional conferences, and
establishing communications linkages among vehicles, facilities, and per-
sonnel. As a result, the "B" agencies defined their role as regional
planners in numerous and inconsistent ways. Some of the projects were
more involved in communications, some in transportation, and some in public
education. The outcome was that by the beginning of 1973, most of the
EMS projects had started their community education programs with a regional
conference to get all the interested parties together, and then had
scattered in all directions to do their regional planning.
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The Emergence of Massachusetts OEMS
Though Tri-State had emerged as the primary source of coordination
for this local activity in EMS, several factors strengthened the State's
position in early 1973. First, Tri-State received word that HEW was
planning to phase out the regional medical program and the EMS money that
had been recently given to them. Tri-State was one of the few regional
medical programs to battle the phaseout, and the time consumed in this
fight cost the EMS program dearly. Not only were the Tri-State staff tied
up in the drive to keep themselves alive, but many of the "B" agency EMS
projects assisted the efforts to keep the Tri-State EMS money to the
detriment of their programs' activities.
At the same time that Tri-State was in danger of losing its funds,
activity at the state level accelerated. OEMS was such a peripheral
agency in the TRMP program that they were spared the turbulence and con-
fusion of the conflict between Washington and Tri-State. In March, OEMS
set up its first Advisory Council which pulled together many of the EMS
interest groups, under OEMS authority, to begin planning for a state level
EMS program. Although RMP funds were in doubt, OEMS was working with its
DOT funds to begin writing a state plan, since a moratorium on further DOT
funds was in effect until the state could produce an EMS plan. As part of
the state plan, they fulfilled one support function by conducting the
Emergency Transportation Study (in which the "B" agencies had agreed to
assist by collecting some of the data.)
The first part of 1973, then, saw the subtle transition of the direct-
ion of EMS activities in Massachusetts from Tri-State to OEMS. Tri-
State had lost control of the "B" agencies, so when Washington sent a site
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visit team in March, they saw the program in turmoil. The state, on the
other hand, appeared to be developing a vision of EMS and a capacity to
plan. Surviving on its DOT funds, OEMS made an attempt to get DHEW to
turn the EMS funds over to them. After numerous visits to Washington,
OEMS convinced HEW that they could develop an EMS system in Massachusetts
and the TRMP EMS money for Massachusetts ($800,000) was transferred to
their program. On July 5, OEMS was informed that they could apply for
the funds but it would be accepted only if the state had completed an
approved work plan by August 1. This meant that the "B" agency proposals
had to be included in the state work plan as a package, with changes
desired by the state included. Thus, the state took direct control of the
funds and as a stipulation of funding, gained direct supervisory control
over the "B" agencies.
A number of relationships changed between the "B" agencies and OEMS
as a result of the shift in Federal funding policy. Through October, the
"B" agencies negotiated contracts and work plans according to the state's
plans, not TRMP's. Where the state had previously run behind the "B"
agencies in their planning activities, they now at least appeared to direct
the operation. They were also able to expand their staff at the central
office to 9 professionals and to increase the regional staffs through the
"B" agency subcontracts. No one in the country had tried to use the "B"
agencies under such tight supervision, so Massachusetts was observed with
great interest.
The essence of the proposals from "B" agencies to subcontract with
the MDPH, was the development of area EMS networks based on the capabili-
ties of hospital emergency departments and an education program to inform
the public about the networks. There was to be a regional advisory board,
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but the regions corresponding to "B" agency areas were to be further
divided into areas with committees and functioning task forces in each
area. Such an intensive planning effort required the gathering of more
specific data in a standardized form. In addition, committees represent-
ing the different components of the EMS system, (communications, transporta-
tion, hospitals, etc.) were to be started in each area. This first con-
tract with the state was to indicate the direction in which the state wanted
each of the "B" agencies to proceed. The contract between the "B" agencies
and OEMS also revealed the concepts embodied in the state's image of an
EMS system and how these concepts were tied to a geographical area.
The state's conception of an EMS system was focused on the hospitals
as the major institutional base. This choice was made on pragmatic grounds;
hospitals were the only system providing consistently effective services
to emergency patients. Thus EMS systems have come to be defined by the
grouping of hospitals, so that in theory they could collectively provide
comprehensive emergency care on a continuous basis. These areas define
their own interrelationships among the providers and develop their own
plans for organizing resources, identifying deficiencies, and coordinating
the delivery of services. The plans were to specify how patients of a
ptarticular category (cardiac, neonatal, poisonings, etc.) should enter the
transportation and facilities networks and how communications and public
education should guide their appropriate treatment in the system. Such
plans were to be developed by committees, at the area and regional level,
that were initiated and assisted by the "B" agency EMS Projects. By
basing the state's system on the care capabilities of the hospitals, OEMS
singled out the parameter that would be used to define the boundaries of
the sub-state regional and area EMS networks.
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The Impact of the Ambulance Law
The state confirmed its status as the locus of power for EMS activities
by the passage of the comprehensive abmulance law in late 1973. The
bill was designed to be a principal tool in enforcing minimal standards of
equipment and training on ambulance personnel.
The Massachusetts Department of Public Health became the regulatory
agency for emergency transportation services with the authority to license,
classify, and determine the need and plan for distribution of ambulances,
and to approve courses of instruction for ambulance attendents. It was
essentially enabling legislation authorizing the MDPH to take steps to
"insure high quality emergency medical care through regulation of ambulance
and ambulance services." An indication of the scope of the state's powers
was explicit in the clause giving them the authority to "...coordinate on
a regional basis communications centers, ambulance services, hospital
emergency services, law enforcement and fire units and emergency operations
centers, and facilitate hospital transfers of patients."
While the passage of the law gave the state these powers, it also
illuminated the strength of local interests in maintaining their own
control over EMS. In October, this legislation gave the MDPH (and OEMS
implicitly), wide authority to develop EMS systems across the entire
state and this amplified the EMS system as a state run program, not
through the law itself but through the development of specific administra-
tive rules and regulations. But, it was the rules and regulations develop-
ment process that bore out the potential impact of the law on the communities.
As information about the rules and regulations was funneled through
the "B" agencies to the local level, the conflict between the new state
power over EMS and the existing EMS infrastructure previously supported
by DOT ambulance funds became apparent. Small towns and agencies in the
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state sensed the potential expense of upgrading ambulance service, an ex-
pense which was evaded in the debate before the law was passed. Concerns
of police and fire departments arose as to what their part would be in the
EMS system. The private services who needed to consider their profits
in maintaining a service were afraid the law would put them out of business.
Small towns and suburban communities who wanted to keep the ambulance
service they now had, were afraid the necessary improvements would be an
additional burden on their budgets and on the taxes of their residents. The
state clearly did not want to disrupt the present tradition of community based
ambulance services but it was evident that they would have to take into
account, in the final revision, the problems the law would impose.
The heated reaction to the law can be traced to a number of attributes
of the law itself, especially its emphasis on establishing requirements
and standards for vehicles and attendant training.. In both cases the
level of upgrading required was immense. The training requirements, for
example, was that everyone who provided emergency medical care as part of
an ambulance service had to be trained to the 81 hour DOT standard level
and had to participate in a refresher training course each year. In
addition, there had to be 2 trained Emergency Medical Techniqians (EMTS)
in each vehicle. Since the state realized that such a program could in-
volve considerable startup time, provision was made for a phasing in of
training over a 3 year period starting in July 1975, with one-third of the
personnel trained each year. Local services were still overburdened even
with this provision.
The rules regarding vehicle standards raised similar issues. Under
the law a Class I (basic first-line emergency dispatch) ambulance had to
incorporate the minimum DOT approved General Services Administration ambu-
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lance design, which calls for either a van or modular vehicle with 60"
headroom. Clearly, for existing services, this requirement would mean re-
placing the vehicle they were presently using. The additional provision
for, the phasing in of vehicles with a lead time of 2 years still did not
remove the stipulation that all vehicles be of the van or modular type.
Thus these regulations caused the biggest problems for the state's existing
ambulance services, and they had to meet these specifications before the
DPH would grant them a license.
Both the vehicle and training regulations incited even greater pro-
test because they tried to change the manner in which local agencies were
providing EMS services. First, police departments typically used dual
purpose vehicles and under DPH regulation all of these would have to be
replaced by 1977. Similarly, police departments and fire departments often
used their entire force in ambulance duty, and thus under the law the
entire force had to be trained in 3 years. The cost of training and over-
time pay for those attending the courses was not easily included in small
town budgets. The sparsely populated parts of the state, especially the
western portion, voiced the loudest protests at the hearings about the
hardship such regulations would place on the services located there and
on the budgets of the towns.
The differences among the towns and their ability to budget for EMS
services was accounted for in a special waiver allowing a 5 year confor-
mance period for sparsely populated areas. Its effect in stemming pro-
test was minimal for two reasons. First, the waiver was only for munici-
pally run services and consequently the private services were not assisted
and second, no money was appropriated with the legislation, leaving towns
and city agencies with cause to resist the regulations of the law.
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Thus, while the ambulance law served to strengthen the status of OEMS
in relation to the power structure of the system, and provided a strong
potential for monumental improvements in the transportation component,
it detracted from OEMS's concentration on the hospitals as the focal
point of the EMS system.
The Emergence of the State EMS System
Despite local protest, due to the ambulance law, there were external
factors which intensified the role of OEMS in building an EMS system.
One factor was the passage of federal legislation in the fall of 1973
which initiated the largest program yet in the improvement and develop-
ment of EMS systems. President Nixon signed the Emergency Medical Ser-
vices Systems Act of 1973 into law at the same time the state had received
the power to regulate ambulances and ambulance services. Also, the state
was still pursuing DOT funding and the passage of this Act served as an
incentive to complete a plan that could be submitted to both DOT and HEW.
In April of 1974, the DOT plan was completed and approved and re-
flected the relationship that had evolved between the "B" agencies and OEMS.
Because the "B" agencies had lagged behind in the activities mandated by
OEMS, they were not in the best favor with the state. Thus the completed
DOT plan,which served as the application to HEW,mentioned the "B" agencies
many times in reference to the good job they had done in getting the system
going initially and in creating regional networks. Critically, however,
they were never mentioned specifically as the subcontractors in the EMSS
Act grant proposal. This implied that the power to direct the system would
be strongly defended by the state.
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As expected, the "B" agencies did make an attempt to strengthen their
position. During the required reviewing process, they demanded to be the
subcontractors. They invited themselves to a state EMS executive committee
meeting of MDPH and confronted the issue. The OEMS representatives argued that
the must have control over the regional activities since they were not
satisfied with the progress of the "B" agency EMS Projects. The "B"
agencies opposed the state by insinuating that they wouldn't approve the
proposal if they were not specified as the subcontractors. But they too
needed the HEW funds to maintain their programs and they were appeased
somewhat by a letter from Commissioner Bicknell which commended the actions
of the EMS projects and stated that the continuing involvement of the "B"
agencies would add considerable strength to the proposal.
This conflict with the "B" agencies culminated in a year of similar
conflicts due to the changed relationship between the "B" agencies and the
state. Under Tri-State, they had been allowed to construct their own
agendas, but when the state took over the program, they were given per-
formance contracts with specific tasks to complete. These tasks were the
same for each agency and were to be executed with respect to the same time
frame. In essence, Massachusetts was trying to achieve a statewide con-
formance to a program of EMS. Moreover, it indicated to the "B" agencies
that they were longer permitted to do as they pleased.
In June 1974, when DHEW awarded Massachusetts $1.9 million in EMSS
Act funds, then the stage was set for the implementation of the state
program for developng EMS systems. The money from the grant was pooled
with the remaining funds from TRMP to expand the staff further. OEMS
was now supporting approximately 60 people, including central and regional
staff. The completion of the DOT plan resumed the flow of money for ambu-
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lances to Massachusetts. OEMS joined with the Governor's Highway Safety
Bureau to create a joint allocation program using identical criteria.
Not surprisingly, the objectives of the state program were to es-
tablish sustaining mechanisms at all previously involved levels -- state,
regional and area. The proposal used the minimum standards of the federal
legislation and the state ambulance law to evidence their ability to up-
grade the equipment and personnel in the transportation component of the
system. The network of sustaining mechanisms was composed of a broad
committee structure topped off by the OEMS staff and the state EMS Care
Advisory Board, and fanned out to regional EMS committees corresponding to
the "B" agency geography, and then sub-regional area committees which the
"B" agency EMS projects would determine and guide. The components of the
EMS system would be represented in the committees and would serve to
educate all the providers and consumers about the operation of the state
system plan.
The important part of the Massachusetts program is the way in which
the statewide EMS system is defined and constructed. The state is divided
into regions primarily based on "B" agency boundaries, and areas based on
hospital care capabilities. This is unique because in the past, the EMS
system was thought of as an ambulance system due to the DOT program. The
concepts of regional EMS systems are embedded in these system-defined
geographical areas. Once the boundaries were determined, those providing
emergency medical services within an area boundary began the activities of
designing and implementing a system based on local needs. The orders
come from the top down, but the activities emerge from the bottom up.
The simultaneity of the area development is designed to eventually lead
to regional systems coordinated under the state OEMS.
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This conception of an EMS system evolved from the merging of two
planning strategies, and was molded by what the federally funded programs
would subsidize. The standard planning theory, practiced before OEMS
took control of the state system, served to identify the parts and actors
in the EMS system. The OEMS coordination methodology took these parts and
assumed that they would logically connect through .a common focus on hospital
care. Finally, hospitals then became the standard around which geographical
boundaries could be defined and around which those involved in providing
EMS could identify.
The importance of the identification process between the EMS pro-
viders and the state's idea of an EMS "system" is exemplified in the re-
mainder of the case study. Spawned by the "B" agencies, area committees
began to formulate notions of how an EMS system could meet their local
needs. As the next section will show, these activities in the context of
the state and regional ("B" agency) EMS system conceptions, begin to re-
flect ways in which regionalization can and cannot alter the organization
and operation of EMS.
-81-
The Regional Setting: A Translation of the State EMS Concept
The CHP "B" agencies were initially defined by Tri-State as the
regional vehicle for planning and implementing EMS systems based on local
needs. OEMS continued to rely on these agencies even when the state assumed
control of the EMS program. The "B" agencies continually found themselves
sandwiched between the state and local interests, but because they were
under strict contract with OEMS, the "B" agencies had to persistantly con-
front the implementation problems of the state program. Certainly one of
the "B" agency's greatest difficulties in developing regional EMS systems
was working with these local constraints within the state. EMS program.
The following section explores the history of the North Shore Health
Planning Council EMS Project, a "B" agency which typifies the problems
of translating the state objectives for EMS into a "regionalized" system.
Whatever success the NSHPC achieved in becoming an active force in regional
EMS planning, it demonstrates the problems imposed on implementation efforts
by the structure of the medical industry and of regional government.
The North Shore Health Planning Council
The North Shore Health Planning Council (NSHPC) is the CHP "B" agency
for Region IV, one of eight Regions in the state of Massachusetts. The
regional planning agencies are established pursuant to Section 314(b) of
the Comprehensive Health Planning and Services Act, and their charge is to
serve as the regional coordinator for planning activities under the state-
wide 314(a) agency. In this capacity, the regional health planning
councils have a broad range of responsibilities for the development of a
regional plan for the delivery of all health care services in their areas.
These responsibilities include such things as reviewing Certificate of
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Need applications to the state Public Health Council for expansions of
health care facilities, providing technical assistance to local health
care facilities, and the like. Their primary responsibility remains, how-
ever, the development of a plan that tailors the characteristicsof health
facilities and activities to the needs of the region. The activities that
are set out for the "B" agencies in the Comprehensive Health Planning
legislation follow a traditional approach to planning -- collecting base-
line data, extracting from the data performance criteria and goals, and
developing plans for meeting these goals.
The NSHPC had only passing involvement in EMS in the past, though it
officially had a "planning capability" in its role as a health planning
agency. It had made several forays into EMS, mostly concerned with communi-
cations among the EMS components, but these efforts had received no follow-
up activity due to the lack of EMS staff and resources. Thus in March 1972,
when the NSHPC and the other "B" agencies received notice from Tri-State
Regional Medical Program of HEW's grant program for the planning and de-
velopment of EMS systems, the Council viewed the opportunity to plan for
EMS as a natural extension of their other regional health planning efforts,
and prepared to adopt EMS planning into their repertoire. Critically,
their assumption was that they could apply the basic CHP planning structure
to the EMS System, with the primary difference being a subcontract with
TRMP rather than the DPH (their 314(a) agency). The problems inherent in
the assumption that EMS and CHP strategies were compatible had to be faced
immediately when the proposal was approved in July, and the "B" agency had
no EMS people on their staff, with Carroll Colby, director of the NSHPC,
serving as acting director of the new EMS project during its initial months.
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With the funding of the initial Tri-State RMP proposal, regional
planning for EMS came to Massachusetts for the first time in the form of
the TRMP subcontract with the 314(b) regional CHP agencies. The subcontract
specified that the "B" agencies were to establish a regional EMS office
in their agencies, responsible to the Board of Directors, which would be
responsible for EMS planning activities at the regional level. These EMS
Projects were to organize community advisory boards, conduct community
education programs, plan the organization of services with appropriate
cooperation and communications between the various components and analyze
EMS utilization and patient origin.
The NSHPC EMS Project
The Project Staff, in following the approach that had been used by
the NSHPC successfully in the past, encountered a number of problems, not
the least of which pertained to relationships with the non-health agencies
in EMS. They began by ambitiously trying to establish a system of liaisons
with all the providers of EMS in the region through the formation of a num-
ber of committees. The primary component of this committee structure was
to be a Regional EMS Advisory Committee to the Board of the Council that
was to be "broadly representative of the emergency medical interest of the
Region and consumers, to provide a single point of contact and coordination
2for EMS System planning and development in the region". With this Advisory
Committee as an instrument, the EMS Project was to undertake an extensive
work program that focused on regional plan development and implementation.
The preliminary planning activities for the Project were as ambitious
as its mandate to involve all the providers: to collect data on ambulance
and emergency room services and to prepare an analysis to be used in de-
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signing plans for the future arrangements of these services. These first
year activities were to be followed by two years of refining the data and
using it in the development of a comprehensive plan for the region's EMS
system. In addition, the Project was to cooperate with other "B" agency
EMS Projects in working toward a compatible regional communication system
linking all emergency services in their region and nearby areas and to
cooperate with the state and TRMP to establish ongoing training for the
personnel in the EMS system, including physicians, ambulance attendants and
emergency room personnel.
Responding to these directives, the North Shore EMS Project began in
September of 1972, with a temporary part-time director, and the first
tasks were to put together the region's organizational structure, particular-
ly the Regional EMS Advisory Comriittee. The Committee was convened in
September with representatives of the hospitals, ambulance services, police
and fire departments and consumer involved from the initial stages of pro-
ject activity. 3 During this initial period, the Committee met several
times and prepared an initial inventory of EMS resources in the region.
During the first several months, the Project was able to accomplish
very little. This was due, in part, to the lack of staff, but also the
guidance offered to the EMS Projects by TRMP was minimal and the state had
yet to establish an EMS agency to oversee the "B"'s activities. This lack
of guidance was to continue throughout the period that the "B" agencies were
under subcontract with TRMP. This resulted in the EMS Projects operating
largely independently of state-level activities once they were initiated and
independent of the ongoing activities of the other Projects. It was also
the basis of considerable turmoil between the State and the Projects when
the state began to assert its programs. Eventually the "B" agencies would
be placed under performance contract by the State in an effort to reduce
-85-
this conflict but, at this stage, the contracts with TRMP were little
more than agreements of principle. More important, the committee struc-
ture, at that time, was very tentative, and most committee activities were
directed solely toward establishing initial contacts and relationships
with EMS providers in the Region and familiarizing them with the goals of
the Project.
The committee structure was critical to the successful functioning of
the Project in two ways -- in meeting their contractual obligations and in
establishing working relationships with the providers of EMS in the Region.
The central element of the structure was the Advisory Committee, which was
intended to serve as the main policy-making and direction-setting body of
the Project. Initially, however, the staff was placed in these policy-making
positions due to the start-Up difficulties of the committees. It took a
considerable amount of time and effort by the staff before the Committee
began to take its own initiative in generating activities for the Project.
The Committee was to appoint Task Forces, from among its membership, to go
deeply into the different EMS components. Their initial attempts to
develop ongoing Task Forces were largely unsuccessful, because the range
of problems and directions in the component areas had not been sufficiently
detailed, which resulted in a tendency to work on individual projects and
disband upon their completion.
It was a long time before the Task Forces showed signs of becoming
self-sustaining. This required them to have explored their functional areas
to the point where they could generate their own work programs, and, until
that point was reached, their activities generally resulted from suggestions
from the Project staff and tended to be mostly geared to the fulfillment of
the Project's contractual agreements. The Committee structure eventually
generated a work program for the Project, which went into effect in January
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of 1973, that included resource inventories, verifying the appropriateness
of the Regional boundaries, establishing a legislative task force to lobby
for the state's Ambulance Law, and sponsoring a regional EMS conference.
The purpose of the conference was to introduce the community and professionals
to the Project and the concept of EMS systems, as well as motivate in-
terest to begin work toward the long-range planning goals of the TRMP pro-
posal.
Since the beginning,the Project's EMS activities had proceeded in-
dependent of pressure from TRMP and the State (which was just establishing
its Office of EMS). But this situation was soon to be drastically altered
as TRMP faded out of the state EMS activities and the state OEMS gained
power and authority over the state program. The sequence of events sur-
rouding' the transformation of Massachusetts EMS from TRMP to OEMS was one
of the most crucial periods for the EMS Projects and their relationship to
the state program.
The Impacts of the RMP Phaseout
In February, TRMP was preoccupied with matters other than the success
of the Projects. Within days of the Region IV conference (held February
28, 1973), the EMS Project received news that HEW was attempting to phase-
out the RMP program, and with it, the EMS money that was providing their
sole support. In the ensuing months, the activities of the Project were
directed almost exclusively at altering their plans and efforts to conform
with TRMP's interpretation of the latest predilections of Washington. The
interpretations changed from month to month, with corresponding changes in
the thrust of Project activities. In addition to contributing to a general
feeling of disorientation among staff and committee members, this un-
fortunate turn of events made it impossible to follow up on the activities
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of the regional conference, and caused untold delays and alterations in
the work program.
The turmoil in the EMS Projects culminated in an HEW site visit that
increased the pressures for state control over the Projects. The problems
that HEW saw in the Massachusetts programs revolved around the independence
of the Projects. Thus, when OEMS offered to assume control over the regional
activities, a new direction, defined by OEMS was established for the Pro-
jects.
While some of the Projects had difficulty adapting to the new policies,
thus in turn, causing considerable problems in the relationships between the
state and the regions in the following year, the North Shore Project was
in a good position to conform to the state's directives. The Activities
Report of the Project, issued May 5, 1973, in conjunction with the HEW site
visit, listed the following accomplishments in the period from September
through January 15: the development of the advisory committee, an in-
ventory of emergency resources in Region IV, and preparation of the socio-
economic profile of the region. In the next phase of operations, commencing
with the hiring of Polly Mansfield, as director, Task Forces were establish-
ed in Transportation, Training, Communications and Legislation. The
Transportation Task Force initiated plans for an ambulance survey in the
Region, plans which had to be dropped when the State announced its inten-
tions of performing a similar survey state-wide. The Communications Task
Force had remained inactive during this period, although the director was
pursuing investigations into a potential application to the Robert Wood
Johnson Foundation's grant progrmr, in cooperation with the Health Planning
Council for Greater Boston's EMS Project, for a regional EMS communications
system. The Training Task Force was involved in efforts to obtain hospital
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sponsorship of EMT courses, and was also responding to other state efforts
in the training area.
The EMS Project Under the State Program
Up to this point, the activities of the Project had been mostly
restricted to start-up procedures and.responding to such outside influences
as the TRMP difficulties and the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Request for
Proposal. But, in the process of responding to these initial necessities,
the Project had accomplished one objective that contributed immensely to
its ability to respond to the directions that were to come from OEMS in the
future. In having to alter its priorities every month, and in the pro-
cess of making several false starts in areas that the State was later to
subsume into its own work plan, the Project had made initial working con-
tact, out of necessity, with EMS people in all the functional areas of its
region. The contacts of its parent agency, the NSHPC, had proven to be
very useful in the development of the EMS Project's committee structure.
The Regional Advisory Committee, particularly, had developed a core of
participants that were committed to working with the Project, and several
of the members had undertaken independent projects in their own communities.
The whole structure, though ineffective in its past roles, was an ideal
basis from which to pursue the State's conception of hospital capability-
based regional EMS networks.
The effects of the Project's new responsibility to the State weren't
manifested until the North Shore EMS Project submitted its plan to OEMS.
At that point, the State's increasing emphasis on decentralizing planning
activities became clear. The work plan that emerged from the Spring of
1973 for the North Shore EMS Project had essentially the same flavor as had
the initial plans. The Project was still very much in keeping with the "B"
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agency planning ideology, and, in their proposal to MDPH, they outlined a
program that followed the trajectory of data collection, identification of
information deficiencies, development of planning standards and requirements
on an Area level, and integration of Area plans with one another. The
proposal definitely reflected the approach of defining measurable criteria
and developing plans for achieving these criteria.
During the summer, however, OEMS was preparing its final proposal to
HEW for takeover of the TRMP program and required proposals from the EMS
Projects to fit more closely into the OEMS program directions. The new
proposal for the Project, effective October 1, 1973, introduced a new
thrust for the Project, placing an emphasis on the development of Area
EMS Committees that would serve the purpose of the Advisory Committee, on
a smaller scale. The Area Committees, specified by the OEMS, were designed
to provide the ultimate planning, interactions, and implementation in the
EMS communities. They were to involve the Area EMS personnel in the planning
and implementation process, and, by so doing, cultivate an understanding
and support of the institutions and services that the planning results
would effect. These Area Committees were to oversee the development of
Area EMS networks, whose boundaries were based on the capabilities of the
Hospital Emergency Departments and the needs of the communities involved.
At this point, then, the EMS Project had stepped directly into the role
envisioned by the State and as would be reflected in the EMSS Act. The
Projects were to serve as the implementation arm of the State's strategy
for developing regional EMS systems composed of smaller Area EMS Networks.
This approach to EMS regionalization anticipated the pending federal EMSS
Act, in the sense that it envisioned establishing regional EMS systems by
initially defining boundaries of service areas based on the "collective
care" capabilities of the EMS facilities within them. The Area Committees
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were expected to play a critical role in this process of establishing the
relationships between the facilities necessary to operationalize these
Networks. Thus, the North Shore Project, with its existing committee
structure, was in excellent position to implement the new decentralized
organization proposed by the State.
The process of implementing the new committee structure was carefully
laid out in the Project'sproposal to OEMS and closely tied to relationships
with hospitals. The Area Committees were to evaluate the existing Regional
and Area boundaries (which had their origins in the Department of Mental
Health's regional setup) and recommend new ones as necessary. The initial
thrust of the Committees was an indepth study of hospital emergency de-
partment utilization and assessment of their emergency capabilities, in
order to provide the data necessary for the establishment of the Area
boundaries. Only then was provision made to establish Area Transportation
Committees that would organize the transportation facilities within the
Areas into a system that would effectively interact with the hospital net-
work. As a last step, the communications, training and public education
components would be consolidated into The Area Committees, which in theory
would have developed the capability of administering a regional EMS system
within their boundaries.
The Area Network concept and its strategy for implementation re-
presents the first significant infusions of state ideology into the EMS
Project's work plan. The North Shore accepted this infusion more readily
than most Projects shaving devoted much of their past efforts to an im-
plementation process much like that envisioned by OEMS. The trajectories
of the other Projects in the state, however, had become quite diverse by the
latter part of 1973. This differentiation, arising from the laxness of
TRIMP control and from the confusion over funding continuity, was evidence.
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in the degree to which some of the Projects had departed from the TRMP
planning approach. While their original orientation had been mainly to
the functional areas of training and communications, some of the regions
had retained these ties and others, particularly the North Shore, had
shifted to hospitals and other areas. The Cape Cod region had received a
Robert Wood Johnson Foundation grant of $400,000 to implement a regional
communications network, for example, and the Regions in the Western part
of the state were preoccupied with the Ambulance Law passed in October.
The North Shore Project was working in all these areas, but the primary
focus was on the hospitals, which was the institutional base adopted by
OEMS.
Even though their focus-appeared to be similar to that of OEMS, a
conflict still existed in the Project's specific strategies for operation-
alizing that focus. The Project structure was established with the
CHP planning approach in mind, using the committee structure to pursue the
immediate development of a regional plan (the traditional "B" agency approach);
kfiile the state planned to use the structure to develop communication,
working relationships, and understanding among the providers represented
on the committees, the other Projects were faced with similar, though
often more severe, conflicts with the state approach. In the process
of writing the 1973 HEW proposal, OEMS had thoroughly reviewed the Projects'
components of the proposal and forwarded them to Washington, in many
cases, with expressions of displeasure and promises of reforms to be made.
Their attempts at reforming the Projects' activities in the coming year
resulted in much friction between OEMS and the Regions, and these initial
differences were to be exacerbated by further developments during the pro-
gram year, particularly the passage of the Ambulance Law and the contract
renewal process.
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In addition to the initial differences in approach between the state
and the regions, the local interrelationships envisioned by the state had
the potential to place even the most cooperative EMS Projects in very un-
comfortable positions. As proposed by OEMS, the Area Network concept gave
the EMS Projects the general responsibility for developing interrelations
among very volatile institutions that were not accustomed to relating in
formal fashions. For example, the EMS Project's primary responsibility
was to join together hospitals on Area Hospital/Medical Committees to
discuss such delicate subjects as diverting patients from one facility to
another based on superior emergency care capabilities in the latter,
formalizing transfer protocols and the like. The traditional atmosphere
in which hospitals interrelate is one of jealousy, parochialism and com-
petitiveness.
With this as a beginning, the Projects were then to expand their
activities to deal with developing cooperation among town ambulance ser-
vices, which tend to operate in an atmosphere similar to, if not more
intense than that of the hospitals. It was the responsibility of the
Projects to deal with these situations on a day-to-day basis, responding to
the local needs, obtaining state resources and assistance and at the same
time, guiding the local providers along a path that would eventually re-
sult in Area EMS Networks.
The passage of the Ambulance Law created additional problems for the
EMS projects in their efforts to implement the area concept. To some ex-
tent the Law added significantly to the importance with which the EMS
Projects were viewed in the communities. The Law effected towns in two
major areas -- training of ambulance attendants and upgrading the quality of
the vehicles used in the services. With these considerations in mind, a
number of communities began to utilize the Project to provide technical
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consultation in the process of reviewing their services for compliance
with the Law. The training Task Force became important in cooperating
with the state and with Blue Cross (who provided funding) to set up
hospital-based EMT courses for communities wishing to train their ambulance
staffs.
At the same time, however, the Law created even greater difficulties
for relationships between the Projects and the State. The fact that the
Projects were working more closely with a wider spectrum of community EMS
providers was, of course, to be desired in terms of the enhanced coopera-
tion it could foster , but it created difficulties in two particular ways.
First, the assistance that local providers requested was not always in
concert with state desires. Many of the local providers were intent on
fighting the rules and regulations that were being promulgated by the
state, and this created obvious difficulties for the Projects. In addi-
tion, the Law naturally resulted in an increased focus on the transporta-
tion component which, in some cases, diffused the Project's attentions
from their hospital-related primary directions. Projects which had pre-
viously focused on transportation were, of course, most susceptible to this
tendency but, to some extent, the Law caused personnel diversion in all
the Projects.
The contract renewal process served as the final step in the esca-
lation of conflicts that had been brewing between the State and the EMS
Projects. The OEMS, in writing their proposal for EMSS Act money, triggered
an open battle for the continuation of the Projects subcontracts, which
resulted in, among other things, the replacement of two of the Directors
of the Regional EMS Projects. The most important outcome of this process,
however, was the eventual consolidation of Project activities under the
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control of OEMS. The conceptual and programmatic directions remained the
same, in terms of the Projects' activities, but the performance expecta-
tions were made somewhat more explicit and stringent. The proposal also
made it clear that the planning phase of the Project was ending and that
implementation was about to take over as the primary thrust of the programs,
both at the state and the regional levels.
The North Shore Project, however, emerged relatively unscathed from the
proposal-writing process. With the influx of EMSS Act funds, the staff
of the Project had grown and, as a result, was able to expand the Project's
activities to deal with the additional directions it was facing. The
Ambulance Law had added both to the workload of the Project staff and to
its influence in the region, and the EMSS Act had considerably refined
the expectations that the state was placing on the activities of the EMS
Projects. The North Shore Project's proposal and work program for the
period of October 1974 through June 1975, clearly reflects this refine-
ment.
In the next section, we will explore some of the activities of the
Project, in one of its Areas, in its attempt to move toward the imple-
mentation of an Area EMS Network. We will deal primarily with the issues
and interactions occurring in the formulation of an Area hospital network
and with efforts to establish a regional ambulance service in the Area.
The North Shore Project, with its record of following (or, in many cases,
preceding) the state's programmatic directions, provides a good framework
for examining the issues and problems in the Area Network concept and in
regional EMS delivery.
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Local EMS Activities: An Examination of the Greater-Lynn Area
The case thus far has traced the evolution of state activities and the
influences on the NSHPC regional level. Its final focus is on the local
reaction to these regional and statewide programs in the Greater Lynn
Area, which characterizes the conflicts and incompatibilities in a state
coordinated but locally operated public service system, and the interactions
of the organizational structures on a regional level. In order to fully
understand the relationships between towns, agencies, and institutions,
we first present the demographic characteristics of Region IV identified by
the NSHPC as the regional context. These characteristics serve as important
indicators of local institutional interests, of possible opposition to the
regionalization of EMS, and the potential dynamics of creating an EMS
System in this region.
An Introduction to Region IV
Region IV is heterogeneous in nearly every respect. Comprised of 27
cities and towns with a total population of over 650,000, the communities
range from highly urbanized industrial cities such as Lynn to rural areas
such as Essex in the Cape Ann section of the region. The area covered by
the NSHPC extends from several miles north of the border of Boston as far
North along the coast as Cape Ann and some twenty miles inland. Thus,
a broad span of the socio-economic spectrum is included in the region,
from wealthy professional communities to decaying industrial areas. In
the original DMH arrangement, Region IV was divided into five Areas, but
the EMS Project has tentatively defined three Areas as the geographic
sections that will be developed as Area EMS networks. We have focused
our efforts on the section they have termed Area 19, and in particular, on
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five municipalities in that Area.
The five towns on which we will concentrate are Peabody (population
48,080), Lynn (90,294), Lynnfield (10,826), Saugus (25,110) and Swampscott
(13,578). 4While Area 19 includes three other towns -- Salem, Marblehead,
and Nahant -- we will in general be analyzing relationships only among
these five communities, and for simplicity, we will be referring to the
first five towns as Area 19. The socio-economic makeup of the population,
geographical eccentricities, forms of government and existing EMS resources
within the Area all play a part in some of the problems the EMS Project
has encountered in Area 19. In particular, differences in the abilities of
their residents to pay for services appears to play an important role in
the willingness of towns to undertake cooperative arrangements for service
provision. In Area 19, considerable differences in the economies of
the towns has proven an important factor limiting the EMS Project's
ability to foster regional cooperation, especially in the provision of
ambulance service.
The Area, in the extreme southern portion of Essex County, is centered
around the city of Lynn, an old industrial city with several large
appliance manufacturing installations inside its borders. The economy of
the city has been on the decline for a number of years, resulting in the
concentration of most of the poverty areas of Area 19 within Lynn. The
residences in Lynn are mostly two and three story walkups, with suburban
areas located in West Lynn and in the other towns in the area. Peabody
also has a substantial industrial base, but, along with Swampscott and
Lynnfield, serve as middle and upper middle income suburbs to Lynn, and as
a professional residential community. The coastal portions of the Area
serve as a resort area for the Greater Boston area. The town of Saugus is
primarily a middle income blue and white collar residential area.
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The political structure of town government also plays an important
role in the responses of the towns to proposals for changing their EMS
provision. The structure of town expenditures and the differing levels of
public exposure of actors in the political process came into play in the
decisions that were made in considering alternative arrangements for ambu-
lance services. Decisions about the EMS activities of Lynn, too, in parti-
cular, were strongly shaped by these types of political factors.
With the exceptions of Lynn and Peabody, the towns in the area use
a town-manager town meeting form of government, peculiar to New England,
in which the authority to allocate town funds is reserved by the town
meeting of all residents, and the executive functions of the towns are
served by an elected Board of Selectmen and a town manager, who provide
the day-to-day administrative functioning for the towns. Lynn and Peabody
use a strong city council, weak mayor form of government, in which the town
decision-making takes place through council ordinances executed by the
mayor.
In order to understand the particular problems faced by the EMS
Project in Area 19, it is important to be familiar with the resources in
the Area. The project's objective was to assess the appropriateness of
the EMS facilities, treatment patterns, and transportation capabilities,
and bring together the providers of EMS to organize these resources more
effectively. A presentation of the current resources and their operations
is necessary to understand the Project's objectives and processes of change
in each of the EMS system components.
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Current EMS Resources
The hospitals in the area are well located to provide emergency care
and have well-established policies for handling emergency cases. There
are four hospitals in the Area which provide emergency services. (See
map 1) Two of them, Lynn Hospital and Union Hospital, are located in the
city of Lynn, on Route 129, approximately four miles apart. Lynn is in
the center of town and Union is located in the middle class suburbs near
the Lynnfield and Peabody borders; J.B. Thomas Hospital is in the center
of Peabody; and Saugus General Hospital lies on the eastern outskirts of
Saugus, near the Lynn border. In addition, the Mary A. Allen Hospital in
Marblehead and Salem Hospital in Salem provide emergency services in the
Area. The major hospitals, in terms of size and staffing are Salem and
Lynn, which contain some of the more specialized and expensive equipment
in the Area. Clearly, these hospitals are well located for fast easy
access to the closest emergency department (as are the hospitals in the
other Areas of Region IV), so that all parts of the towns in Area 19 have
hospitals within 10 minutes travel time. In these sense, the Area is a
somewhat typical suburban region with well-dispersed and numerous emergency
care facilities.
Judged by the quality of care,5 the hospitals are fairly uniform for
"routine" cases but individually have tended to develop specialized capa-
bilities and referral practices. Confronted with steady rises in demand
for services, the availability of resources, and the pressures of being
"community hospitals", the hospitals expanded at approximately the same
rate until the early Seventies. With the exception of differentials in the
availability of certain specialists and expensive and highly specialized
equipment (such as the cobalt therapy unit at Lynn), the Area 19 hospitals
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have all developed a very similar breadth of capabilities. The most
obvious differences in care capabilities may lie in the degree of care
available for a particular type of emergency in the different hospitals.
Specialists in the Area are typically on the staffs of several hospitals.
The specialists appear to have developed their own preferences of hospitals
in which to treat their most severe cases, based on their perceptions of
the depth of support capabilities available. In cases which require the
use of these specialized capabilities, transfers and referrals are routine
practice.
One implicit practice that has arisen is for the hospitals to handle
all but the most severe cases that arrive at the emergency department,
while the severe cases that require more indepth treatment are transferred
to a facility that can support that treatment capability. An average of
approximately 1% of emergency intakes are transferred to other hospitals.
When a patient is transferred from these hospitals, they are generally
transferred to another facility in the Area, with the teaching hospitals
in Boston, or specialized facilities like the North Shore Childrens Hospi-
tal, the primary exceptions.6
The ambulance services are the other main set of existing EMS re-
sources with which the Project must deal. The basic tasks of the Project's
involvement in transportation have required assisting in the implementation
of the Ambulance Law (i.e. quality assurance) and insuring the development
of appropriate interfaces with the emerging hospital network. The important
issues in these tasks revolve around the structure of the delivery of
ambulance services and the implications that this structure has for the
effectiveness of the efforts to develop a high-quality EMS Network.
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The provision of ambulance service, like hospital services, re-
flects well-entrenched methods of service provision, though not a coordi-
nated EMS system. The five towns in the area operate a total of seven
ambulances, three of which are provided under contract from private ambu-
lance companies, while the remaining four are operated by the police de-
partments in the towns. Due to the small population and size of most of
the towns in the Area, the ambulances are underutilized, indicating that
the vehicles are idle a considerable amount of the time so the ambulance
attendents infrequently use their medical skills. The towns that operate
police-run services are Lynn, Lynnfield and swampscott. The vehicles in
these towns are located at the police department headquarters in the center
of each town, with Lynn operating two vehicles, and Lynnfield and Swampscott
each using one. Peabody contracts to provide two vehicles, one located in
the rest of the town by Route 1. Saugus, similarly, is under private con-
tract for one vehicle located in the police headquarters in the center of
town.
For backup services to these formal facilities, Saugus and Lynn both
have rescue vehicles operated by their fire departments, and these vehicles
answer calls that come in when the regular vehicles are unavailable. An-
other common arrangement for provision of backup is an informal agreement
with a private service to respond to calls in congested situations.
Implications for Area 19's Objectives for Change
The overriding problem that is presented by the current arrangement
of resources in the Area is to organize them into a coherent system for the
delivery of EMS in the face of the diversity of settings in which they pre-
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sently operate. The EMS Project, in their attempt formulate an Area EMS
Network for Area 19, is faced with the task of confronting directly the
institutional and political conflicts that the present hospital and ambulance
services engender. Their efforts in this direction will provide us with an
understanding of these conflicts and their implications for the possibility
of joining EMS services in regional arrangements.
In particular, the perceived similarity of the hospitals' emergency
capabilities sets a difficult task for the EMS Project. Their objectives
require a refined definition of capabilities, far beyond those indicated by
the categorization scheme. They want the hospitals to state precisely their
capabilities to handle the six types of cases specified in the EMSS Act. 7
Furthermore, the hospitals should, according to the Project's program, or-
ganize their patient treatment protocols, in formal recognition of differ-
ences in capabilities, and take steps to make intake and transfer patterns
conform to this organization. As we have seen, the hospitals had developed
their own patterns of division of labor.
The main tasks imposed on the EMS Project for intervening in the ambu-
lance system are insuring that service exists for all those who need it,
training ambulance personnel to the level required by the Law (and maintain-
ing that level), establishing arrangements for secondary coverage (mutual
aid), and insuring the use of adequate vehicles to transport emergency
patients. The training and mutual aid areas are noticeably deficient in
Area 19. In an ambulance survey taken by the Project, the police services
contended that they maintain mutual aid agreements with surrounding towns,
but in situations where these agreements might be used, the most common
practice is to transport patients in police cruisers, or to call a private
service. A common complaint with using the private services for backup is
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that their response times tend to be unacceptably high according to police
department standards.
Taken together, in the face of potentially expensive legislated change
in the quality of service, these issues serve to raise fundamental questions
about the efficacy of continuing EMS services in their current form. The
immediate questions revolve around the potential status of the service --
municipal, private, non-profit -- and the cost of providing service in al-
ternative structures under the upgraded situation imposed by the Law.
Hospital Committees: Planning, Problems and Procrastination
The thrust of the planning initiatives of the NSHPC EMS Project re-
flects the State's emphasis on the hospitals as the center of regional EMS
systems. As a result of this emphasis, planning has revolved around the
hospital emergency care capabilities in six particular categories. The
categories (medical including cardiac, trauma, point/drug overdose, pedi-
atric/prenatal, psychiatric, and alcohol intoxification) 8 .are defined in
the federal EMSS Act guidelines and reiterated as part of the State's pro-
gram. The critically ill and injured patients in these categories, about
5% of the total real emergencies in all categories, were not considered
salvagable a few years ago but are now regarded as the patients whose lives
could be saved if definitive care is provided at the scene and at the appro-
priate facility. 9
The first effort of the NSHPC was to form hospital committees, in-
cluding the administrator, head ED nurse, and head ED physician of each
facility within the area boundaries. Each hospital committee's initial
agenda was to develop plans which recognized the different care capabilities
needed for the effective treatment of the several categories of emergency
patients and the differential capabilities of the individual facilities to
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care for patients in each of these categories. These plans, called point
of entry plans, addressed the sorting of patients to appropriate facilities
after entry into the EMS transportation system. These plans can affect
only those patients the system can now control, that is ambulance patients.
Thus, if a severe burn patient was picked up by an ambulance and stabilized
at the scene in a town whose hospital is not able to treat that patient,
the ambulance attendant might make the decision to by-pass the closest
facility in favor of a more distant hospital capable of providing superior
burn care. The small number of real emergencies in these categories would
appear to make such planning activities relatively unthreatening to the
individual hospital. This should be especially true in Area 19, where all
the facilities are likely to be typed as routine, and the number of trans-
fers mandated by a plan would be especially small.
The process of pursuing a point of entry plan, on the other hand was
uncomplicated because the similar capabilities of the hospitals meant that
the category which would describe a facility did not prove to be useful
information for planning purposes. As a means of getting finer data, the
Project attempted to have the hospitals differentiate their own critical
care capabilities. While this approach may yield more useful information
for state and regional planning, the process does reveal problems with the
State's methodology of planning based on hospital self-definition., In fact,
the similarities between the hospitals and their desires to maintain a high
level of care capability have made the differentiation process long and
difficult.
It is important to note the problems of such a regional planning metho-
dology because it may indicate the potential barriers to the implerentation
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of the plans. When asking facilities in a defined geographical area to
develop their own hospital systems, planners must confront issues which
cannot be addressed with this strategy. In the Lynn area, the relationships
between the emergency department and the rest of the hospital -- the ED's
role in provision of primary medical care by hospitals, the percentage of
patients entering the hospital through the ED who are eventually admitted,
and the economic return of the emergency department patients -- may in-
fluence the degree to which a hospital administrator is willing to alter
the behavior of the facility to influence the flow of these patients.
Relationship of the ED to the Rest of the Hospital
All of the hospitals in the Greater Lynn area consider themselves
community hospitals, and this self-image makes them aware of certain pres-
sures from the "community". One of these pressures is the increased burden
of providing a greater majority of the primary health care which was pre-
viously furnished by the family physician. The decline of the general
practitioner has contributed to the view that the hospital is now the hub of
an organization of medical care programs that includes emergency depart-
ments, outpatient departments and home-care. 10
The increased flow of patients through the emergency and outpatient
departments has made hospitals more aware of their new perceived role and
image in the community. Anything which might reflect upon this image has
taken on an increased significance. Returning to the previous example, a
plan which would divert burn patients from a facility might, from the
hospital's viewpoint, negatively affect its relationship with the community
by carrying with it the implication that perhaps the hospital is not able
to care for other emergencies as well. In essence, the hospitals have been
asked to comply with a scheme that may be damaging to its participants.
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Implementing the program then, will require an effective public education
program which would provide information about which facilities residents
should use for particular problems, so that emergency department users
will not think that delineating care capabilities in a particular category
reflects on a facility's ability to treat patients in other categories.
Another relationship that exists between the emergency department and
the rest of the hospital is the flow of patients from intake in the emer-
gency department to inpatient beds. A certain percentage of patients that
enter the hospital from the emergency department end up as inpatients. If
this represents a high percentage of total inpatients, a decrease in the
number of emergency patients might reduce the hospitals ability to main-
tain their bed census. This data reflects on the utilization of the hospital,
and such information is frequently used by the hospitals to defend (their
need to expand. In addition, one criterion used by the decisionmakers in
reviewing the application for expansion is the hospital's normal occupancy
rate. Certainly a hospital would not like to divert patients from its
services if it would severely affect this occupancy rate.
A last major issue, and probably the one most commonly voiced, is the
economics of the ED-hospital relationship. Hospitals, in general, do not
keep very good records of their emergency departments so they cannot cite
figures which indicate if theirs is a profitable or losing operation. This
makes it difficult for them to assess the affects of reducing the number
of patients in a particular category on the profitability of the ED and the
rest of the hospital. But hospital administrators are well aware how much
the hospital gains or loses on patients with a given kind of insurance.
The sources of income to the hospital are divided up into third
party payments, self-pay, and unpaid accounts. Third party payments include
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such groups as Blue Cross, commercial insurance companies, Medicare,
Medicaid, Workmen's Compensation, etc. which reimburse the hospital at
different rates. Blue Cross, the federal government (Medicare), and the
state government (Medicaid), because they are wholesale buyers of health
care, reimburse on "cost." or "cost plus" basis, whereas the remainder of
the purchasers pay rates which are not directly related to the cost of
services to the hospital. Those who purchase health care without insurance
pay much higher retail prices which attempt to make up the deficit the
hospitals realize from the wholesale buyers and uncollectable bills. The
state government reimburses welfare patients (Medicaid) entirely for
emergency services rendered, but reimburses a flat rate for inpatient
hospital use. Often a large difference exists between the cost of a patient
to the hospital and the reimbursement structure which pays for the service.
In addition, the time until the fees for service are reimbursed varies
with the type of insurance. Private insurers usually provide prompt re-
imbursement although most insurance plans have some deductable costs from
the total charge to the patient, which may become uncollectable debts.
Government reimbursements, on the other hand, often become uncollectable
on the short term which can create a serious shortage of immediate cash
intake for the hospital. In the interim the hospital must find money to
pay its daily operating expenses. In situations where there is a severe
cash flow deficit because the hospital is waiting for reimbursement, a
facility is unable to support health programs for the residents that
might reinforce community rapport. This cash flow issue plays an important
part in the planning for emergency services in the Greater Lynn area.
These issues arise when regional planning presents the potential for
exchanging patients between facilities and hence altering the "mix" of in-
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surances that a hospital must rely on for part of its income. Regional
planning and cooperation has the potential of equalizing the deficit burden
on some of the hospitals, though at the disadvantage of others. Those
hospitals who have a large number of welfare patients, for example, where
the state government has been known to take in excess of three years to
reimburse, would like to have more patients who will pay amounts that will
cover their treatment costs and will pay cash so that the hospital has a
good cash flow balance.
Another effective way to alter patient mix is by controlling whether
the hospital's inpatient load arises from elective treatment patients or
emergency admissions. Elective treatment patients tend to be those who can
afford such health care and as a result usually have insurance that covers
most of the cost. This makes them more reliable economically than the
average emergency patient who could be anywhere from completely insured to
uninsured. The important potential of reallocating patients in a regional
system, then, is that those hospitals suffering poor cash flows from an
excess of welfare patients could receive more elective patients whose re-
imbursement may help counteract the cash deficit realized by welfare patients.
The immediate concern of the economic argument is to maintain a healthy
cash flow to meet day to day operation expenses.
Hospital Service Planning in Lynn
The problems which arise in accomplishing a point of entry plan are
illustrated by the efforts of the two hospitals located in the city of Lynn.
In this instance, each hospital found that the relationship between the
emergency department and the rest of the hospital became a source of diffi-
culties in the process of emergency care capability categorization. Al-
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though care capability categorization was not an immediate threat to the
emergency department operations of either hospital, the close relationship
of the ED and the overall stability of the hospitals led theadministrators
to fear that problems might occur in the inner operations of the hospital.
The two hospitals in Lynn are Lynn Hospital and Union Hospital. Lynn
Hospital is located close to the downtown area, in a much older and larger
facility, and has a long history of providing emergency health care for
Lynn residents. It is also the "city hospital" without any subsidy from
the city government. Union Hospital is located further from the center in
the more suburban parts of the city, and just opened it's emergency facility
for 24 hour service in July of 1974. Union is an example of a hospital
that didn't overexpand when most others did and so has a relatively well
controlled operation and a good financial base.
The locations of the two hospitals affect the type of patients who
compose the inpatient and user populations. Lynn Hospital has a much
larger percentage of welfare patients, which, from earlier discussions, means
it has a less healthy cash flow. They have a large outstanding debt from
the State which has been accumulating for over three years. Emergency
department patients generate many of Lynn's inpatients, and since the Lynn
Police Department ambulance brings 95% of the city's emergencies to Lynn,
they end up with a majority of the welfare inpatients. Union Hospital
does not receive many emergencies from the ambulance servicebut they cus-
tomarily get the elective patients who are displaced from Lynn Hospital due
to the influx of emergencies. From the standpoint of the public interest,
this situation is inefficient and possibly detrimental to overall quality of
service. Cooperation between the two hospitals potentially could equalize
the burden of the welfare patients and balance the distribution of elective
surgery to emergency patients so that the deficit suffered from the delayed
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reimbursement of the state be more equitably distributed. Cooperation of
this kind was attempted during the summer of 1974. The obstetrical/gynecolo-
gy unit at Union Hospital was unprofitable because the birth rate was drop-
ping and all the other hospitals in the area had ob/gyn units with low
utilization rates. This prompted an arrangement between Lynn and Union
Hospitals which resulted in Union closing their ob/gyn unit and Lynn taking
on the extra load of patients. But at the same'time, Union had increased
their emergency capabilities by contracting with a physicians group to
provide 24 hour coverage. Lynn could then send more emergencies to Union
to ease the burden on Lynn's emergency department and to compensate for the
decreased number of ob/gyn inpatients that Union would have.
This instance of regional cooperation would greatly improve the
elective surgery and emergency patient mix and the insurance mixes at both
hospitals. Significantly, however, the exchange never occured because
Lynn Hospital realized how many patients and how much money they would be
sending to Union Hospital. Union closed their ob/gyn unit but few emer-
gency patients came from Lynn Hospital.
This case illustrates that implementation issues as well as the plan-
ning issues must be considered when hospitals are asked to do their own
planning. It is also clear that in regional planning, these issues are
compounded because of the nonhomogeneity of the population in a region
that is defined around an urban area. The principal consequences of non-
homogeneity are primarily economic and force those hospitals with poor cash
flows to resist changes in the allocation of patients in their region if it
will alter the type of patients using their facility.
In the case of hospitals, those same considerations which give rise to
regional planning also promote insecurity in the relationships between faci-
lities. The ability to reallocate patients through regional planning can
-110-
potentially ensure that the most appropriate care is provided for the criti-
cally ill and injured, but it also might have negative effects on the hospi-
tal 's role in the community. The economic advantage gained from sharing
those patients who contribute to a cash flow deficit might also conflict
with other economic constraints, such as the need to do short term economic
planning and pay operating expenses. The fierce competition between the
facilities has hindered an honest confrontation of the realistic capabilities
of each hospital in conjunction with the economic issues. The cooperation
attempts between Lynn and Union Hospitals indicates that hospitals are only
beginning to see themselves as part of a system which collectively provides
the entire range of emergency care.
A general discussion of the hospitals' point of view evidences some
of the economic and role conflicts which affect the way hospitals will re-
act to regionalization. It is also apparent that adequate hospital re-
sources exist, but there is no direct linkage to EMS, and in particular,
regional EMS activities. This is further verified in an examination of the
activities which proceeded from the NSHPC's first intervention into the
hospital system. The differentiation of critical care capabilities and the
development of point of entry plans began to indicate some of the problems
of dealing with hospitals on a regional scale one level above the case of
two hospitals in the same city.
The Hospital Committee Confronts the Emergency Department Issue
The same economic and role conflicts which dominated the earlier Lynn-
Union debate surfaced in modified form at the hospital committee meetings,
usually in arguments stressing the hospitals' similar staffing patterns,
staff characteristics, and care capabilities. Important points of view were
put forth by both the hospital administrators and some of the physicians,
therefore it is important to recognize the various positions held by those
who composed the hospital committees.
The Interest Groups
The hospital administrators were the group with the largest number of
pressures and conflicting roles. They had to respond to the policies of the
hospital board of directors who are businesspeople rather than medical people.
The board certainly did not want the hospital to lose money. Another pres-
sure arose from the medical staff who control patient care. The staff's
priority was to provide the best care possible and this frequently took pre-
cedence over economic issues. The community placed immediate demands on
the hospital to provide all types of medical care, which affected the hos-
pital's efforts to plan for future needs. The state health department and
its regulatory powers were a potential threat to the way the administrator
might deal with the demands of local interests. Finally, there was the
economic condition of the individual hospital.
When the EMS Project placed the hospitals in a situation where they were
told to do their own planning, the administrators became overprotective of
their facilities. At the same time, due to all the conflicts, the adminis-
trators were vulnerable on many fronts. They wanted to save money, pro-
vide good comprehensive care, meet the community's needs, and avoid any down-
grading due to the state's regulations.
Some of the physicians, who were tied to a particular institutionfelt
the hospital specialization of emergency cases would affect their ability to
provide quality care. They thought the diversion of ambulance patients in a
particular category would reduce their ability to treat the same patients
who arrived at the facility by another mode of transportation because they
-112-
needed continual exposure to these patients to maintain their treatment
skills. These physicians also believed the ambulance attendants were not
capable of diagnosing a particular critical injury or illness in the field,
so the patient should always be taken to the nearest facility for stabiliza-
tion. In addition, they cited existing informal protocols for transfers as
evidence that formalisms were unnecessary since existing procedures ade-
quately provided for exceptional cases.
These physicians were countered by the specialist physicians whose
interests tended to be separate from a particular hospital. They rotated
through the facilities in the area and provided services to their patients
regardless of the hospital. These doctors were able to differentiate between
the facilities based on the support. capabilities they knew from their ex-
perience were available. They consequently saw the usefulness of categor-
izing these capabilities. In particular, one group of emergency physicians
which staffed both Lynn and Union's emergency departments, advocated the
categorization of facilities. But they also sensed a need to expand the
interests of the hospital committee to include the other EMS subsystems,
especially transportation and communications. These doctors witnessed
daily what they considered to be the mishandling of patients during trans-
port by the ambulance services. The lack of communications between the
hospital and the ambulance, especially prenotification of impending arrivals,
they felt, also left the physicians unprepared for some emergencies.
It is important to note, however, that neither the hospital administra-
tors nor the specialist physicians had a good knowledge of any EMS com-
ponent other than the hospital. The administrators and physicians were
aware of the issues involved in regional hospital planning and the linkages
that were necessary among the hospital, transportation and communications
systems to make the hospital component effective as the center of the EMS
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system. But they did not understand the way the other components of the
EMS system operated,and as a result, the hospital committee's later inter-
ventions into the communications and transportation systems reflected these
misunderstandings.
The hospital committee meetings served as a forum for the interplay
of these interest groups. Throughout the discussion the recurring theme was
that all the hospitals had the same care capabilities. The procrastination
in differentiating care capabilities and developing point of entry plans
was primarily due to the conflicts previously described. The powerful in-
terest groups, especially the hospital administrators, were wary to reveal
their own problems without similar information surfacing from the other
hospitals.
The NSHPC was caught between the State and the Hospital Committee.
The State required the EMS Project to provide assistance and guidance to the
committee in their planning activities and to stress the importance of re-
solving institutional conflicts. Conversely, the Hospital Committee was
pressuring the EMS Project to concede that the hospitals were similar enough
to eliminate the need for care capability categorization.
The state anticipated the reactions of the hospitals to this planning
strategy by the development of a questionnaire that sought to obtain uniform
information from all the hospitals for the evaluation of ED care capabilities.
The questionnaire, developed by a statewide physician committee, ensured
that a consistent mechanism was used across the state to guide the hospital
committee discussions and to identify the appropriate hospital point of entry
for emergencies in particular categories. The major intentions of the
questionnaire were to serve as a stimulus for honest disclosure of previously
confidential information, to provide an educational tool to teach the hos-
pital administrators about the capabilities of their ED and to tell the
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administrators what the state considered important in evaluating care
capabilities.
The questionnaire was successful in providing another pressure on the
hospital administrator. They were now answering the same questions and pro-
viding the same information. Along with the specialist physician's presence,
the results of the questionnaire furnished a more realistic set of data for
the eventual development of the point of entry plans. This planning
strategy, although not action oriented, created an environment where some
of the committee members were well motivated to act on these plans.
The Emergency Physicians Emerge as the White Hats
One important thing that emerged from this planning process was the
consciousness of the emergency physicians that more action had to occur and
that they were partly responsible for motivating that action. The phy-
sicians' concerns were transmitted, through the medium of the hospital
committee, to other actors in the system who were part of the hospital
committee. Two of their major complaints, the deficiencies in the communi-
cations system and the inadequacies of the transportation system, evolved
into attempts to implement programs -- neither of which involved emergency
departments directly. The initial development of a communications system
and the attempt to promote a regional ambulance service are processes which
suggest some important lessons in regional EMS planning and implementation.
The effort to implement a communications system points out a situation
where a hospital committee can get things accomplished despite the lack of a
well defined plan for action. Their attempts to rationalize emergency trans-
portation failed even with the existence of an operational plan for the
system. If both experiences are assessed in the same context, it becomes
clear that regionalization has limited power to alter the operation of an
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EMS system. What emerges is a set of considerations that reflect the
feasibility of regionalizing components of the EMS system given the
different nature of these components.
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The Development of a Regional Communications System
The extension of the hospital committee into the development and imple-
mentation of a communications system occured as a direct extention of the
interaction between the specialist physicians and the hospital administra-
tors. The problem of prenotification had continually plagued the ability
of the ED doctors to prepare for emergencies and to reroute patients when a
hospital was busy with other serious emergencies. If such communications
could be established, it was believed, cases would no longer overload one
facility while another in the area was not busy. Richard Jandl, administra-
tor of Union Hospital, adopted the idea of a regional communications system
as one the hospitals should develop and implement. It would not only enable
the transmittal of administrative information but also permit a dialogue
between the attendants in the field and the medical experts in the hospitals.
While these plans were being developed (in late 1974), no ambulances
had radios to connect them with hospitals and none of the hospitals had
base stations to communicate with the ambulances. It appeared to the plan-
ners that this lack of equipment was the only thing to prohibit a regional
communications system. The need for communications was voiced by the emer-
gency physicians in the hospital committee, and Union Hospital had reserve
funds to engage in a program to assist the health needs of the community.
The time was apparently ripe for some action to evolve.
The fact that the communications system was a prime target for the
Committee's initiative is not surprising in light of the way such a system
would function. Communications was an unthreatening component of an EMS
system because it was not embedded in an organizational or institutional
structure. There were no complications due to the non-homogeneity of the
towns or the unequal usage of the communications links because as the system
was envisioned, that is hospital to ambulance linkages, each town would
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own their ambulance radios and the hospitals would have their base stations.
Thus the program would be implemented so as to enable communications but
not involve any cost sharing. As a capital intensive component, communica-
tions would link medical knowledge, administrative notifications and calls
for service in an efficient information network. It could exploit the
agreement that all emergency medical personnel need to have the potential
to converse with each other quickly and easily. The barrier to implementa-
tion appeared to be a financial one that only needed initial money to buy
the equipment. Once in place, the radios and base stations would be almost
costless to operate and would require no reorganization of the provision of
services.
These characteristics of the particular hospital to ambulance system
permitted Dick Jandl to proceed without extensive preparation. A committ-
ment was made to build the system around a Federal Communications Commission
approved radio frequency, and the equipment for the hospital base stations
was ordered, using the funds from Union Hospital with the intent to seek
contributions from civic groups or the industrial sector. Having prepared a
system for Lynn, the Committee solicited the cooperation of the other towns.
Efforts to gain cooperation from the towns were not difficult given
Jandl's persistence. Since agreement had been reached that a radio system
was needed, the Hospital Committee organized itself to locate money to
support a region-wide communications network. In Lynnfield, Jandl's home-
town, he convinced two members of the Union Hospital Board of Directors to
support the project; Swampscott's money was raised by the committee respon-
sible for the ambulance service. Due to the favorable publicity given to
those who bought radios, the remainder of the towns readily joined the
regional system.
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There are critical points to be learned from the way the communica-
tions system was developed and implemented. The federal and state programs
to develop EMS systems involved expanding definitions of the types of ser-
vices that comprise EMS and developing upgraded and coordinated hospital
networks to serve as foci for an expanded system that included communica-
tions as one of the system components. In the Greater Lynn case, the com-
munications component did not previously exist, so the expansion of the EMS
system could proceed by establishing the communications network and then
identifying it as part of the hospital-based system. The fact that the
communications system did not exist prior to-the Hospital Committee inter-
vention was crucial to the implementation of the system because there were
no providers to include in the system planning process. More importantly,
there were no existing vested interests in the way the service had been
provided.
The EMS Project, while successfully implementing a communications net-
work, also turned to the problem of integrating the EMS transportation
services into the now growing network of emergency services. This venture
into the ambulance services failed despite the fact that the planners used
substantially the same methods as they had in their two previous attempts
to institute changes in EMS. Their defeat, which appears to derive from
the misapplication of their planning methods, the complexity of community
political interests surrounding ambulance services, the difficulties of
intermunicipal relationships, and some inherent flaws in the incentive
structure offered by the EMS legislation, provides an instructive con-
trast to the Committee's previous successes.
In the section that follows, we will trace the development of a
regional ambulance proposal from its initial planning stages through its
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eventual failure. In this development, we will observe some of the pro-
blems that the Project's planning process encountered as a result of their
isolation from the municipal decision structures in the region. The pro-
posal that was developed required, for its implementation, extensive inter-
ventions in the municipal provision of ambulance services and several im-
portant conflicts arose within the towns in response to this proposal.
From the proposal and other attempts at changing municipal ambulances that
occurred in the region, the patterns of conflict and isolation between the
planners, town officials and providers of service emerge as controlling
factors in all attempts to modify the way ambulance service is provided.
With the added complication of the plan's regional scope, the Project faced
the difficulties of resolving conflicts among the diverse towns as well as
within each town. In the face of these problems, it is not surprising
that the Project failed in its initial attempt at planning for the trans-
portation component. But in its failure, it uncovered some valuable insights
into the comparative incentives that must be provided to towns to insure
their adoption of such proposals, and into the planning process that is
required to minimize the conflicts that inhibit these changes.
The Transportation Planning Process
When the Project became involved in planning for the transportation
component of EMS, an important step was taken. Previously, the planning
activities had revolved almost exclusively around the development of the
hospital aspects of Area EMS Networks. These planning activities had
taken place in the Area Hospital Committees, internal to the hospitals
themselves. The extension of Project activities into transportation ser-
vices in the Area represented the first attempt to expand the process of
Area EMS planning to components that existed in other non-EMS systems, out-
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side the realm of the hospitals. As proposed by the EMSS Act and the OEMS
program, the Project hoped to expand the scope of planning activities by
establishing a "Task Force" in the transportation component. The Task
Force was to engage in activities in the transportation component that
paralleled the activities of the Area Hospital Committee in the hospital
component. As this was the first attempt by the Project to apply the Task
Force concept, it constitutes an important test of this mode of planning.
In Area 19, the Task Force planning mode was altered somewhat when
the Emergency Physicians Group provided the initial impetus to extend
the EMS Project's activities into the transportation component. In the
summer of 1974, several of the physicians had begun to express dissatis-
faction with the quality of the existing police ambulance service of the
city of Lynn and with the city's apparent lack of concern for complying
with the Ambulance Law. Several of the doctors recalled incidents where
apparent mistreatment in transit had worsened an emergency patient's con-
dition. They also noted that none of the Lynn police force had enrolled
in EMT Courses at the Union and Lynn Hospitals, the two hospitals served by
the Group. With these concerns in mind, Dr. James Wasco, the director of
the Lynn Emergency Physicians Group, contacted the EMS Project, and, with
the Project's assistance, began to plan alternatives to the Lynn Police
ambulance service. The people at these meetings, eventually constituted
by the EMS Project as the Greater Lynn Emergency Medical Transportation
Task Force, were motivated by a common concern about the quality of pre-
hospital EMS in Lynn. The Task Force had a membership which resembled that
of the Project's Hospital Area Committees'; Union and Lynn Hospitals were
represented by their emergency physicians and administrators, and the EMS
Project provided staff assistance to their efforts.
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Initially, the Task Force considered municipal alternatives to the
Lynn Police ambulance service. They examined the fire department, private
companies and the establishment of a new municipal EMS department as possi-
bilities, with the ambulances potentially stationed'at the two hospitals.
None of the municipal possibilities attracted much positive response, but
the concept of hospital-based ambulances suggested the formulation of a
non-profit EMS service that covered, regardless of municipal boundaries,
the entire service area of the hospitals. Once the Task Force had reached
this stage they began to assemble the details of their final recommendation
as an alternative to the police service -- a unified regional ambulance
service for the city of Lynn and four surrounding municipalities (Swampscott,
Peabody, Lynnfield and Saugus).
The Task Force, with its original hospital-centered membership supple-
mented by financial consultation from the comptroller of Lynn Hospital, deve-
loped the regional concept into a formal proposal and presented it to offi-
cials of the communities involved. The presentation, In September of 1974,
marked the completion of the Task Force's planning process, and the commence-
ment of attempts to implement a Greater Lynn ambulance service. In the
development of their plan, the Task Force had focused on the details of the
alternatives to the present system, rather than the necessary institutional
changes implied by their plan, and the political steps needed for its
accomplishment. This fact created problems when they had to confront the
providers and decision-makers who held sway over the actual delivery of
services.
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Problems with the Task Force's Approach
The primary flaw in the planning process undertaken by the Greater
Lynn Emergency Medical Transportation Task Force lies in the fact that those
who devised the plan and those who were to implement the plan were two
separate groups of people, each with its own set of concerns and decision
criteria. Those town officials and providers of service who were respon-
sible for ambulance services were concerned with issues of cost and institu-
tional relationships which the planners were not prepared to address, and
this situation contributed to the eventual demise of the plan. The decision
taken by the Project in adopting this mode of operation, therefore, must be
viewed as a procedural error with important consequences for future plan-
ning efforts for the components of EMS which involve a wider circle of
decisionmakers than the hospitals and medical community.
The Task Force model of EMS planning envisioned the application of the
Area Hospital Committee's approach to the other components. The Area Hospi-
tal Committee had included the providers and administrators of emergency
hospital services, thus including the entire range of concerned groups in
the planning process. The issues that surfaced in this process did not al-
ways relate directly to the provision of emergency service (e.g. the cash-
flow difficulties and patient mix problems in Area 19), but considering these
issues both resolved substantial conflicts among the interested groups and
increased the prestige of the Hospital Committee. The Transportation Task
Force, however, failed to engage a realistic range of concerned people to
address their issues.
The Transportation Task Force brought two sets of concerns to bear on
the ambulance services of Greater Lynn -- the medical concerns generated by
the emergency physicians and the Area Hospital Committee, and the ENS plan-
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ning concerns of the EMS Project dedicated to the development of an EMS
system for the Area. For instance, one of the basic features of the plan
was that all services for the towns would be performed by four vehicles with
36 attendants. The Task Force pointed out that these attendants would re-
ceive much more frequent exposure to emergency patients, which would enable
them to maintain their skills better than the 219 attendants currently ser-
ving the Area.11  Also, with the ambulances stationed at hospitals, the
attendants could receive ongoing training in the emergency rooms to supple-
ment their EMT skills. These arguments, among the major points presented
by the Task Force, illustrate their concern for quality of care and their
attempts to develop EMS systemsthrough proper planning for service provision,
and reflect the preoccupations of the Task Force's membership.
The nature of the Task Force's membership, while it closely resembled
that of the Area Hospital Committee, represents a major deviation from the
Area Hospital Committee's approach in its translation to the transportation
component because providers of ambulance service and political decision-
makers in the Area were not represented on the Task Force. As a result, the
concerns of the municipal providers of service were not adequately pre-
sented to the Task Force and the interactions that had occurred between plan-
ners and providers on the Hospital Committee were not paralleled in the Task
Force. In the case of the transportation plan, the health personnel partici-
pating in the Task Force, who had served as providers in the Hospital Com-
mittee, acted essentially only as planners since they played no role in the
provision of ambulance service. The ambulance providers, on the other hand,
had little expertise in hospital matters, nor were they planners. So, in
omitting ambulance providers from their membership, the Task Force failed to
preserve the elements of the Hospital Committee's successful process when
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they applied their planning model to the transportation. In effect, they
transferred the form but not the substance of their process to the transpor-
tation component. The efforts of the Task Force to change Lynn's ambulance
service illustrate clearly the difficulties inherent in the planning process
chosen by the Task Force.
Problems within the Task Force: The Health Decision Process
In February of 1975, long after the development of the regional plan,
the mayor of Lynn approached James Wasco, of the Emergency Physicians Group,
and Dick Jandl, the Union Hospital Administrator, about the possibility of
a hospital-run ambulance service for the city. In response to this request,
Jandl and the Task Force quickly reworked the -major aspects of the regional
plan into a hospital-run proposal for the mayor's consideration. The shift
that this necessitated (from an unspecified regional administrative body to
a hospital-run service) raised the first major problem in this implementation
effort of the Task Force. This shift constituted an inconsistency with a
position that Lynn Hospital had established early -in the regional planning
process. It was the Lynn Hospital's position that their cash flow deficit
would make it impossible for them to consider any subsidy of an ambulance
service for the city.
Six months later, an article appeared in the'lynn Daily Ited', prompted
by a press release from the mayor's office, that quoted him as saying that
the hospitals had offered to run the city's ambulance service. The publica-
tion of the idea in the'ItemIplaced Jandl in a rather embarassing situation
because it had mentioned both hospitals and Lynn Hospital had not yet been
approached on the subject. The article had also placed Harrison, the Lynn
administrator, in an uncomfortable position. His hospital could not afford
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to subsidize the service, but he was afraid that the article sounded like a
public commitment that the hospital had to meet or risk losing credibility
with the community.
The ambulance question, thus, had resurrected some of the problems that
had transpired in past relations between the two hospitals. Union, using
its favorable financial situation, was trying to increase the number of in-
patients in its recently expanded emergency department, and an ambulance ser-
vice might contribute to this effort. Lynn Hospital, while it could not be-
come financially involved in the ambulance venture, did not wish to lose any
public relations benefits that might accompany the service. These concerns
were resolved at a joint meeting of the Boards of the two hospitals, where
agreement was reached that Union would bear all costs of the service.
Another concern that was expressed at the meeting was a hesitance to
get involved in the political processes of the city. The hospitals follow-
ed this policy by awaiting a commitment from the city, before the hospital
service was activated. This commitment was never forthcoming, and, although
Jandle and other members of the Task Force continued to discuss alternatives
with the mayor and the city council, the hospitals never really pressed the
issue with the politicians or the public.
Two observations can be made about the health decision process on the
basis of this abortive attempt to become involved in municipal services.
First, the hospitals are relatively naive in their dealings with the poli-
tical process. The newspaper article essentially forced Union Hospital into
the agreement. It also prematurely upset Jandl's approach to Lynn Hospital,
which could have caused serious problems between the two hospitals. But,
the article served the mayor's needs quite well, as he was then under
attack for inaction of the ambulance question. A second observation is that
the hospitals are reluctant to intervene in the political process, even as an
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extension of concerns that arise within the hospital. They preferred to deal
indirectly (i.e. through the mayor) with the decision-makers and providers
of the present service. Their actions closely resembled the Task Force's,
in that they were prepared only to propose an alternative, and were neither
willing nor prepared to do the political groundwork necessary to insure that
the proposal was adopted.
Problems with the Task Force's Isolation from Political Questions
Because of its isolation from the Area ambulance providers and the
controlling political processes, the Task Force was not adequately prepared
to adapt their proposal to meet the demands or the arguments of the decision
processes that controlled the municipal services. When Jandl was exploring
the hospital service with the mayor, he had begun to bridge the dichotomy
between the health and political concerns. However, even in this attempt,
the municipal service was treated as a monolithic structure, with one pres-
sure point, where, in fact, there were two distinct sets of considerations
involved in responding to such a proposal. In the towns of Area 19, we
observed that responses to attempted interventions in ambulance service were
formulated through a process of interaction between the elected officials
and administrators of the towns, on the one hand, the providers of the
service, on the other. Moreover, these two groups of people each had dif-
ferent criteria for the formulation of their positions about the interven-
tion in question, and these criteria were similar throughout all the attempts
to alter ambulance service that we encountered.
When the Task Force presented their regional proposal to the towns that
were to be involved, problems of municipal political decision-makers immedi-
ately began to make themselves felt. The failures of the plan, originally
intended to include all eight towns in Area 19 but ultimately rejected by
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each of them, reflects not only the inadequacy of the planning process that
developed, but, perhaps more critically, the complexity of the problems
raised in restructuring municipal services to conform to a regional plan.
Implementation of the regional concept required that the towns intervene in
their present ambulance provision, either to eliminate the present service
or to alter its operating procedures. In addition, the regional proposal
required that the towns resolve to cooperate in the provision of ambulance
services.
Issues in the Towns: Considerations Neglected by the Task Force
The alteration of municipal ambulance services in response to the re-
gional proposal required the concurrence of three groups of people in each
town -- the Task Force planners, the decision-making bodies and elected
officials in the town, and the present providers of the service for the town.
Our case provides ample evidence that these three groups tend to operate in-
dependent of each other, and, with the exception of confrontation in public
situations, the influence that each exercises on the other groups is either
subtle or nonexistent.
Intervening in Municipal Services: The Conflicts that Arise
In the absence of other constraints or influences, officials of the
towns placed the major emphasis in their consideration of proposals on the
immediate cost of implementation as compared to the present operating cost
of implementation and to the present operating cost of their ambu-
lance service. However, the structure of costs, because of the accounting
systems of both private and public ambulance services, tends to produce great
conservatism toward revision of the structure by which ambulances are pro-
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vided. The tendency to retain their original service arises from two charac-
teristics in the town decision processes about their ambulance services.
First, the services are provided in a manner which makes it difficult
to determine the exact present cost of operation for use in comparison with
the cost of a proposed change. Except in situations where there is an anti-
cipated rise in present cost which can be calculated, town officials are left
with no possibility of a substantive cost comparison to consider as a benefit
of the alternative service. This leaves officials without considerations
that would counter the second -characteristic of municipal ambulance services
-- their ability to generate favorable externalities for the providers (publi-
city, overtime pay, etc.) and the resultant desires to retain the service in
its present institutional environment.
In terms of these characteristics, two observations can be made of the
North Shore case. Only when the cost considerations clearly outweigh-.the
externalities, will the providers agree to proposed changes that adversely
affect the externalities. And only when the providers accede to a change or
the cost benefits can be clearly demonstrated to town officials, will the
officials press for action that runs counter to externalities that benefit
the providers. An examination of some situations in which changes in the
municipal ambulance service- of the North Shore were accomplished bears out
these observations.
The systems of cost accounting and externalities in municipal ambulance
services have their roots in the structure of service delivery in Area 19.
In all the towns of Area 19, the police were the original providers of am-
bulance service, dating back, in some cases, more than forty years. The
three ambulance services still provided by police (Swampscott, Lynnfield, and
Lynn) operate in response to calls for service which come to the police
-129-
headquarters, where the ambulances are located. Upon receiving a call, the
dispatcher will dispatch a police cruiser to the scene of the incident, a
policemen from headquarters with the ambulance will meet the cruiser at the
scene and one of the men from the cruiser will accompany the patient and the
ambulance driver to the hospital. This arrangement allows the patrolmen
to perform routine police duties when they aren't servicing an ambulance
call..
The ability of patrolmen to perform dual functions in police ambulance
services is the factor which makes cost accounting complex because it is
difficult to allocate manpower costs between the police and ambulance func-
tions. In this arrangement, the cost of ambulance services, with the ex-
ception of the cost of vehicles, becomes subsumed into the general budget
of the police department, with the result that it is sometimes argued that
police ambulance services are cost-free. This argument, of course, ignores
the decrease in police services that occurs during ambulance calls, but it
cannot be ignored since its common use in debates about ambulance service
does point out the difficulty involved in placing an unequivocal cost fig-
ure on the police provision of services. It thus becomes difficult to
support an argument for changing from police service based on cost compari-
sons. An examination of the conditions under which two towns in the areas
changed from police to private provision of service illustrated the magni-
tude of comparative benefits that must exist to cause such a change to be fi-
nancially sound in the face of the "cost-free" status of police ambulances.
Conditions for Change in Area 19: A Favorable Cost Comparison
When Saugus originally changed to a private service, the company offered
to provide coverage without charge to the city, as an alternative to the
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police service. The town was able to agree to this arrangement for two
reasons. The first reason, of course, was that the cost to the city was
demonstrably less. The police might have objected to the removal of the
service, except that the demand for transport services to the town's four
nursing homes had grown immensely, and the service had become a nuisance to
the police without the benefits that might have come.had the rise been in
emergency calls. The provision of this non-emergency service was moreover,
becoming a hindrance to the performance of regular police duties. So, in
the case of Saugus, the town officials and the providers both had strong
financial incentives to find other means of providing the ambulance service.
In Peabody, the change to a private company occurred when both of the town's
police ambulances were demolished in accidents over the course of one month.
The town was in a position where the immediate purchase of two vehicles (each
$20,000) was required to maintain the police ambulance service. This ex-
pense overrode all other considerations and the mayor signed an emergency
contract with a private provider. In both towns, an offer was made that the
town "couldn't refuse".
Institutional Inhibitors of Change: Externalities for the Providers
In attempts at changing service in two other towns, Lynnfield and Lynn,
the cost considerations were not as clear cut, and the institutional concerns
of the providers assumed the major role in the outcomes of the towns' deci-
sion processes. An examination of these attempts reveals the importance with
which the providers view the externalities associated with the ambulance
service, and the great degree of influence they can exert in protecting their
interests from outside interventions.
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In Lynnfield, an abortive attempt was made to develop an ambulance
service provided by an agency other than the police. The response of the
police to this effort indicates the extent to which police have come to
view the ambulance service as being an essential part of their purview, and
some of the problems that can arise in trying to influence their delivery of
the service. The two main advocates of the program, Tom Flaherty and Dick
Jandl, had been very successful in generating substantial interest in the con-
cept of a volunteer ambulance service for the town. Their arguments in
favor of the volunteer squad rested on two issues -- the police were not
sufficiently trained as ambulance personnel, and a serious delay could re-
sult if the two Lynnfield police cruisers were involved in police work when
an ambulance call arose. They maintained that the volunteers would be more
enthusiastic and better trained in the provision of emergency medical assis-
tance than the police, and that they would constitute a dedicated service,
as opposed to the police dual-function.
The police chief responded to this attempt in a particularly defensive
posture, and began the process of lobbying against the proposal. He thought
that the ambulance service was an essential part of the department's re-
lationship with the community, and interpreted this attempt to remove the
service as an attack on the police service in general. In one of the meetings
called to consider the matter, he promised that his men would voluntarily
receive EMT training, which resulted in the training of a third of the force.
Furthermore, he argued that a volunteer service would be beyond the control
of the town, and that experience had shown that volunteer efforts tended to
dissipate after a period of time, leaving the town without an ambulance ser-
vice. He pointed to the problems of the fire department in their recent con-
version from an all-volunteer service to one that was half composed of full-
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time employed fire personnel, due to an inability to obtain reliable volun-
teers in sufficient numbers.
The Concerns of Municipal Providers of Ambulance Service
In Lynnfield, then, the ambulance providers had two main concerns.
They wanted to insure that the town would retain control over the service,
which was interpreted as requiring that it be provided by a municipal agency.
They also wanted to protect the department's image (and the boost that it
received as an externality from the department's provision of ambulance
service) from what was perceived as an attack on the quality of service that
they provided. In the city of Lynn, these concerns are echoed by the Lynn
police union, in response to attempts to intervene in their service. But
in Lynn, there are several added threats to the providers implicit in re-
moving the ambulance service from the police department. The effect of
these threats was to make the department almost totally inflexible to attempts
at intervention by town officials, planners, and even the police chief.
The department's response to the proposed changes in its ambulance
service was complicated by a long-standing conflict between the Lynn Police
Chief and the police union, the Lynn Branch of the Massachusetts Police
Association. This conflict gets to the roots of the types of externalities
that can accrue to municipal providers of ambulance service. It revolved
around the Chief's efforts to assign more men to police duties by realloca-
ting men presently assigned to the ambulance detail.
Lynn is a high crime area and the Chief had been trfing to increase the
size of the force for some time to alleviate the crime problem, but he was
frustrated in his attempts by the very strong police union, who saw addition-
al men as a threat to the high rate of overtime pay possible under the exist-
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ing work rules. The union's contract with the department includes a clause
that specifies minimum levels of police on patrol duty for each of the three
shifts in the day. This requirement, the "minimum manning clause", was
intended to maintain an adequate level of police protection for the city.
However, it also generated a demand for massive levels of overtime work since
the minimum staffing figures were computed without taking into account such
items as vacations and sickdays. A revealing investigation by the "Lynn
Daily Item" pointed out that, in an average two day period, 54 men had to
be called in on overtime to meet the minimum quota.12
When the full extent of the ambulance regulations became known,. the
Police Chief tried to seize this opportunity to remove the ambulance ser-
vice from the duties of the police department in an attempt to alleviate
both the crime problem and the demand for overtime personnel. The Chief was
acutely aware that every time a call arose for medical assistance, a minimum
of three men were required from the force to service the call and thus di-
verted from police duties. In addition, there were 11 men assigned as
chauffeurs whose tasks were solely associated with the ambulance service.
These men directly contributed to the overtime requirement since chauffeur
duty was not considered as "patrol duty" in the contract with the union.
The Chief, thus, was very responsive to all of the Task Force proposals that
included removing the ambulance service from the department.
The union took active steps to block any of the proposals for altered
ambulance service which the Task Force developed. They attended public
meetings in force, and distributed a handbill that presented their arguments
for retention of the service. On the handbill, they appealed to the resi-
dents' familiarity with the service that was now being offered, arguing that
it would be superior to an unknown service. Their points were;
-- police services are on duty around the clock and available
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for calls on an immediate basis
-- the force was well known for their compassion in assisting
citizens
-- the cost to users would be minimized if the service was
financed with municipal tax revenues
-- the police response time was excellent
-- the service had operated without complaints from users and
inspired trust as a result
-- vital evidence might be disturbed in crime-related in-juries by services other than police. In such cases, the
police can serve as "expert witnesses" in court where other
providers could not. 13
The union's public arguments, thus, revolved around cost comparisons, their
positive relationship to the community, the quality of service provided by
the police, and the requirements of the police function. While it may not
have represented all of the union's motives for keeping the service, the
handbill did make clear their intentions to press for its retention. In this
effort, the union entered the political arena and eventually emerged with
their desired result.
Conditions for Conflict in the Towns' Political Process
In both Lynnfield and Lynn, the providers had been able to dominate the
municipal decision processes. In Lynnfield, the planners abandoned their
proposal before it was raised at a selectmen's, meeting, thus avoiding a
conflict between the town officials and the providers. However, the situa-
tion in Lynn was different, and a confrontation did develop. In Lynn, the
union, with its ability to mobilize several thousand votes in municipal
elections, was able to convince the city council to vote unanimously to up-
grade the police service to comply with the Ambulance Law without receiving
an estimate of the cost of doing so or an assurance that the union's plan
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would, in fact, comply with the Law.
The mayor was caught between the unrelenting union and the planners
armed with the Ambulance Law. It was at this point that the mayor approached
the hospitals as a last attempt to escape from his political trap. However,
the time had passed when any of the three groups were amenable to compromise,
with the result that Lynn remains committed to the police service, possibly
in violation of the Law.
In the four towns that we have examined, the outcomes of the attempts
at intervention in the ambulance service have all been resolved unilaterally
by one of the two groups of municipal interests. In Saugus and Peabody, the
officials of the towns and their concern for cost prevailed, whereas in
Lynn and Lynnfield, the providers' position, in protection of their exter-
nalities, dominated the outcomes. In all four cases, there was essentially
no compromise within the municipal decision processes, and, in Lynn, this
fact lead to direct confrontations between the two groups. In Swampscott,
the fifth town of the regional plan, town officials and service providers
entered the planning and decision processes together and emerged with a
set of alternatives that included compromise positions on the behalf of both
groups.
The Case of Swampscott: A Compromise is reached
Swampscott's consideration of the future of its ambulance service
predated the Ambulance Law by two weeks. The town fathers were concerned
about the replacement of their decrepit, eleven year-old ambulance, and the
Board of Selectmen appointed an Ambulance Needs Study Committee to investi-
gate the purchase of a new vehicle. Various members of the Committee re-
presented the police department (providers of the town's service), the fire
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department, the Selectmen, and the media (in marked difference from the
restricted membership of the Task Force). When the Ambulance Law was
passed, the responsibility of the Committee expanded to include all the
ramifications of the Law.
Swampscott's position with respect to the Law was typical of many of
the small towns in the state. The Committee's initial interpretations in-
dicated that the town would be required to purchase a new vehicle and train
the entire force in order to comply with the Law. The Committee worked out
an estimate of the annual cost of this upgrading and operation of the ser-
vice, which, amortized over ten years, totalled $20,000 per year. Town
officials expressed the feeling that this annual cost figure was totally
out of proportion to the small number of calls (250) that Swampscott gener-
ates each year, and, at this point, the Committee began to search for al-
ternatives to the police service.
The police chief had been involved in this process from its beginning,
and he realized the reasoning that went into this decision. His only con-
cern was that the police department should retain the transport of non-
emergent cases, which would provide the department with ample public rela-
tions value and serve as a cost reduction to residents in need of routine
transfers and non-emergency transportation.
As a result of this broad representation in its planning process,
the Swampscott Committee was able to reach three major accomplishments that
had not been attained in the other towns of the Area. First, the Committee
had accurately defined the concerns of town officials by reaching a realistic
assessment of the cost of their present service. Second, they had acknow-
ledged the providers' concerns by recognizing the external public relations
benefits to the department that were created by the police ambulance service.
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Finally, they were able to incorporate both of these concerns in a com-
promise position that allowed them to search for less expensive sources
of emergency ambulance service while retaining the non-emergency aspects
(and resultant favorable externalities) with the police. These accom-
plishments placed the town in a position which was extremely receptive to
the regional ambulance proposal of the EMS Project Task Force.
Patterns of Isolation and Conflict in the Town's Decision Processes
The central point that emerges in considering the towns' decision
processes arises from the isolation of the three components in the process --
planners, providers, and town officials -- from one another. We have seen
two patterns of isolation in consideration of proposed changes in ambulance
service, with the planning process isolated from the municipal political
processes, and, within the towns, with providers isolated from town offi-
cials. These dichotomies produced decision processes in which the outcomes
were based on incomplete consideration of the quality of emergency care
that might result. In the North Shore case, the emergency medical care
questions were dealt with by health personnel isolated, during the planning
process, from the political process that must consider their plan, with the
result that, in the implementation process, these health considerations
seldom surfaced. Furthermore, the dichotomy within the political process,
between the decision-makers and the providers of the service, served to
further remove the public debate from EMS-related issues. Within the
towns' decision processes, considerations were focused on reconciling the
cost issues of town officials with the external incentives of the providers.
This resulted in directing municipal attention to issues that were almost
exclusively externalities to the actual provision of service, and, were far
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afield of the concerns of the planners to develop an integrated regional
service from the existing, municipally-based fragments.
Response to the Regional Plan: Issues between the Towns
When the Greater Lynn Task Force presented their proposal for a region-
al ambulance service to the towns, they assumed that the towns would re-
solve their individual internal conflicts and thus could consider the pro-
posal on its merits compared to the present services. As we have pointed
out, this was, in general, not the case. The towns remained caught in in-
ternal battles between the providers and the town officials throughout the
process. But the Task Force seldom addressed the issues that contributed
to the conflict, concentrating, instead, on comparisons of quality of care
and costs of the services proposed. As a result, the towns could only
approach the proposal at a hypothetical level, and were forced to consider
the plan based on the assumptions under which it was made.
The proposed regional ambulance service offered two main features as
potential improvements over the current service arrangement -- improved
coverage characteristics and a better cost profile for the towns. When the
towns considered the regional proposal, isolated from the intra-town issues,
these features became the main questions for debate. An examination of the
towns' treatment of these two features reveals three sources of complexity
in working out details of regional ambulance services. With regard to the
coverage characteristics, the towns displayed an inability to assess the
benefits that arose from changing the coverage characteristics. This be-
came obvious, first, when they failed to appreciate the potential for main-
taining attendants' EMT skills offered by the greater rate of attendant
activity provided by the more efficient regional arrangement. Second, the
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towns demonstrated a highly unsophisticated notion of the concept of cover-
age with their expressed preference for "a vehicle in every town". By
believing that their present coverage was at least the equivalent of the
plan's, the towns ignored the benefits of high utilization of the ambulances
and attendants, and the advantages of more effective backup coverage and
lower average response time to calls provided by the regional scheme.
Allocating Cost Among the Towns
The final source of difficulty in the regional proposal was allocating
cost among the participating towns. One fundamental characteristic of the
regional proposal was that the provision of services was not tied to the
municipal boundaries. Under the proposal, there were to be four strategi-
cally located ambulances serving the five towns, with service areas that
corresponded to demand characteristics rather than muncipal boundaries.
This arrangement caused substantial debate concerning different strategies
of dividing the operating costs equitably among the participating towns.
The regional ambulance service was to be financed in much the same way
as a private ambulance service. As proposed by the Task Force, the basic
revenues of the service would be generated by billing patients for ambulance
runs , and would be subject to reimbursement by third party insurers. In-
surance regulations that apply to private service would also cover the
regional service, limiting their fees to a fixed service charge plus a
mileage charge. The revenues that could be generated through patient fees
were thus influenced by two factors -- the demand for service, and the
types of reimbursement schemes possessed by the patients. The costs, on
the other hand, are mostly fixed with respect to these factors. Roughly 85%
of the cost of operating an ambulance typically accrues from wages paid to
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the attendants who staff the vehicle. The depreciation of the vehicle and
equipment accounts for most of the remaining costs, thus leaving only a
small portion of the total cost that varies with usage of the vehicle. The
characteristics of cost and revenue -- that cost is proportionate to the
number of vehicles and revenue is dependent upon the number and economic
status of the population -- and the main complicating elements in the alloca-
tion of costs among the towns.
Sources of the Financial Problem: The Effect of Socio-Economic Diversity
Problems involving cost allocation arise because of the tendency of an
emergency ambulance service to operate at a deficit. The private companies
serving Saugus and Peabody encountered this problem, with the result that
both companies required a subsidy to meet the cost of stationing vehicles
in the towns. The deficit was caused by a demand level that, coupled with
the rate ceiling imposed by insurers, generates insufficient revenues from
patient fees. This situation is aggravated by nonpaying patients (destitute
or without insurance), and cash flow problems similar to those experienced in
the hospitals can develop with high percentages of government insured
patients. The private services can offset this deficit somewhat with
routine transfers and other non-emergency patients, which often have the
advantage of being schedulable. An emergency service, such as the proposed
regional system, has neither of these advantages working in its favor, with
the result that the municipalities in the proposal would be required to
underwrite the entire operating deficit. It was the distribution of this
deficit that raised the major inter-town problems in the consideration of
the regional plan.
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The concerns raised by the towns about cost allocation can be traced
to an uncertainty about what, exactly, constitutes ambulance service, and to
the socio-economic diversities in the region. The towns wanted to insure
that they pay only for services that their taxpayers received. With ser-
vice provision not in correspondence with town boundaries or with particular
vehicles, the service received by individual towns became difficult to de-
termine. There are two extremes to the range of definitions considered.
One extreme would be to define the ambulance service as "coverage" for a
town. The regional service would provide coverage to a town by insuring
that it would service all calls from that town. Under this definition,
the deficit might be apportioned according to the potential demand for ser-
vice, based on the relative populations of the towns. At the other extreme,
service might be defined as the number of runs made to a particular town.
In this arrangement, the deficit would be allocated proportionate to the
calls serviced in each town. Given the socio-economic characteristics of
our region, a relatively impoverished densely populated central city
surrounded by more affluent, less populous suburbs, both of these defini-
tion cause problems in the division of costs.
The size of the deficit "run up" by each town varies with the defi-
nition of ambulance service and with the revenue-generating potential of
-he town. Among the towns included in the regional plan, Lynn has, by
far, the largest population and the highest percentage of uninsured and
impoverished residents, so that service for Lynn would contribute most to
the regional deficit. The other towns in the region, in considering the
plan, were wary of assuming responsibility for any deficit generated by
Lynn, and asked for precise definitions of cost allocation formulas and
statistics of the revenue-generating potentials of the other towns. The
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towns realized that, under any arrangement, Lynn, with 48% of the popula-
tion and 46% of the runs in the region, would be responsible for a high
percentage of the subsidy.14 Furthermore, Lynn was geographically in the
center of the region, so that its presence in the regional plan did not
place undue requirements for additional vehicles. For these reasons, the
towns realized that Lynn's participation in the system was necessary to
sustain the cost of maintaining the number of vehicles required for the
diapersed locations of the other towns. But they sought to insure that
Lynn's deficit would not offset any of the benefits that the other towns
accrued by Lynn's participation, especially since a small percentage de-
crease in Lynn's deficit could mean a large increase in the other towns'
required subsidies because of the difference in magnitude. With these con-
siderations being predominant, there was no alternative presented that
would alleviate the burden on Lynn, which could least afford to bear it.
Because the conflicts between providers and town officials were not
directly raised in consideration of the regional proposal, the main con-
cerns were with cost and institutional power. Had the plan progressed
beyond the hypothetical stage, it might have been possible for the planners
to propose their regional service on the basis of its cost characteristics
and institutional structures. Unfortunately for the regional planners,
there were two seemingly insurmountable obstacles -- the inability of the
towns to resolve the internal conflicts and the lack of precise cost com-
parisons. As a result, the planners were unable to present the favorable
aspects of their proposal before the providers and politicians faced their
own conflicts.
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Inadequate Incentives for Change
These obstacles to implementation of the regional proposal point to
inadequacies in the incentives offered to the region by the Transportation
Task Force. When the Task Force first conceived of an attempt to inter-
vene in Lynn's ambulance, and, later, in the other towns' in the Area, they
had relied on the Ambulance Law and on quality of care consideration to
provide the towns with sufficient incentives to change their services. The
Task Force assumed that the Law would aid in resolving the internal con-
flicts by making the cost of compliance too high to retain the present ser-
vices. This, they thought, would make the towns amenable to suggestions
for alternatives. The Ambulance Law, thus, was relied upon to cause in-
ternal institutional changes in the municipal service, and to achieve these
changes by requiring that additional resources be devoted to the ambulance
function. The Task Force saw its activities as providing a viable alterna-
tive to the financially untenable positions that they assumed the Ambulance
Law would cause in the towns' services. As we have seen, the cost struc-
tures of town services did not allow the full impact of the Law to surface.
The Law, as a result, failed in this respect, because it specified only
resource levels of services and omitted the structure of the services from
its regulations.
The Task Force also assumed that the comparative quality issues raised
by the emergency physicians group would provide convincing arguments in
favor of their proposals. As we have seen, the decision processes within
the towns were almost totally isolated from both health personnel and health
issues because of the dichotomies and conflicts within these processes.
This left the outcome of these processes to be determined by cost and poli-
tical issues, so that health considerations also failed to bring about the
institutional changes sought by the Task Force.
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One obvious element that was lacking in both the Ambulance Law and
the federal involvement in Massachusetts EMS was a subsidy to ambulance
services that were attempting to regionalize or to involve themselves in an
Area EMS Network. With this subsidy as an incentive, the regional pro-
posal in Area 19 might have been able to generate favorable cost comparisons
necessary to overcome the internal factors mitigating against changes in
the provision of municipal ambulance services. However, in the absence of
a sufficient cost incentive and with the Task Force's failure to stimulate
a sufficient incentive through quality of care arguments, the Project's
regional proposal was at the mercy of municipal politics, and the negative
outcome of the proposal reflected this.
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CHAPTER FIVE
FINDINGS
In setting the policy debate in EMS, we have identified several
problematic aspects of the current directions at the federal level.
Since the passage of the EMSS Act of 1973, massive federal efforts and
funds have been expended to establish hospital-centered regional EMS
systems. We discovered a considerable body of literature devoted to
the assessment of regionalization of government services, but this
literature had several difficulties. First, the criteria developed to
determine the efficacy of regional provision of services were oriented
solely to public sector services, which left open the appropriateness of
private sector (emergency hospital facilities) regionalization. Second,
the literature was devoted almost exclusively to static normative assess-
ments of the regional provision of services and had very little to offer
about the dynamic process of achieving a particular regional assignment
of services. Finally, the dynamic problems faced in developing regional
EMS systems from component services provided in both the private and
public sectors were an added layer of complexity in the federal policy
and had been virtually untouched by the literature of regionalization.
The literature, thus, had very little to contribute specifically to the
process of evaluating the current regional systems policy in EMS.
From the data presented in our case study, we are attempting to
examine three important areas of the regional EMS systems policy. First,
we are addressing the normative issues arising from the regional scale
of the service proposed by the EMSS Act. Second, we are examining the
process of planning and implementation of regional EMS service systems.
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And, finally, we are exploring the complexities of creating regional
EMS systems from an initial state where components of service exist
in a broad range of institutional contexts and scales, spanning both
the public and private sectors.
The Application of Federal Criteria at the Regional Level
The area we chose for our study, Greater Lynn, was a subregional
section of the North Shore Health Planning Council's (NSHPC) primary
area of responsibility for health care planning. This region (Area 19),
located in the northern part of the metropolitan Boston area, is composed
of 8 towns. However, we addressed the events that united only 5 of those
8 towns.
The NSHPC conducted a patient origin study over their entire region
(27 towns) in order to determine for planning purposes, the patient flow
patterns around the hospitals. We found, then, that our region was
defined as such because the residents of the area primarily used the
hospitals within the 8 towns, hence spillover effects from other areas
into Greater Lynn and effects from Greater Lynn to other areas would be
minimized.,Thus, the towns in Area 19 were identified explicitly by
observing the existing patient usage of hospital emergency facilities
within the Area. This definition was also implicitly hospital-based,
which became obvious when the state's regional definition, based on
hospital emergency care capabilities, yielded the same boundaries for the
Area. The state's definition required the planners in the North Shore
region to examine each of their existing regions and determine if the
necessary hospital capabilities were present in each of the subregions.
This finer delineation of regional boundaries was also necessary to enable
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the statewide program to begin its agenda with the development of Area
EMS Networks.
The criteria used for defining the Greater Lynn area patient flow
patterns, is in full accord with the EMSS Act program guidelines which
state: "A regional EMS system is one that is geographically described
by the existing natural patient care flow patterns."' But the EMSS Act
also stated four other criteria essential for planning and operating an
EMS region: regional contiguity, medical competence, conformance with
geopolitical boundaries, and sufficiency of population, resources,
and financial support.
The entire state of Massachusetts is presently working under an
EMSS Act grant program which is being uniformly performed across the
entire state. This means that the state is divided up into 8 regions
according to the state Mental Health planning regions, but also in line
with the Comprehensive Health Planning Regional boundaries. These 8
regions are further subdivided by the regional EMS planners into Areas
centered around the hospital facilities. This geographical pattern
implies that each town in the state is part of a larger health planning
Region and part of a smaller EMS Area. Each of the Regions and Areas
is contiguous with the others, in.conformance with the EMSS Act recommenda-
tions.
The Act loosely defines "medically competent" as capable of provid-
ing definitive care to a majority (95%) of general, emergent, and critical
patients. Our Area contains four hospitals, collectively capable of pro-
viding almost all the emergency care needed. In addition, Boston serves
as a resource for the most highly sophisticated care when needed. Accord-
ing to the federal definition, then, our Area is medically competent
because it is able to provide definitive emergency care for a majority of
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of the cases that arise within the boundaries. Those that need more
sophisticated care are transferred to the hospitals in Boston, but
this only comprises 1 percent of the cases,2 which indicates that the
hospitals within the Area provide care for most of the patients of the
Area.
The area we studied was a five town subsection of Area 19, which
retained the essential characteristics of the federal definition of an
EMS region. Defining the region as such formalized the boundaries
around the urban center of Lynn. This in reality is a natural way to
group the towns because it provides a typical small metropolitan region.
The city of Lynn, at the center of the region, is a densely populated
city with high unemployment and a declining economic base. The surround-
ing area is primarily residential with a higher median income and no
industry. We found then, that our region not only conformed to the Act's
requirements, but also naturally formed a small metropolitan region.
The five town area of our case study had a total population of about
190,000 people. The resources included in the area for EMS purposes were
four hospitals with well established policies for handling emergencies
and well located for fast access to the closest emergency department. In
addition, the five towns operate a total of seven ambulances through
police departments and private contract. This means that there is at
least one vehicle in each town that respond to calls only within their
borders. The financial support of these services is through municipal
budgets and in the case of the hospitals, private sources. We found in
our study that the Area would be capable of sustaining an EMS system
according to the federal criteria.
According to the above analysis, we found that we had a valid region
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by federal standards. But at the same time, we wanted to discover
what capabilities were added by enlarging the geographical area, to
assist in developing regional EMS systems. We found that when the
area expanded to include more than one town, no well-defined institutional
base existed for regional decisionmaking. Each town still had to make
their own decisions and then join together voluntarily as a region.
In addition, no management capability existed at the regional level so
that regional systems would be forced to create both a management capa-
bility and an institutional base at the regional level. Without an
institutional base, the region so defined had no capability to create
incentives for change. The only incentives that could be used were those
that were created at the state level and those that arose out of the
individual towns. The state level incentives were certainly not catered
to our region, and town-generated incentives were of limited use in the
scope and degree of regional influence.
We found that the only potential which increased by expanding the
geographical boundaries was the planning agency, with a small project
staff responsible for EMS planning. This agency provided the necessary
guidance and technical assistance to the entire region in their attempt
to develop regional EMS plans. In addition, the staff worked with the
individual towns to help them with their problems in upgrading EMS
resources and development of coordinated services with neighboring towns.
This agency was well established in the health care system, so the EMS
Project staff could rely on their connections with existing health care
services to provide assistance to the towns. Since the only capability
that the region gained by expanding its geographical boundaries was EMS
planning, we decided to examine in greater detail the nature of the
planning process.
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The Nature of the Regional Planning Process
In the Massachusetts program, regional EMS systems were to be
achieved through a planning process designed to incorporate planning
and implementation activities into the same programmatic structure. The
EMS Projects, the arm of the state program at the regional level, were
to develop this planning and implementationstructure and guide activities
to establish regional EMS systems. The North Shore EMS Project, in pur-
suing this program, encountered many of the fundamental problematic aspects
of the regional systems policy in EMS.
Guiding Values of the Plannin g Process
The fundamental problem encountered by the North Shore EMS Project was
the divergence of values and interests among the participants in the
planning process. The EMS Project hoped to guide the planning process to
a consensus among all participants, which recognized the need for a regional
EMS system and to accomplish this by effectively inculcating their values
in the other participants. In this fashion, they hoped to motivate the
adoption of their programmatic goals. They were unsuccessful in this
critical endeavor because the values which the EMS Project applied to the
planning process were systematically obscured and coopted by the institu-
tional settings of the other participants.
From the data presented in our case study, we are attempting to
examine three important areas of the regional EMS systems policy. First,
we are addressing the normative issues arising from the regional scale
of the service proposed by the EMSS Act. Second, we are examining the
process of planning and implementation of regional EMS service systems.
And, finally, we are exploring the complexities of creating regional
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EMS systems from an initial state where components of service exist in
a broad range of institutional contexts and scales, spanning both the
public and private sectors.
The EMS Project was the only full-time advocacy force for quality of
emergency care that we encountered at the local or regional levels in
our case. Their concern for quality was coupled with a programmatic
approach which sought to achieve higher quality service with the least
additional long-term cost of operation. The quality and efficiency con-
cerns of the EMS Project were exhibited throughout the case in ways con-
sistent with their programmatic goal of regional EMS systems. In the
hospital component, they advocated specialized definitions of emergency
room capabilities which would foster concentrations of treatment
facilities while ameliorating the-costly duplications of lower quality
facilities that currently predominated. In the transportation component,
the EMS Project sought a regional ambulance service which would reduce
the overall number of ambulance vehicles and attendants in the system.
This would also increase the utilization of the attendants and, as a
result, foster the retention and further development of the attendants'
skills. Finally, they served as advocates within the planning mechanism
for efforts to upgrade quality of service which arose outside the process.
This function resulted in the development of the communications system and
the efforts to improve the Lynn ambulance service.
Participants in the Planning Process and Their Interests
The role of the EMS Project as a consistent advocate of quality and
efficiency is critical when viewed in relation to other participants in the
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planning process. The planning process, as specified in the EMSS Act
and the Massachusetts program, is designed to incorporate all the insti-
tutions and interest groups in EMS, and this presented the EMS Project
with a wide range of interests to resolve into the consensus they sought.
We found that both the regional scope and the multi-component nature
of their planning efforts detracted from the development of this consensus
in the planning process. However, we also found that the consistent qual-
ity concern of the EMS Project contributed to incremental changes towards
conformity in the interests of the participants.
We found three distinct levels of involvement in the regional plan-
ning process. First, the state was implicitly involved by their determina-
tion of the overall policy directions and their performance contract with
the EMS Project. The state, thus, had tied the EMS Project to the
particular programmatic direction of hospital-centered regional systems.
In our region, we found that this direction caused few explicit conflicts
with the EMS Project, because they had preceded the state in adopting
this focus. The Project constituted the only regional level involvement,
however, and in their capacity as executors of state policy, we found them
often caught between state-level performance demands and the recalcitrance
of local participants in the regional planning process.
Of the three levels of participants, we found that the interests of
local components of the planning mechanism were at greatest variance with
the guiding principles of quality and efficiency. The local participants
in the hospital component planning process included the administrators of
all the hospitals in the region, emergency room physicians, emergency
department nurses, "citizen representatives" and members of the EMS
Project. We found that the most active participants in the process tended
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to be administrators, emergency specialists, EMS Project personnel,
and more sporadically, the citizen representatives.
We found that the participants in the hospital planning process
divided into characterizable interest groups in their responses to
initiatives of the EMS Project. Moreover, we found that these divisions
were different when the planning process addressed issues of hospital
resource allocation than when it focused on other EMS components. In
the hospital planning process, the EMS Project could count on the
allegiance of those specialists and citizen representatives who were not
affiliated with particular hospitals. We found throughout the planning
process, that these three groups consistently allied around quality
issues. The cooperation of the specialists was particularly critical
to the hospital planning process because they constituted the only con-
sistent allies of the EMS Project within the hospital component.
Balanced against these interests were the hospital administrators
and the physicians who were affiliated with only one hospital. We found
that these individuals were extremely reluctant in concurring with parti-
cular quality of care arguments that would affect the operation of their
hospitals. Hospital administrators responded to and represented the most
complex set of interests in the planning process. These specialists were
concerned that changes in patient allocation among hospitals might decrease
the number of patients they treated.
The actions of the hospital administrators were reflections of pres-
sures that originated within their hospitals, in the community, and from
the state. Within the hospital, we found two distinct sources of pressure
on the administrators--the financial situation of the hospital as inter-
preted by the Board of Directors, and the medical departments' competition
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for hospital resources. The hospital planning process could aggravate
both of these pressure points throuqh its potential for alterinq the
patient flow into the emergency department. We found also that the
image that the hospital maintains in the community was of vital interest
to the administrators and the emergency department was viewed as an
important determining factor in this community relationship. We found
that these factors motivated the administrators to try to conserve or
expand the present emergency service capability of their hospital, often
in conflict with the intentions of the EMS Project to upgrade the quality
of services in the region. These pressures on the administrators were
countered, to an extent, by the threat of a pending state hospital cate-
gorization law which the EMS Project used to encourage "voluntary" coopera-
tion, and, also, by the quality of care arguments raised by specialists
who were on their staff as well as the staffs of other hospitals.
We found that the interests of the participants in the planning pro-
cess were a reflection of the professional and institutional setting
that they represented. Administrators were interested in the same con-
cerns which shaped their role in the hospitals--the financial and commun-
ity relations implications of the planning process. Medical specialists
were interested in the ways in which the planning process would affect
the allocation of patients and resources to their specialties. Those
specialists with the patients and resources of several hospitals avail-
able to them, were relatively unthreatened by the process. Furthermore,
they devoted their efforts to the quality concerns of the EMS Project, as
they perceived these concerns from their vantage points in the hospitals.
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The Roles of Participants in the Planning Process
The roles which these participants adopted in the planning process
were determined by the degree to which the planning focus was on sub-
jects that could impact their interests. In the three endeavors we
have examined--hospital, transportation and communications planning--we
detected noticeable shifts in the participants' roles, depending upon
which component was the focus. In the hospital planning process, the
interests of specialists and administrators were potentially threatened
and they continually questioned the aspects of the plans which were of
greatest potential impact on their interests. However, when the focus
shifted to transportation and communications, the issues were substan-
tially removed from direct patient allocation, and the roles of administra-
tors and specialists reverted to those of advocates for quality in these
components.
As long as the resources of the hospital were not being committed in
ways that were inconsistent with their financial positions, the administra-
tors pursued the quality issues in other components. However, this pursuit
could be self-serving in two ways. First advocacy efforts contributed to
favorable publicity for the hospitals. We saw this in both the communica-
tions and-the transportation planning endeavors (where Lynn Hospital, while
unable to commit resources to these efforts, took steps to insure that
their community relations were augmented by establishing that their hos-
pital was not conspicuously absent from these advocacy efforts). Second,
the communications and transportation efforts had the potential to subtly
alter the emergency patient allocation process among the hospitals. We
found that, although this was a relatively minor consideration, it did
play a part in determining the roles adopted by administrators in the
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planning process.
We found that, in planning for non-hospital EMS components, the
role adopted by hospital personnel was that of quality advocates. This
shift in role placed them in almost complete conformity with the planning
process as established by the EMS Project, and allowed the process to
focus on the quality and efficiency values that shaped its outcomes
in the non-hospital components.
Interactions in the Planning Process
Interactions in the hospital planning process were extensions of
existing relationships among the different hospitals and interest groups.
The initiation of EMS Project activities served to focus their attention
on the emergency department. This was especially true in the case of Lynn
and Union Hospitals, where we found that informal arrangements, both in
terms of patient and hospital resource allocation, played a substantial
role in delimiting the extent and nature of cooperation among hospital
and administrators in the planning process. We found that two separable
lines of interaction were generated--interactions among the hospital,
and between the characteristic interests of the hospitals and those of
the EMS Project.
Interactions among the hospitals reflected their competition for
emergency patients, with the cash inflow and public relations benefits
that emergency patients can generate. As such, hospital's administrators
were extremely wary of planning actions that might yield those benefits
to other hospitals. We found this condition in interhospital relations
throughout the planning process, and especially on the part of the
smaller hospitals, whose patient loads might have been absorbed into the
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larger hospital. We found several exceptions to this general principle
in the relationship between Union and Lynn Hospitals, but this too was a
reflection of past relationships and not a product of the planning process.
Interactions between the characteristic concerns of the hospitals and
the EMS Project were somewhat complex. The EMS Project was under pressure
from the state to generate point of entry plans, preliminary to planning
for specialized facilities and they spent and invested substantial
unsuccessful efforts to differentiate among hospitals. A recurring
situation in this process was the reluctance of professional medical people
to criticize the services of other professionals. The hospitals presented
a united front in opposition to the EMS Project's attempts to differentiate
among their capabilities with the claim that their facilities were identi-
cal. Specialists on the staffs of several hospitals attempted to refute
this claim with their own observations, but the administrators were
adamant in their contentions of similarity of their facilities. With
this contention they were able simultaneously to avoid criticizing other
hospitals and to protect their own hospital from changes in patient
inflow.
The final critical interaction in the hospital planning process
arose when data had been gathered that refuted the administrators' claims
of similarity. At this point, the potential for formally recognizing
differences among hospitals existed and the administrators reacted by
pointing to deficiencies in the prehospital component that would under-
mine the effectiveness of a specialized hospital component. This reaction
was critical because it signified the end of the interal dispute over the
concept of defining care capabilities. Although the planning process
remained stalled in the details of achieving these definitions, the
participants' adoption of the concept constituted the major incremental
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change in attitudes that occurred in the hospital planning process.
It also provided additional motivation for transportation and communica-
tions activities.
In the transportation planning process, the interests of the parti-
cipants--hospital administrators, emergency physicians, EMS Project staff,
and other hospital personnel--were seldom threatened by the issues that
arose, because these issues did not affect the hospital operations directly.
As a result, the consensus which developed quickly among the participants
embraced the values of quality and efficiency almost exclusively. The
remainder of the planning process was essentially a research and develop-
ment effort aimed at achieving these values in the resultant proposal.
In comparing the transportation and hospital planning processes, we
find that the hospital planning efforts were attempts at resolving con-
flicts that arose from the competition at the regional level for EMS
resources within the region, whereas the transportation planning process
was a proposal-generating effort in which there was little conflict among
the values of the participants. This difference in the nature of these
two efforts resulted from the fact that the hospital planning process
included the potential implementers of the outcome where the transporta-
tion efforts included only participants who acted in the role of planners.
The Mechanism for Interaction in the Regional Planning Process
In order to understand the nature of the interactions which occurred
during the planning process, it is necessary to analyze the incentive
structure that motivated the involvement of its participants. We found
that the incentives which encouraged or demanded the involvement of the
participants also determined their roles in the planning process. The
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pending hospital emergency department categorization law, which would
provide the state with authority to enforce externally developed plans
on the hospitals, was a serious threat to the autonomy of individual
hospitals' emergency care operations. The planning process presented
hospital administrators with an opportunity to moderate the impacts
of this legislation on their institutions and awareness of this oppor-
tunity was fostered by the state program. In this atmosphere, then,
many hospital administrators exhibited a willingness to participate in
this process to moderate the impacts of the law. Once such a process
began, an incentive was created for other administrators to join, to
protect their hospitals from adverse initiatives of the other participants.
We found that this incentive structure played a critical part in con-
tributing to the defensive posture of the administrators.
The medical specialists were motivated by the changes in resource and
patient allocation that might arise from these planning efforts. They,
too, perceived the potential impact that reorganization of emergency
capabilities might have upon their specialty, and reacted according to
their institutional role in the hospitals as advocates for the quality of
service in their specialties. Doctors who were based at particular
hospitals interpreted the quality concern as requiring the protection of
their specialized resources in the hospital which they serviced. This
concern for protection served to motivate their participation in the
process. Other specialists, who served more than one hospital (and, thus,
could be termed "regional specialists") interpreted the quality concern
as the augmentation of their specialty in the region. They saw the
regional planning process as an opportunity to effect this augmentation.
The EMS Project was required by the terms of their performance contract
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to initiate, direct and- participate in the planning process;'so their
role was relatively clearcut, though problematic, in attempting to
establish regional EMS systems in their planning area. The planning
process that they established had to meet certain descriptive and opera-
tional criteria. The descriptive criteria involved the development of a
very delicate relationshi0 with the local participants in the committee
planning structure specified by the state. The operational criteria
required the exploitation of this relationship, often in opposition to
the immediate interests of the participants, to meet the necessities
of developing a regional EMS system. These two criteria often worked
in opposition during the planning process which placed a great strain
on both the EMS Project and the planning mechanism.
The final participant-group in regional EMS planning--providers and
administrators of the prehospital service component--was conspicuously
absent from the planning process. This can be traced to the incentives
that were offered to foster their participation. The major incentive
offered to prehospital interest groups was the impending changes in ser-
vices rquired by the state Ambulance Law. This incentive, however, did
not have a regional focus, unlike the categorization law that was directed
towards the hospitals. The Ambulance Law directed its provisions to the
individual services,motivating them to seek additional resources within
the municipal context.
The municipal incentives to participate demonstrated one critical
difference from the incentives in the hospital setting. In the municipal
setting, competition for EMS resources was entirely within the confines
of the individual towns' budgets. In the hospital component, this competi-
tion was on the regional level for EMS resources. We found that this
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regional competition generated hospital participation in the planning
process, but that no similar incentive was offered to stimulate the
participation of the prehospital services.
Institutional Responsibilities for Implementation
The planning process was conducted in the committee structure estab-
lished by the EMS Project. The central component of the structure was
the Area Hospital/Medical Committee, to integrate the plans for other
components into the hospital component planning process. Since an
essential feature of these committees was their representation of all
EMS interest groups, the motivation for implementation was supposed to
arise from within the committee structure as a result of the infusion
of EMS Project values into the planning process. Since EMS was provided
by both hospitals and municipal ambulance services, these two institutional
settings were the basic targets for implementation.
In the hospitals, the power to implement changes in resource alloca-
tion was vested in the Boards of Directors, as represented by the admini-
strator. In municipal services, we found implementation power to rest
with elected town officials, which had legislative authority over the
administration of these services. The elected town officials could,
theoretically, exercise this power unilaterally, but the policies were
generally set in interactions between providers and officials. Thus the
implementation results would be determined by two complex sets of inter-
actions--the decision processes in each of the hospitals in the region,
and the political and administrative components of each of the municipal
ambulance services.
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The Outcomes of the Planning Process
The regional EMS planning process produced two forms of outcomes--
the ongoing planning mechanism and a regional EMS plan. The planning
mechanism, a network of Area Committees focused on the various components
of the EMS system, continued to function and discuss ways of improving the
delivery and organization of EMS in the region. The intended outcome of
the committee activities was the incorporation of the separate committees
into one Area EMS Committee which would serve to maintain the established
regional EMS system, and perform the functions of a "lead agency" as
envisioned in the EMSS Act.
We found, however, that the Area committee showed little indication
of developing the capabilities of a lead agency. In particular, we found
the regional EMS Committee would have no source of financial support,
apart from the support each individual EMS service could generate from
municipal funds (ambulance services), operating funds (hospitals), or
public and private contributions (communications). In addition, a
separate management and administrative capability would have to be developed
to enable the Committee to oversee the EMS system. As envisioned by the
state and regional programs, this Committee membership would consist of
representatives of all the components to facilitate the coordination of
the established regional EMS system. Therefore, we found that the
committee structure proposed to serve as the sustaining mechanism of the
EMS system during development, implementation, and eventual operation,
would have to generate additional institutional base, financial support,
and administrative and management capability in order to conform to the
EMSS Act's notion of a "lead agency."
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The Regional EMS Plan
The regional EMS plan generated in the planning process was actually
a set of plans for the system components. The hospital component, for
example, produced a point-of-entry plan to advise transportation services
and public education programs as to the most appropriate hospital for
emergency patients' initial entry into the EMS system. In the process
of developing the point-of-entry plan, it was also necessary for the
Hospital Committee to determine the exact care capabilities of the
regional hospital system. This was accomplished by using a questionnaire
to collect the information, suggest standards for judging care capabilities
and to make the planning process an educational experience for the adminis-
trators, nurses, and emergency department doctors. In addition, transfer
protocols were formalized to ensure that the hospitals would be coordinated
within their own component.
The Transportation Task Force that grew out of the Hospital Committee,
also produced a plan for improving the EMS transportation services in the
Greater Lynn area. Their plan involved 5 of the 8 towns in the defined
region in a regional ambalance service that would replace the current
town services. Each vehicle would be owned or contracted for by an
independent non-profit emergency medical authority. This authority would
provide independent management of the ambulance resources, coordinate
dispatching, manage expenditures and a quality assurance program, and
provide for continuing education of ambulance attendants. The number of
ambulances in the region would be reduced so that added work experience
would insure that their crews remained well-trained. The regional
service depended on two sources for financing--subsidies from the towns
and third party payments. The fact that the towns were going to subsidize
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the service from their municipal budgets necessitated the development
of a cost-sharing scheme to divide the subsidies among the towns.
In all respects, this transportation plan complied with the EMSS
Act's concern that prehospital components be.addressed and linked to the
hospital component. As the plan was developed further, the demands of
the political processes which ruled on municipal ambulance provision forced
the final proposal to be a regional hospital-based service, with the hos-
pitals in the city of Lynn serving as the managers. This further promoted
the EMS system as a hospital-centered system with the hospitals: in charge
of the ambulance service as well.
At the same time, communications activities were in progress to
create a regional communications network, but there was no plan to guide
these activities. The activities were also guided by some members of
the Hospital Committee who saw the need for better prehospital resources
in the communications component. The communications system was to provide
linkages that would enable ambulances to notify hospitals when they were
bringing in a patient, would enable medical consultation between the
hospital and ambulances and would facilitate the rerouting of patients if
a particular hospital was overcrowded.
When viewing the hospital plan, the transportation plan and communica-
tions system activities together, we found that the regional planning pro-
cess had generated plans or activities in each of the prehospital and
hospital components that the EMSS Act emphasized in their policy. The
hospital system was the central component around which the transportation
and communications prehospital components were planned and coordinated.
These plans outlined a regional EMS system that contained the necessary
linkages to facilitate the development of a regional hospital-centered
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EMS system.
Changes Necessitated by the Regional Plan
The regional plan required many changes in the hospital and ambulance
services as a result of these new projected regional relationships within
and between components. In the hospital system, the changes required on
the short term were not very extensive. The planning process had generated
point-of-entry plans that needed implementation, but the changes merely
required recognizing the special care capabilities of the hospitals and
allocating emergency patients to the appropriate facility. The substan-
tive change was required in the long term, when preliminary data collec-
tion was complete. The point of entry plans and transfer protocols would
then be used to design a regional hospital system with specialized emer-
gency departments. This change was particularly critical because
specialized emergency departments could have serious effects on the
inpatient and outpatient allocations. It also had serious implications
for other critical indicators of hospital well-being--the need to gener-
ate sufficient revenue, and the need to have the proper patient "mix"
between emergency and elective surgery patients. Lastly, the regional
hospital plan required an effective public education program to ensure
that the system really worked.
The transportation component also required critical alterations if
it was to function according to the plan of the Transportation Task Force.
The proposal required that the services in the town relinquish responsibil-
ity for providing ambulance service and yield this service to the regional
emergency medical authority. This meant that all the police and private
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companies that were presently providing service in the region would
have to abandon their ambulance responsibilities. In addition, the
town decisionmakers would be taking part in a regional decisionmaking
process that required municipal officials to allocate their resources to
a service that would accrue benefits outside the town boundaries. This
was radically different from the present decisionmaking process, in
which benefits from municipal ambulance services were realized within
the town. In a sense, each town was giving up a little control over
the ambulance service provided in their town, and instead making decisions
with four other towns. Most critically, the regional ambulance service
demanded that the towns and the hospitals have similar value systems in
regard to the regional ambulance service. Thus, an important outcome
of the planning process had to be a conformity of consciousness about
what good EMS meant and how it could bedachieved'with' the regional service.
Implementation Results
The implementation of the regional plan was so embroiled in conflict
that, for the most part, few of the necessary changes to develop a
regional EMS system in Greater Lynn were effected. We found that the
hospital planning process had accomplished their plan, but that essen-
tially no change of behavior had resulted. The regional transportation
plan faced serious and intractable conflicts that thwarted its implementa-
tation. And finally, although the communications system was implemented,
it failed to alter EMS provision because it was to be used by
other EMS components that suffered severe internal conflicts. We found,
then, that attempts to create a regional EMS system which included all
these components failed to establish the necessary linkages between the
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planning stage and the implementation stage.
The Implementation of the Hospital Plan
The implementation of regional hospital plans encountered great
difficulties in resolving the institutional conflicts between hospitals
and hence fell short of accomplishing any substantive changes in the
patterns of care provided. The primary issues that arose in the imple-
mentation of the hospital plans were directly linked to the conflicts
that had characterized the planning process. First, the hospitals
felt threatened by the pending categorization legislation. We found
numerous manifestations of this threat in the reluctance of the hospitals
to share resources at the regional level because each hospital was in
competition for a share of the region's patient population. If the
categorization legislation was applied, they would also be competing
for the newly fixed hospital resources of the region. At the present
time, however, the only competition was for the patient population,
hence this surfaced as a major issue in preventing the implementation of
the hospital plans.
Another critical issue that the hospitals faced in following a
regional plan was the financial stability required to participate in a
regional system which potentially altered the internal economics of the
hospital. We found that efforts to reallocate hospital patients within
the region aTtered two critical elements of financial stability--the
types of patients (elective surgery or emergency) and their insurance
types. One requisite of hospital financial security is a favorable cash
flow that freed administrators from worrying about their daily operating
expenses. Disturbing this cash flow was a critical issue that also
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served to hamper efforts towards regional cooperation.
The last major issue in the implementation failure of the hospital
plans was the relationship that the hospital had with the community it
served. The administrators in particular were concerned that care
capability categorization would taint the image of their hospital in
the eyes of the community if a particular type of patient was rerouted
from one facility to another in the region. We found this to be another
manifestation of the regional competition among hospitals which was not
reflected in their pattern of frequent transfers to the Boston teaching
hospitals. The hospitals were much more hesitant to transfer patients
within the region than they were to transfer patients to Boston, because
they felt such intra regional transfers reflected more strongly on their
image in the region. Since there were no strong public education programs
going on in the region to reinforce the categorization efforts, we found
the hospitals unwilling to implement their categorization scheme.
The only incentive we found applicable to both planning and implementa-
tion in the hospital component was the pending categorization legislation
at the state level. The major impact of this incentive was to create a
threat to the hospitals because of the future implications of fixed
resources within the region and the implicit interhospital competition for
patients and resources such a constraint would produce. This resulted
in the hospitals resisting the implementation of any regional plans that
would limit their immediate and future capabilities to compete for all
types and categories of patients and resources available to the region.
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The Implementation of the Transportation Plan
The implementation of the regional transportation plan surfaced
many conflicts in an attempt to bring the municipal decisionmaking
process in accord with the medical decisionmaking process. We found the
major conflicts with the regional ambulance proposal were as much within
the individual towns as between them. The fact that the ambulance pro-
viders were excluded from the planning process was critical to both these
sets of conflicts.
The issues that arose within the towns did not address the regional
plan explicitly, but reflected the municipal reactions to the demands of
the Ambulance Law and the implications the Law had for altering present
service provision. The immediate concern that surfaced in the towns
was the cost of meeting the minimum standards of the law. We found the
concern for cost also arose as a governing criterion when the towns con-
sidered the regional ambulance plan. We found that the operating costs
of municipal (police) ambulance services were obscured by the dual-
purpose nature. This meant that the cost of the regional service could
only be compared to the apparently negligible costs of providing present
service. The municipal providers of the service also realized benefits
(overtime pay, public relations, etc.) which reduced their willingness
to relinquish the service within the towns.
These issues served to complicate the situation when the regional
plan was presented to the towns. Among the concerns that we discovered
in the implementation of the regional plan were the difficulty of
determining a cost sharing scheme and the difficulty of joining the
health decision processes with the public decision processes. As a
result, EMS priorities were dissipated in both the health system where
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there was competition among other health services and in the public
service system where the ambulance service had to compete for resources
with other municipal services.
We found that the health care interests were concerned with the
quality of care that was presented in the regional plan and the municipal
interests were concerned with the immediate cost of implementing the
system. The two value structures were rendered irreconciliable by pres-
sures from the present service providers who did not want to give up the
service. Therefore, the transportation plan never progressed beyond the
planning stage.
The incentives for change in the transportation component--the
Ambulance Law, the potential for reduced cost in the regional service,
and the potential for improved quality of care--proved to be inadequate
due to the institutional settings outlined above. Both the Ambulance Law
and the potential for reduced cost in the regional proposal failed as
incentives because they relied on comparisons with municipal services
which successfully hide their total operating costs. The Ambulance Law
was a more favorable incentive because it required an identifiable cost
increase in present services, simultaneously over the entire region. We
found that the operating costs of the regional service were not a strong
incentive because they were compared with the hidden present costs of the
municipal services. The other major incentive, quality of care, was gener-
ated totally within the health sector. We found that the municipal
services had developed their own notions of quality care, and so were
unresponsive to the health sector's more sophisticated ideas of quality.
Moreover, the municipal perspective was reinforced by good public rela-
tions which their ambulance services generated, and criticism of the
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quality of their services was a threat to these public relations. Thus,
municipal decisionmakers were unresponsive to both the cost-related and
quality care incentives to alter their ambulance services.
The Implementation of the Communications System
The implementation of the communications system was the most readily
accepted endeavor of the EMS planning activities which we observed. We
found the communication system to be malleable enough to attract the
interest of all the providers of EMS because they envisioned the capa-
bilities of the communications system as having a strong potential for
establishing a relationship between the hospital and prehospital systems.
In addition, the EMS interest groups saw the communications system as
the real power in the EMS system because it could effect patient alloca-
tion even without point of entry plans in the hospital or transportation
components. The cost of the equipment was not prohibitive, especially
because it was only a one-time cost that could be offset by private con-
tributions, and once in place the system maintenance costs were insig-
nificant. Therefore, we found the communications system was implemented
in our region.
We found, however, that although the communications system was easier
to implement than changes in existing services, it did not change the
behavior of EMS institutions that interacted with the new service. Hence,
although links were created between the hospital and prehospital compon-
ents, these links did not automatically result in interactions despite the
new capability. In particular, we found that interhospital problems
Prevented the reallocation of patients, an argument that had been offered
for the creation of the communications system. The weakness of existing
relationships between health and non-health systems decreased the willing-
ness of health providers in the hospitals to assist municipal ambulance
attendants in the field. Hence we found the communications system was
limited in its capability to link EMS components by the severe internal
conflicts within and among the components.
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CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSIONS
From our holistic analysis of regional EMS planning and implementa-
tion, we have attempted to pinpoint those elements of EMS that are
critical determinants of responsiveness to policy interventions. All
of the EMS components which we encountered were provided by institutions
whose major concerns extended far beyond the narrow confines of their
EMS elements. We concluded that this characteristic of the EMS
institutional setting gave rise to many of the complexities that were
encountered in the EMS Project's attempts to translate the EMSS Act to
the regional level because it placed EMS components in competition for
resources and attention with the other concerns of the institutions in
which they operated. This characteristic had four specific manifesta-
tions which we have identified as the fundamental descriptors of the
institutional nature of EMS provision in determining responses to policy
initiatives:
1. The institutions which contain EMS components possess
self-serving notions of the quality of the services provided by these
components. (Self-serving Attitudes)
2. The cost of providing these EMS components are absorbed
into the overall financial structure of the setting in which they are
provided. (Hidden Cost)
3. The EMS components serve functions within their institu-
tional settings which are more closely related to the goals of the insti-
tution than to the requirements of EMS provision. (Externalities)
4. Because of the secondary role of EMS components in
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shaping policy in their institutional settings, the institutions which
provide different EMS functions exhibit divergent values and policy
directions with respect to the provision of EMS. (Divergent Values)
These descriptors of EMS provision served as the main determinants
of the failure of the EMS Project to implement a regional EMS system in
Greater Lynn. When we examined the major elements of the EMSS Act
policy, these descriptors led us to our major conclusion -- the insti-
tutional nature of EMS provision is in fundamental opposition to the
concept of hospital-centered regional EMS systems. Moreover, we conclude
that this situation indicates two alternative policy directions -- the
pursuit of alternative institutional arrangements of EMS that are more
receptive to regionalization or an exploration of more refined measures
within the present institutional structure to achieve the quality and
efficiency goals of regionalization.
Although our conclusions appear to run counter to the present
federal commitment to "regional EMS systems," we feel that our case study
has revealed some of the generic institutional conflicts of regionalized
EMS systems. A further analysis of these conflicts, in the context of
the voluntary nature of the EMSS Act's incentive structure, reinforces
our conclusion that further strategies must be explored in the two policy
options described above. To substantiate our conclusions, we examined
the goals of regionalized EMS in terms of our policy response descriptors,
in order to explore the nature of alternative regional structures and
identify means of making the present local EMS structure receptive to the
policy implications of the federal concern for quality and efficiency.
The two steps necessary to achieve the goal of technological up-
grading in EMS encounters problems with the self-serving notions of the
quality of service in EMS institutions. First, the perception of need
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for upgrading must be generated, which requires an awareness of
deficiencies in the present capabilities of the service. Second,
resources must exist and be allocated to achieve that upgrading.
However, EMS institutions have self-serving attitudes about the quality
of EMS that they provide, and little awareness of this quality deficiency.
As a result, this situation, coupled with the fact that individual
providers have insufficient resources to devote to technology for
advanced EMS, mitigates against the achievement of the goals of techno-
logical upgrading.
The attempts to create linkages among EMS components confront many
aspects of the divergent values of EMS institutions, because these
linkages require that each component recognize its part in a coordinated
EMS system. In order to coordinate EMS components, it is also necessary
that the interfaces of the components be defined in the context of the
EMS system, rather than the context of the institutions who provide the
service. This linking process reveals problems with the fundamental
nature of EMS because, in general, the EMS components do not see them-
selves as part of a larger coordinated system. Several aspects of the
different value structure that governs EMS institutions are indicated in
the fact that EMS is embedded in other institutions who view EMS values
as subservient to the values of their institutions and the fact that EMS
exists in both the public and private sectors and is provided by health
and non-health institutions.
Finally, the federal goal of hospital-centered EMS systems requires
that the hospitals join together into a system where care capabilities
are specialized for each hospital. In order to make the specialized
care capabilities effective in providing appropriate care to patients,
the hospitals need the support of the prehospital services which also
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means that they need to integrate the prehospital services with the.hos-
pital services. This concept of hospital-centered EMS systems encounters
implementation problems because hospitals do not relate on the regional
level due to the externalities that each hospital gains from its EMS ser-
vices. In addition, the integration of prehospital and hospital services
is quite difficult to accomplish due to the divergent valaesamang the EMS
components.
The.comparison between the values of the hospital and prehospital
components yielded the greatest divergence in our case and resulted in
the most open and obvious conflicts that we observed. There are three
important aspects of the conflicts that are caused by this divergence.
First, because the prehospital components were provided in a public
sector institutional setting, they were placed in competition with
other public sector services for resources. Resolution of this public
sector competition hinged on public sector concerns that did not address
the medical nature of EMS. In contrast, the private sector hospital
component was placed in competition only with other aspects of the health
system. As a result, the public sector setting of prehospital EMS sub-
jected policy issues to the vagaries of the political process and added
an extra measure of conflict (in this case, political) to the decision-
making process. As our case clearly indicates, this conflict removed
policy questions from quality-related issues. Finally, the absence of
mechanisms for regional cost allocation in the public sector served as
an important inhibitor to the regionalization of public services. A
further comparison of values in the prehospital component yields the
observation that prehospital components are also in substantial conflict
with the quality and efficiency concerns of the EMSS Act. This leads to
our second major conclusion -- EMS should be totally provided within the
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health care system.
However, placing EMS entirely in the health care system also generates
problems when the service is provided at the regional level. In our case,
we found that, although the values of hospital people were more closely
related to quality and efficiency, the externalities generated by hospital
emergency services created profound difficulties in the process of setting
policy for interhospital cooperation. These difficulties were exacerbated
by the absence of a mechanism at the regional level to generate and exe-
cute policies designed to facilitate such cooperation. It is our conclu-
sion that a strong regional policy mechanism is necessary to resolve the
conflicts among hospitals that these externalities create.
In our case, we found that the tendency of EMS costs to remain hidden
in the institutional costs of the service providers was a substantial
roadblock to the creation of a regional system, especially in the prehos-
pital component. The increased economic efficiency could not be demon-
strated, a priori, to the present EMS decisionmakers. Moreover, the
change to a regional service was necessarily abrupt, requiring the simul-
taneous voluntary termination of existing service relationships as a pre-
requisite to the regional service. From these observations we conclude
that a voluntary change from local to regional services can only be ac-
complished by subsidizing the concurrent establishment and operation of
the new regional service. This approach places local services in compe-
tition with the new service on the regional level, which would simulta-
neously establish the service and demonstrate its comparative advantages,
both in terms of efficiency and quality, over the present services.
The final problematic aspect that we have identified in the nature
of existing EMS institutions is their tendency to adopt self-serving
definitions of the quality of services which they provide. In all aspects
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of the system, we found that these internally generated definitions of
quality were employed to justify resource allocations that, at best, met
patient needs in a minimal and inefficient fashion. This aspect of EMS
again indicates the need for developing a perspective of quality that
extends beyond the limits of single institutions. It adds another compo-
nent to the functions of the regional EMS mechanism that has been indi-
cated above. The mechanism must have the authority (generated consen-i
sually or otherwise) to make resource allocations that demonstrate and
contribute to the quality and efficiency of EMS provision, based on
assessments that aren't presently made at the local level.
We have explored what changes need to be made in the institutional
nature of EMS to make it receptive to the concept of hospital-centered
regionalization. In our conclusions, we also posited the policy direc-
tion which would explore more refined measures within the present insti-
tutional structure to achieve the same goals as regionalization. Essen-
tially, in following this alternative policy direction, we are trying to
assess the potential of the relationships in the present EMS institutional
structure to pursue the goals of quality and efficiency without having
to confront the problems of regionalization explicitly. Our case study
indicates that this policy option presents two ways to guide the behavior
of the present EMS institutional structure -- a reliance on consensual
agreement among the EMS providers and decisionmakers, or the use of
legislation to mandate the changes that are necessary to achieve the
quality and efficiency goals.
However, our case also revealed one fundamental characteristic of
trying to implement change in EMS -- decisions in EMS are strongly influ-
enced by externalities that are generated within the institutions that
provide EMS. This is further complicated in the local EMS structure by
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the fact that these institutions are in many different service systems
where the decision processes do not share common decisionmaking criteria.
An unavoidable implication of this characteristic is that policy must be
directed by forces external to the local EMS structure. This would indi-
cate that legislation in each component is necessary to gain conformance
in pursuing quality and efficiency goals among the institutional providers
of EMS.
Another option is to exploit the relationships between and within
the interest groups in the EMS structure to alter behavior toward the
desired goals of EMS. Our case revealed several relationships which in-
cluded advocates for the goals of quality and efficiency. In particular,
the emergency and specialist physicians served to generate enough aware-
ness and concern in the other interest groups in the planning process
that implementation efforts ensued from the regional plans. The emergency
physicians group also served to advocate change within the hospitals, and
made use of their perspectives on the staff of two hospitals to support
their efforts. We found the role of emergency physician specialists had
and exciting potential for the provision of emergency hospital care be-
cause it gave the physicians a comparative perspective on the care capa-
bilities of the hospitals that contributed to the decrease of the present
self-serving attitudes about the quality of care provided in the EMS sys-
tem. We believe that encouraging the practice of these regional emergency
physician proups would be a promising strategy for creating advocates to
motivate change in the hospital and prehospital components of EMS.
We have thus outlined two approaches to incorporating the values of
quality and efficiency into the provision of EMS. Each of these approaches
follows a particular pattern of intervention in the present system. We
have found that pursuing quality and efficiency through regionalization
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requires that present EMS decision processes be replaced by a regional
mechanism for allocating resources. We have also outlined several ap-
proaches to changing the values that control the present decision processes.
The development of these approaches reflects our conclusion that a new
perspective must be added to EMS decision processes that allows the com-
parative assessment of the roles of individual elements in the total sys-
tem of service provision.
There are two important sets of hypotheses that we have generated
through our holistic exploration of regional EMS planning and implemen-
tation. One set of hypotheses addresses the concept of regionalization
of EMS and its overriding implications for the entire health care system.
In our research we have found inextricable ties that relate EMS to the
provision of many other aspects of health care provision, in particular
those services based in the hospital component. It is clear that a sub-
stantial impact on EMS resource allocation is closely tied to and faces
many of the same problems of the reorganization of the health care system.
From these considerations we concluded that the potential for regionalized
EMS and reorganized health care services relies upon the creation of a
regional institutional base in the health care system that would facili-
tate the allocation of resources to meet the needs of patients in the
system.
Finally, the processes that we have explored for regionalizing EMS
encompasses the problems encountered in creating a service system from
components with diverse institutional bases as well as implementing a
regional scale of service. We found the problems involved in achieving
these two policies require remarkably similar intervention strategies.
Both policies will fail unless narrow institutional interests are
made to confront the role of their services in the context of the entire
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service system. We have witnessed, in our case study, great reluctancy
on the part of EMS institutions to confront their roles as cooperative
providers in an EMS system, and the strategies that we have explored to
overcome these hesitancies are addressed equally well to the problems
of regionalization and of creation of new service systems. In both of
these areas, the need for further research is evident in exploring the
problems of mixing public and private provision of services within a
service system, developing the particulars of regional mechanisms, exam-
ining the implications of establishing competing service systems, and,
especially, defining the role of governmental and regulatory in insuring
the proper allocation of resources to meet health care needs.
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